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PREFACE
I offer my thanks to several friends who have been kind enough to read the proofs of this 
book, and to send me corrections and suggestions; among whom I will mention Professors 
John Adams and J.H. Muirhead, Dr. A. Wolf, and Messrs. W.H. Winch, Sidney Webb, L. 
Pearsall Smith, and A.E. Zimmern. It is, for their sake, rather more necessary than usual for 
me to add that some statements still remain in the text which one or more of them would have 
desired to see omitted or differently expressed.
I have attempted in the footnotes to indicate those writers whose books I have used. But I 
should like to record here my special obligation to Professor William James's Principles of 
Psychology, which gave me, a good many years ago, the conscious desire to think 
psychologically about my work as politician and teacher.
I have been sometimes asked to recommend a list of books on the psychology of politics. I 
believe that at the present stage of the science, a politician will gain more from reading, in the 
light of his own experience, those treatises on psychology which have been written without 
special reference to politics, than by beginning with the literature of applied political 
psychology. But readers who are not politicians will find particular points dealt with in the 
works of the late Monsieur G. Tarde, especially L'Opinion et la Foule and Les Lois de 
l'Imitation and in the books quoted in the course of an interesting article on 'Herd Instinct,' by 
Mr. W. Trotter in the Sociological Review for July 1908. The political psychology of the 
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poorer inhabitants of a great city is considered from an individual and fascinating point of 
view by Miss Jane Addams (of Chicago) in her Democracy and Social Ethics.
GRAHAM WALLAS.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
I have made hardly any changes in the book as it first appeared, beyond the correction of a few 
verbal slips. The important political developments which have occurred during the last 
eighteen months in the English Parliament, in Turkey, Persia, and India, and in Germany, have 
not altered my conclusions as to the psychological problems raised by modern forms of 
government; and it would involve an impossible and undesirable amount of rewriting to 
substitute 'up-to-date' illustrations for those which I drew from the current events of 1907 and 
1908. I should desire to add to the books recommended above Mr. W. M'Dougall's Social 
Psychology, with special reference to his analysis of Instinct.
G.W.
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, CLARE MARKET, 
LONDON, W.C.,
30th December 1909.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION (1920)
This edition is, like the second edition (1910), a reprint, with a few verbal corrections, of the 
first edition (1908). I tried in 1908 to make two main points clear. My first point was the 
danger, for all human activities, but especially for the working of democracy, of the 
'intellectualist' assumption, 'that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by 
which a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which 
that end can be attained' (p. 21). My second point was the need of substituting for that 
assumption a conscious and systematic effort of thought. 'The whole progress,' I argued, 'of 
human civilisation beyond its earliest stages, has been made possible by the invention of 
methods of thought which enable us to interpret and forecast the working of nature more 
successfully than we could, if we merely followed the line of least resistance in the use of our 
minds' (p. 114).
In 1920 insistence on my first point is not so necessary as it was in 1908. The assumption that 
men are automatically guided by 'enlightened self-interest' has been discredited by the facts of 
the war and the peace, the success of an anti-parliamentary and anti-intellectualist revolution 
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in Russia, the British election of 1918, the French election of 1919, the confusion of politics in 
America, the breakdown of political machinery in Central Europe, and the general 
unhappiness which has resulted from four years of the most intense and heroic effort that the 
human race has ever made. One only needs to compare the disillusioned realism of our present 
war and post-war pictures and poems with the nineteenth-century war pictures at Versailles 
and Berlin, and the war poems of Campbell, and Berenger, and Tennyson, to realise how far 
we now are from exaggerating human rationality.
It is my second point, which, in the world as the war has left it, is most important. There is no 
longer much danger that we shall assume that man always and automatically thinks of ends 
and calculates means. The danger is that we may be too tired or too hopeless to undertake the 
conscious effort by which alone we can think of ends and calculate means.
The great mechanical inventions of the nineteenth century have given us an opportunity of 
choosing for ourselves our way of living such as men have never had before. Up to our own 
time the vast majority of mankind have had enough to do to keep themselves alive, and to 
satisfy the blind instinct which impels them to hand on life to another generation. An effective 
choice has only been given to a tiny class of hereditary property owners, or a few organisers of 
other men's labour. Even when, as in ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia, nature offered whole 
populations three hundred free days in the year if they would devote two months to ploughing 
and harvest, all but a fraction still spent themselves in unwilling toil, building tombs or 
palaces, or equipping armies, for a native monarch or a foreign conqueror. The monarch could 
choose his life, but his choice was poor enough. 'There is,' says Aristotle, 'a way of living so 
brutish that it is only worth notice because many of those who can live any life they like make 
no better choice than did Sardanapalus.'
The Greek thinkers started modern civilisation, because they insisted that the trading 
populations of their walled cities should force themselves to think out an answer to the 
question, what kind of life is good. 'The origin of the city-state,' says Aristotle, 'is that it 
enables us to live; its justification is that it enables us to live well.'
Before the war, there were in London and New York, and Berlin, thousands of rich men and 
women as free to choose their way of life as was Sardanapalus, and as dissatisfied with their 
own choice. Many of the sons and daughters of the owners of railways and coal mines and 
rubber plantations were 'fed up' with motoring or bridge, or even with the hunting and fishing 
which meant a frank resumption of palaeolithic life without the spur of palaeolithic hunger. 
But my own work brought me into contact with an unprivileged class, whose degree of 
freedom was the special product of modern industrial civilisation, and on whose use of their 
freedom the future of civilisation may depend. A clever young mechanic, at the age when the 
Wanderjahre of the medieval craftsman used to begin, would come home after tending a 
'speeded up' machine from 8 A.M., with an hour's interval, till 5 P.M. At 6 P.M. he had 
finished his tea in the crowded living-room of his mother's house, and was 'free' to do what he 
liked. That evening, perhaps, his whole being tingled with half-conscious desires for love, and 
adventure, and knowledge, and achievement. On another day he might have gone to a billiard 
match at his club, or have hung round the corner for a girl who smiled at him as he left the 
factory, or might have sat on his bed and ground at a chapter of Marx or Hobson. But this 
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evening he saw his life as a whole. The way of living that had been implied in the religious 
lessons at school seemed strangely irrelevant; but still he felt humble, and kind, and anxious 
for guidance. Should he aim at marriage, and if so should he have children at once or at all? If 
he did not marry, could he avoid self-contempt and disease? Should he face the life of a 
socialist organiser, with its strain and uncertainty, and the continual possibility of 
disillusionment? Should he fill up every evening with technical classes, and postpone his 
ideals until he had become rich? And if he became rich what should he do with his money? 
Meanwhile, there was the urgent impulse to walk and think; but where should he walk to, and 
with whom?
The young schoolmistress, in her bed-sitting-room a few streets off, was in no better case. She 
and a friend sat late last night, agreeing that the life they were living was no real life at all; but 
what was the alternative? Had the 'home duties' to which her High Church sister devoted 
herself with devastating self-sacrifice any more meaning? Ought she, with her eyes open, and 
without much hope of spontaneous love, to enter into the childless 'modern' marriage which 
alone seemed possible for her? Ought she to spend herself in a reckless campaign for the 
suffrage? Meanwhile, she had had her tea, her eyes were too tired to read, and what on earth 
should she do till bedtime?
Such moments of clear self-questioning were of course rare, but the nerve-fretting problems 
always existed. Industrial civilisation had given the growing and working generation a certain 
amount of leisure, and education enough to conceive of a choice in the use of that leisure; but 
had offered them no guidance in making their choice.
We are faced, as I write, with the hideous danger that fighting may blaze up again throughout 
the whole Eurasian continent, and that the young men and girls of Europe may have no more 
choice in the way they spend their time than they had from 1914 to 1918 or the serfs of 
Pharaoh had in ancient Egypt. But if that immediate danger is avoided, I dream that in Europe 
and in America a conscious and systematic discussion by the young thinkers of our time of the 
conditions of a good life for an unprivileged population may be one of the results of the new 
vision of human nature and human possibilities which modern science and modern industry 
have forced upon us.
Within each nation, industrial organisation may cease to be a confused and wasteful struggle 
of interests, if it is consciously related to a chosen way of life for which it offers to every 
worker the material means. International relations may cease to consist of a constant plotting 
of evil by each nation for its neighbours, if ever the youth of all nations know that French, and 
British, and Germans, and Russians, and Chinese, and Americans, are taking a conscious part 




file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (5 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS
(Introduction, page 1)
The study of politics is now in an unsatisfactory position. Throughout Europe and America, 
representative democracy is generally accepted as the best form of government; but those who 
have had most experience of its actual working are often disappointed and apprehensive. 
Democracy has not been extended to non-European races, and during the last few years many 
democratic movements have failed.
This dissatisfaction has led to much study of political institutions; but little attention has been 
recently given in works on politics to the facts of human nature. Political science in the past 
was mainly based, on conceptions of human nature, but the discredit of the dogmatic political 
writers of the early nineteenth century has made modern students of politics over-anxious to 
avoid anything which recalls their methods. That advance therefore of psychology which has 
transformed pedagogy and criminology has left politics largely unchanged.
The neglect of the study of human nature is likely, however, to prove only a temporary phase 
of political thought, and there are already signs that it, is coming to an end.
(PART I.—Chapter I.—Impulse and Instinct in Politics, page 21)
Any examination of human nature in politics must begin with an attempt to overcome that 
'intellectualism' which results both from the traditions of political science and from the mental 
habits of ordinary men.
Political impulses are not mere intellectual inferences from calculations of means and ends; 
but tendencies prior to, though modified by, the thought and experience of individual human 
beings. This may be seen if we watch the action in politics of such impulses as personal 
affection, fear, ridicule, the desire of property, etc.
All our impulses and instincts are greatly increased in their immediate effectiveness if they are 
'pure,' and in their more permanent results if they are 'first hand' and are connected with the 
earlier stages of our evolution. In modern politics the emotional stimulus which reaches us 
through the newspapers is generally 'pure,' but 'second hand,' and therefore is both facile and 
transient.
The frequent repetition of an emotion or impulse is often distressing. Politicians, like 
advertisers, must allow for this fact, which again is connected with that combination of the 
need of privacy with intolerance of solitude to which we have to adjust our social 
arrangements.
Political emotions are sometimes pathologically intensified when experienced simultaneously 
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by large numbers of human beings in physical association, but the conditions of political life in 
England do not often produce this phenomenon.
The future of international politics largely depends on the question whether we have a specific 
instinct of hatred for human beings of a different racial type from ourselves. The point is not 
yet settled, but many facts which are often explained as the result of such an instinct seem to 
be due to other and more general instincts modified by association.
(Chapter II.—Political Entities, page 59)
Political acts and impulses are the result of the contact between human nature and its 
environment. During the period studied by the politician, human nature has changed very little, 
but political environment has changed with ever-increasing rapidity.
Those facts of our environment which stimulate impulse and action reach us through our 
senses, and are selected from the mass of our sensations and memories by our instinctive or 
acquired knowledge of their significance. In politics the things recognised are, for the most 
part, made by man himself, and our knowledge of their significance is not instinctive but 
acquired.
Recognition tends to attach itself to symbols, which take the place of more complex sensations 
and memories. Some of the most difficult problems in politics result from the relation between 
the conscious use in reasoning of the symbols called words, and their more or less automatic 
and unconscious effect in stimulating emotion and action. A political symbol whose 
significance has once been established by association, may go through a psychological 
development of its own, apart from the history of the facts which were originally symbolised 
by it. This may be seen in the case of the names and emblems of nations and parties; and still 
more clearly in the history of those commercial entities—'teas' or 'soaps'—which are already 
made current by advertisement before any objects to be symbolised by them have been made 
or chosen. Ethical difficulties are often created by the relation between the quickly changing 
opinions of any individual politician and such slowly changing entities as his reputation, his 
party name, or the traditional personality of a newspaper which he may control.
(Chapter III.—Non-Rational Inference in Politics, page 98)
Intellectualist political thinkers often assume, not only that political action is necessarily the 
result of inferences as to means and ends, but that all inferences are of the same 'rational' type.
It is difficult to distinguish sharply between rational and non-rational inferences in the stream 
of mental experience, but it is clear that many of the half-conscious processes by which men 
form their political opinions are non-rational. We can generally trust non-rational inferences in 
ordinary life because they do not give rise to conscious opinions until they have been 
strengthened by a large number of undesigned coincidences. But conjurers and others who 
study our non-rational mental processes can so play upon them as to make us form absurd 
beliefs. The empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate 
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exploitation of subconscious non-rational inference. The process of inference may go on 
beyond the point desired by the politician who started it, and is as likely to take place in the 
mind of a passive newspaper-reader as among the members of the most excited crowd.
(Chapter IV.—The Material of Political Reasoning, page 114)
But men can and do reason, though reasoning is only one of their mental processes. The rules 
for valid reasoning laid down by the Greeks were intended primarily for use in politics, but in 
politics reasoning has in fact proved to be more difficult and less successful than in the 
physical sciences. The chief cause of this is to be found in the character of its material. We 
have to select or create entities to reason about, just as we select or create entities to stimulate 
our impulses and non-rational inferences. In the physical sciences these selected entities are of 
two types, either concrete things made exactly alike, or abstracted qualities in respect of which 
things otherwise unlike can be exactly compared. In politics, entities of the first type cannot be 
created, and political philosophers have constantly sought for some simple entity of the second 
type, some fact or quality, which may serve as an exact 'standard' for political calculation. This 
search has hitherto been unsuccessful, and the analogy of the biological sciences suggests that 
politicians are most likely to acquire the power of valid reasoning when they, like doctors, 
avoid the over-simplification of their material, and aim at using in their reasoning as many 
facts as possible about the human type, its individual variations, and its environment. 
Biologists have shown that large numbers of facts as to individual variations within any type 
can be remembered if they are arranged as continuous curves rather than as uniform rules or 
arbitrary exceptions. On the other hand, any attempt to arrange the facts of environment with 
the same approach to continuity as is possible with the facts of human nature is likely to result 
in error. The study of history cannot be assimilated to that of biology.
(Chapter V.—The Method of Political Reasoning, page 138)
The method of political reasoning has shared the traditional over-simplification of its subject-
matter.
In Economics, where both method and subject-matter were originally still more completely 
simplified, 'quantitative' methods have since Jevons's time tended to take the place of 
'qualitative'. How far is a similar change possible in politics?
Some political questions can obviously be argued quantitatively. Others are less obviously 
quantitative. But even on the most complex political issues experienced and responsible 
statesmen do in fact think quantitatively, although the methods by which they reach their 
results are often unconscious.
When, however, all politicians start with intellectualist assumptions, though some half-
consciously acquire quantitative habits of thought, many desert politics altogether from 
disillusionment and disgust. What is wanted in the training of a statesman is the fully 
conscious formulation and acceptance of those methods which will not have to be unlearned.
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Such a conscious change is already taking place in the work of Royal Commissions, 
International Congresses, and other bodies and persons who have to arrange and draw 
conclusions from large masses of specially collected evidence. Their methods and vocabulary, 
even when not numerical, are nowadays in large part quantitative.
In parliamentary oratory, however, the old tradition of over-simplification is apt to persist.
(PART II.—Chapter I.—Political Morality, page 167)
But in what ways can such changes in political science affect the actual trend of political 
forces?
In the first place, the abandonment by political thinkers and writers of the intellectualist 
conception of politics will sooner or later influence the moral judgments of the working 
politician. A young candidate will begin with a new conception of his moral relation to those 
whose will and opinions he is attempting to influence. He will start, in that respect, from a 
position hitherto confined to statesmen who have been made cynical by experience.
If that were the only result of our new knowledge, political morality might be changed for the 
worse. But the change will go deeper. When men become conscious of psychological 
processes of which they have been unconscious or half-conscious, not only are they put on 
their guard against the exploitation of those processes in themselves by others, but they 
become better able to control them from within.
If, however, a conscious moral purpose is to be strong enough to overcome, as a political 
force, the advancing art of political exploitation, the conception of control from within must be 
formed into an ideal entity which, like 'Science,' can appeal to popular imagination, and be 
spread by an organised system of education. The difficulties in this are great (owing in part to 
our ignorance of the varied reactions of self-consciousness on instinct), but a wide extension 
of the idea of causation is not inconsistent with an increased intensity of moral passion.
(Chapter II.—Representative Government, page 199)
The changes now going on in our conception of the psychological basis of politics will also re-
open the discussion of representative democracy.
Some of the old arguments in that discussion will no longer be accepted as valid, and it is 
probable that many political thinkers (especially among those who have been educated in the 
natural sciences) will return to Plato's proposal of a despotic government carried on by a 
selected and trained class, who live apart from the 'ostensible world'; though English 
experience in India indicates that even the most carefully selected official must still live in the 
'ostensible world,' and that the argument that good government requires the consent of the 
governed does not depend for its validity upon its original intellectualist associations.
Our new way of thinking about politics will, however, certainly change the form, not only of 
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the argument for consent, but also of the institutions by which consent is expressed. An 
election (like a jury-trial) will be, and is already beginning to be, looked upon rather as a 
process by which right decisions are formed under right conditions, than as a mechanical 
expedient by which decisions already formed are ascertained.
Proposals for electoral reform which seem to continue the old intellectualist tradition are still 
brought forward, and new difficulties in the working of representative government will arise 
from the wider extension of political power. But that conception of representation may spread 
which desires both to increase the knowledge and public spirit of the voter and to provide that 
no strain is put upon him greater than he can bear.
(Chapter III.—Official Thought, page 241)
A quantitative examination of the political force created by popular election shows the 
importance of the work of non-elected officials in any effective scheme of democracy.
What should be the relation between these officials and the elected representatives? On this 
point English opinion already shows a marked reaction from the intellectualist conception of 
representative government. We accept the fact that most state officials are appointed by a 
system uncontrolled either by individual members of parliament or by parliament as a whole, 
that they hold office during good behaviour, and that they are our main source of information 
as to some of the most difficult points on which we form political judgments. It is largely an 
accident that the same system has not been introduced into our local government.
But such a half-conscious acceptance of a partially independent Civil Service as an existing 
fact is not enough. We must set ourselves to realise clearly what we intend our officials to do, 
and to consider how far our present modes of appointment, and especially our present methods 
of organising official work, provide the most effective means for carrying out that intention.
(Chapter IV.—Nationality and Humanity, page 269)
What influence will the new tendencies in political thought have on the emotional and 
intellectual conditions of political solidarity?
In the old city-states, where the area of government corresponded to the actual range of human 
vision and memory, a kind of local emotion could be developed which is now impossible in a 
'delocalised' population. The solidarity of a modern state must therefore depend on facts not of 
observation but of imagination.
The makers of the existing European national states, Mazzini and Bismarck, held that the 
possible extent of a state depended on national homogeneity, i.e. on the possibility that every 
individual member of a state should believe that all the others were like himself. Bismarck 
thought that the degree of actual homogeneity which was a necessary basis for this belief 
could be made by 'blood and iron'; Mazzini thought that mankind was already divided into 
homogeneous groups whose limits should be followed in the reconstruction of Europe. Both 
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were convinced that the emotion of political solidarity was impossible between individuals of 
consciously different national types.
During the last quarter of a century this conception of the world as composed of a mosaic of 
homogeneous nations has been made more difficult (a) by the continued existence and even 
growth of separate national feelings within modern states, and (b) by the fact that the European 
and non-European races have entered into closer political relationships. The attempt, therefore, 
to transfer the traditions of national homogeneity and solidarity either to the inhabitants of a 
modern world-empire as a whole, or to the members of the dominant race in it, disguises the 
real facts and adds to the danger of war.
Can we, however, acquire a political emotion based, not upon a belief in the likeness of 
individual human beings, but upon the recognition of their unlikeness? Darwin's proof of the 
relation between individual and racial variation might have produced such an emotion if it had 
not been accompanied by the conception of the 'struggle for life' as a moral duty. As it is, inter-
racial and even inter-imperial wars can be represented as necessary stages in the progress of 
the species. But present-day biologists tell us that the improvement of any one race will come 
most effectively from the conscious co-operation, and not from the blind conflict of 
individuals; and it may be found that the improvement of the whole species will also come 
rather from a conscious world-purpose based upon a recognition of the value of racial as well 
as individual variety, than from mere fighting.
HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
The study of politics is just now (1908) in a curiously unsatisfactory position.
At first sight the main controversy as to the best form of government appears to have been 
finally settled in favour of representative democracy. Forty years ago it could still be argued 
that to base the sovereignty of a great modern nation upon a widely extended popular vote 
was, in Europe at least, an experiment which had never been successfully tried. England, 
indeed, by the 'leap in the dark' of 1867, became for the moment the only large European State 
whose government was democratic and representative. But to-day a parliamentary republic 
based upon universal suffrage exists in France without serious opposition or protest. Italy 
enjoys an apparently stable constitutional monarchy. Universal suffrage has just been enacted 
in Austria. Even the German Emperor after the election of 1907 spoke of himself rather as the 
successful leader of a popular electoral campaign than as the inheritor of a divine right. The 
vast majority of the Russian nation passionately desires a sovereign parliament, and a 
reactionary Duma finds itself steadily pushed by circumstances towards that position. The 
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most ultramontane Roman Catholics demand temporal power for the Pope, no longer as an 
ideal system of world government, but as an expedient for securing in a few square miles of 
Italian territory liberty of action for the directors of a church almost all of whose members will 
remain voting citizens of constitutional States. None of the proposals for a non-representative 
democracy which were associated with the communist and anarchist movements of the 
nineteenth century have been at all widely accepted, or have presented themselves as a definite 
constructive scheme; and almost all those who now hope for a social change by which the 
results of modern scientific industry shall be more evenly distributed put their trust in the 
electoral activity of the working classes.
And yet, in the very nations which have most whole-heartedly accepted representative 
democracy, politicians and political students seem puzzled and disappointed by their 
experience of it. The United States of America have made in this respect by far the longest and 
most continuous experiment. Their constitution has lasted for a century and a quarter, and, in 
spite of controversy and even war arising from opposing interpretations of its details, its 
principles have been, and still are, practically unchallenged. But, as far as an English visitor 
can judge, no American thinks with satisfaction of the electoral 'machine' whose power alike 
in Federal, State, and Municipal politics is still increasing.
In England not only has our experience of representative democracy been much shorter than 
that of America, but our political traditions have tended to delay the full acceptance of the 
democratic idea even in the working of democratic institutions. Yet, allowing for differences 
of degree and circumstance, one finds in England among the most loyal democrats, if they 
have been brought into close contact with the details of electoral organisation, something of 
the same disappointment which has become more articulate in America. I have helped to fight 
a good many parliamentary contests, and have myself been a candidate in a series of five 
London municipal elections. In my last election I noticed that two of my canvassers, when 
talking over the day's work, used independently the phrase, 'It is a queer business.' I have heard 
much the same words used in England by those professional political agents whose efficiency 
depends on their seeing electoral facts without illusion. I have no first-hand knowledge of 
German or Italian electioneering, but when a year ago I talked with my hosts of the Paris 
Municipal Council, I seemed to detect in some of them indications of good-humoured 
disillusionment with regard to the working of a democratic electoral system.
In England and America one has, further, the feeling that it is the growing, and not the 
decaying, forces of society which create the most disquieting problems. In America the 
'machine' takes its worst form in those great new cities whose population and wealth and 
energy represent the goal towards which the rest of American civilisation is apparently 
tending. In England, to any one who looks forward, the rampant bribery of the old fishing-
ports, or the traditional and respectable corruption of the cathedral cities, seem comparatively 
small and manageable evils. The more serious grounds for apprehension come from the newest 
inventions of wealth and enterprise, the up-to-date newspapers, the power and skill of the men 
who direct huge aggregations of industrial capital, the organised political passions of working 
men who have passed through the standards of the elementary schools, and who live in 
hundreds of square miles of new, healthy, indistinguishable suburban streets. Every few years 
some invention in political method is made, and if it succeeds both parties adopt it. In politics, 
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as in football, the tactics which prevail are not those which the makers of the rules intended, 
but those by which the players find that they can win, and men feel vaguely that the expedients 
by which their party is most likely to win may turn out not to be those by which a State is best 
governed.
More significant still is the fear, often expressed as new questions force themselves into 
politics, that the existing electoral system will not bear the strain of an intensified social 
conflict. Many of the arguments used in the discussion of the tariff question in England, or of 
the concentration of capital in America, or of social—democracy in Germany, imply this. 
Popular election, it is said, may work fairly well as long as those questions are not raised 
which cause the holders of wealth and industrial power to make full use of their opportunities. 
But if the rich people in any modern state thought it worth their while, in order to secure a 
tariff, or legalise a trust, or oppose a confiscatory tax, to subscribe a third of their income to a 
political fund, no Corrupt Practices Act yet invented would prevent them from spending it. If 
they did so, there is so much skill to be bought, and the art of using skill for the production of 
emotion and opinion has so advanced, that the whole condition of political contests would be 
changed for the future. No existing party, unless it enormously increased its own fund or 
discovered some other new source of political strength, would have any chance of permanent 
success.
The appeal, however, in the name of electoral purity, to protectionists, trust-promoters, and 
socialists that they should drop their various movements and so confine politics to less exciting 
questions, falls, naturally enough, on deaf ears.
The proposal, again, to extend the franchise to women is met by that sort of hesitation and 
evasion which is characteristic of politicians who are not sure of their intellectual ground. A 
candidate who has just been speaking on the principles of democracy finds it, when he is 
heckled, very difficult to frame an answer which would justify the continued exclusion of 
women from the franchise. Accordingly a large majority of the successful candidates from 
both the main parties at the general election of 1906 pledged themselves to support female 
suffrage. But, as I write, many, perhaps the majority, of those who gave that pledge seem to be 
trying to avoid the necessity of carrying it out. There is no reason to suppose that they are men 
of exceptionally dishonest character, and their fear of the possible effect of a final decision is 
apparently genuine. They are aware that certain differences exist between men and women, 
though they do not know what those differences are, nor in what way they are relevant to the 
question of the franchise. But they are even less steadfast in their doubts than in their pledges, 
and the question will, in the comparatively near future, probably be settled by importunity on 
the one side and mere drifting on the other.
This half conscious feeling of unsettlement on matters which in our explicit political 
arguments we treat as settled, is increased by the growing urgency of the problem of race. The 
fight for democracy in Europe and America during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries was carried on by men who were thinking only of the European races. But, during 
the extension of democracy after 1870, almost all the Great Powers were engaged in acquiring 
tropical dependencies, and improvements in the means of communication were bringing all the 
races of the world into close contact. The ordinary man now finds that the sovereign vote has 
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(with exceptions numerically insignificant) been in fact confined to nations of European 
origin. But there is nothing in the form or history of the representative principle which seems 
to justify this, or to suggest any alternative for the vote as a basis of government. Nor can he 
draw any intelligible and consistent conclusion from the practice of democratic States in 
giving or refusing the vote to their non-European subjects. The United States, for instance, 
have silently and almost unanimously dropped the experiment of negro suffrage. In that case, 
owing to the wide intellectual gulf between the West African negro and the white man from 
North-West Europe, the problem was comparatively simple; but no serious attempt has yet 
been made at a new solution of it, and the Americans have been obviously puzzled in dealing 
with the more subtle racial questions created by the immigration of Chinese and Japanese and 
Slavs, or by the government of the mixed populations in the Philippines.
England and her colonies show a like uncertainty in the presence of the political questions 
raised both by the migration of non-white races and by the acquisition of tropical 
dependencies. Even when we discuss the political future of independent Asiatic States we are 
not clear whether the principle, for instance, of 'no taxation without representation' should be 
treated as applicable to them. Our own position as an Asiatic power depends very largely on 
the development of China and Persia, which are inhabited by races who may claim, in some 
respects, to be our intellectual superiors. When they adopt our systems of engineering, 
mechanics, or armament we have no doubt that they are doing a good thing for themselves, 
even though we may fear their commercial or military rivalry. But no follower of Bentham is 
now eager to export for general Asiatic use our latest inventions in political machinery. We 
hear that the Persians have established a parliament, and watch the development of their 
experiment with a complete suspension of judgment as to its probable result. We have helped 
the Japanese to preserve their independence as a constitutional nation, and most Englishmen 
vaguely sympathise with the desire of the Chinese progressives both for national independence 
and internal reform. Few of us, however, would be willing to give any definite advice to an 
individual Chinaman who asked whether he ought to throw himself into a movement for a 
representative parliament on European lines.
Within our own Empire this uncertainty as to the limitations of our political principles may at 
any moment produce actual disaster. In Africa, for instance, the political relationship between 
the European inhabitants of our territories and the non-European majority of Kaffirs, Negroes, 
Hindoos, Copts, or Arabs is regulated on entirely different lines in Natal, Basutoland, Egypt, 
or East Africa. In each case the constitutional difference is due not so much to the character of 
the local problem as to historical accident, and trouble may break out anywhere and at any 
time, either from the aggression of the Europeans upon the rights reserved by the Home 
Government to the non-Europeans, or from a revolt of the non-Europeans themselves. Blacks 
and whites are equally irritated by the knowledge that there is one law in Nairobi and another 
in Durban.
This position is, of course, most dangerous in the case of India. For two or three generations 
the ordinary English Liberal postponed any decision on Indian politics, because he believed 
that we were educating the inhabitants for self-government, and that in due time they would all 
have a vote for an Indian parliament. Now he is becoming aware that there are many races in 
India, and that some of the most important differences between those races among themselves, 
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and between any of them and ourselves, are not such as can be obliterated by education. He is 
told by men whom he respects that this fact makes it certain that the representative system 
which is suitable for England will never be suitable for India, and therefore he remains 
uneasily responsible for the permanent autocratic government of three hundred million people, 
remembering from time to time that some of those people or their neighbours may have much 
more definite political ideas than his own, and that he ultimately may have to fight for a power 
which he hardly desires to retain.
Meanwhile, the existence of the Indian problem loosens half-consciously his grip upon 
democratic principle in matters nearer home. Newspapers and magazines and steamships are 
constantly making India more real to him, and the conviction of a Liberal that Polish 
immigrants or London 'latch-key' lodgers ought to have a vote is less decided than it would 
have been if he had not acquiesced in the decision that Rajputs, and Bengalis, and Parsees 
should be refused it.
Practical politicians cannot, it is true, be expected to stop in the middle of a campaign merely 
because they have an uncomfortable feeling that the rules of the game require re-stating and 
possibly re-casting. But the winning or losing of elections does not exhaust the whole political 
duty of a nation, and perhaps there never has been a time in which the disinterested 
examination of political principles has been more urgently required. Hitherto the main 
stimulus to political speculation has been provided by wars and revolutions, by the fight of the 
Greek States against the Persians, and their disastrous struggle for supremacy among 
themselves, or by the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the 
American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century. The outstanding social events in 
Europe in our own time have, however, been so far the failures rather than the successes of 
great movements; the apparent wasting of devotion and courage in Russia, owing to the deep-
seated intellectual divisions among the reformers, and the military advantage which modern 
weapons and means of communication give to any government however tyrannous and 
corrupt; the baffling of the German social-democrats by the forces of religion and patriotism 
and by the infertility of their own creed; the weakness of the successive waves of American 
Democracy when faced by the political power of capital.
But failure and bewilderment may present as stern a demand for thought as the most 
successful revolution, and, in many respects, that demand is now being well answered. 
Political experience is recorded and examined with a thoroughness hitherto unknown. The 
history of political action in the past, instead of being left to isolated scholars, has become the 
subject of organised and minutely subdivided labour. The new political developments of the 
present, Australian Federation, the Referendum in Switzerland, German Public Finance, the 
Party system in England and America, and innumerable others, are constantly recorded, 
discussed and compared in the monographs and technical magazines which circulate through 
all the universities of the globe.
The only form of study which a political thinker of one or two hundred years ago would now 
note as missing is any attempt to deal with politics in its relation to the nature of man. The 
thinkers of the past, from Plato to Bentham and Mill, had each his own view of human nature, 
and they made those views the basis of their speculations on government. But no modern 
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treatise on political science, whether dealing with institutions or finance, now begins with 
anything corresponding to the opening words of Bentham's Principles of Morals and 
Legislation—'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain 
and pleasure'; or to the 'first general proposition' of Nassau Senior's Political Economy, 'Every 
man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible.'[1] In most cases one 
cannot even discover whether the writer is conscious of possessing any conception of human 
nature at all.
It is easy to understand how this has come about. Political science is just beginning to regain 
some measure of authority after the acknowledged failure of its confident professions during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Bentham's Utilitarianism, after superseding both 
Natural Right and the blind tradition of the lawyers, and serving as the basis of innumerable 
legal and constitutional reforms throughout Europe, was killed by the unanswerable refusal of 
the plain man to believe that ideas of pleasure and pain are the only sources of human motive. 
The 'classical' political economy of the universities and the newspapers, the political economy 
of MacCulloch and Senior and Archbishop Whately, was even more unfortunate in its attempt 
to deduce a whole industrial polity from a 'few simple principles' of human nature. It became 
identified with the shallow dogmatism by which well-to-do people in the first half of Queen 
Victoria's reign tried to convince working men that any change in the distribution of the good 
things of life was 'scientifically impossible.' Marx and Buskin and Carlyle were masters of 
sarcasm, and the process is not yet forgotten by which they slowly compelled even the 
newspapers to abandon the 'laws of political economy' which from 1815 to 1870 stood, like 
gigantic stuffed policemen, on guard over rent and profits.
When the struggle against 'Political Economy' was at its height, Darwin's Origin of Species 
revealed a universe in which the 'few simple principles' seemed a little absurd, and nothing has 
hitherto taken their place. Mr. Herbert Spencer, indeed, attempted to turn a single hasty 
generalisation from the history of biological evolution into a complete social philosophy of his 
own, and preached a 'beneficent private war'[2] which he conceived as exactly equivalent to 
that degree of trade competition which prevailed among English provincial shopkeepers about 
the year 1884. Mr. Spencer failed to secure even the whole-hearted support of the newspapers; 
but in so far as his system gained currency it helped further to discredit any attempt to connect 
political science with the study of human nature.
For the moment, therefore, nearly all students of politics analyse institutions and avoid the 
analysis of man. The study of human nature by the psychologists has, it is true, advanced 
enormously since the discovery of human evolution, but it has advanced without affecting or 
being affected by the study of politics. Modern text-books of psychology are illustrated with 
innumerable facts from the home, the school, the hospital, and the psychological laboratory; 
but in them politics are hardly ever mentioned. The professors of the new science of sociology 
are beginning, it is true, to deal with human nature in its relation not only to the family and to 
religion and industry, but also to certain political institutions. Sociology, however, has had, as 
yet, little influence on political science.
I believe myself that this tendency to separate the study of politics from that of human nature 
will prove to be only a momentary phase of thought, that while it lasts its effects, both on the 
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science and the conduct of politics, are likely to be harmful, and that there are already signs 
that it is coming to an end.
It is sometimes pleaded that, if thorough work is to be done, there must, in the moral as in the 
physical sciences, be division of labour. But this particular division cannot, in fact, be kept up. 
The student of politics must, consciously or unconsciously, form a conception of human 
nature, and the less conscious he is of his conception the more likely he is to be dominated by 
it. If he has had wide personal experience of political life his unconscious assumptions may be 
helpful; if he has not they are certain to be misleading. Mr. Roosevelt's little book of essays on 
American Ideals is, for instance, useful, because when he thinks about mankind in politics, he 
thinks about the politicians whom he has known. After reading it one feels that many of the 
more systematic books on politics by American university professors are useless, just because 
the writers dealt with abstract men, formed on assumptions of which they were unaware and 
which they had never tested either by experience or by study.
In the other sciences which deal with human actions, this division between the study of the 
thing done and the study of the being who does it is not found. In criminology Beccaria and 
Bentham long ago showed how dangerous that jurisprudence was which separated the 
classification of crimes from the study of the criminal. The conceptions of human nature 
which they held have been superseded by evolutionary psychology, but modern thinkers like 
Lombroso have brought the new psychology into the service of a new and fruitful criminology.
In pedagogy also, Locke, and Rousseau, and Herbart, and the many-sided Bentham, based 
their theories of education upon their conceptions of human nature. Those conceptions were 
the same as those which underlay their political theories, and have been affected in the same 
way by modern knowledge. For a short time it even looked, as if the lecturers in the English 
training colleges would make the same separation between the study of human institutions and 
human nature as has been made in politics. Lectures on School Method were distinguished 
during this period from those on the Theory of Education. The first became mere descriptions 
and comparisons of the organisation and teaching in the best schools. The second consisted of 
expositions, with occasional comment and criticism of such classical writers as Comenius, or 
Locke, or Rousseau; and were curiously like those informal talks on Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, which, under the name of the Theory of Politics, formed in my time such a 
pleasant interlude in the Oxford course of Humaner Letters. But while the Oxford lecture-
courses still, I believe, survive almost unchanged, the Training College lectures on the Theory 
of Education are beginning to show signs of a change as great as that which took place in the 
training of medical students, when the lecturers on anatomy, instead of expounding the 
classical authorities, began to give, on their own responsibility, the best account of the facts of 
human structure of which they were capable.
The reason for this difference is, apparently, the fact that while Oxford lecturers on the Theory 
of Politics are not often politicians, the Training College lecturers on the Theory of Teaching 
have always been teachers, to whom the question whether any new knowledge could be made 
useful in their art was one of living and urgent importance. One finds accordingly that under 
the leadership of men like Professors William James, Lloyd Morgan, and Stanley Hall, a 
progressive science of teaching is being developed, which combines the study of types of 
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school organisation and method with a determined attempt to learn from special experiments, 
from introspection, and from other sciences, what manner of thing a child is.
Modern pedagogy, based on modern psychology, is already influencing the schools whose 
teachers are trained for their profession. Its body of facts is being yearly added to; it has 
already caused the abandonment of much dreary waste of time; has given many thousands of 
teachers a new outlook on their work, and has increased the learning and happiness of many 
tens of thousands of children.
This essay of mine is offered as a plea that a corresponding change in the conditions of 
political science is possible. In the great University whose constituent colleges are the 
universities of the world, there is a steadily growing body of professors and students of politics 
who give the whole day to their work. I cannot but think that as years go on, more of them will 
call to their aid that study of mankind which is the ancient ally of the moral sciences. Within 
every great city there are groups of men and women who are brought together in the evenings 
by the desire to find something more satisfying than current political controversy. They have 
their own unofficial leaders and teachers, and among these one can already detect an 
impatience with the alternative offered, either of working by the bare comparison of existing 
institutions, or of discussing the fitness of socialism or individualism, of democracy or 
aristocracy for human beings whose nature is taken for granted.
If my book is read by any of those official or unofficial thinkers, I would urge that the study of 
human nature in politics, if ever it comes to be undertaken by the united and organised efforts 
of hundreds of learned men, may not only deepen and widen our knowledge of political 
institutions, but open an unworked mine of political invention.
PART I
The Conditions of the Problem
CHAPTER I
IMPULSE AND INSTINCT IN POLITICS
Whoever sets himself to base his political thinking on a re-examination of the working of 
human nature, must begin by trying to overcome his own tendency to exaggerate the 
intellectuality of mankind.
We are apt to assume that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by which 
a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which that 
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end can be attained. An investor, for instance, desires good security combined with five per 
cent interest. He spends an hour in studying with an open mind the price-list of stocks, and 
finally infers that the purchase of Brewery Debentures will enable him most completely to 
realise his desire. Given the original desire for good security, his act in purchasing the 
Debentures appears to be the inevitable result of his inference. The desire for good security 
itself may further appear to be merely an intellectual inference as to the means of satisfying 
some more general desire, shared by all mankind, for 'happiness,' our own 'interest,' or the like. 
The satisfaction of this general desire can then be treated as the supreme 'end' of life, from 
which all our acts and impulses, great and small, are derived by the same intellectual process 
as that by which the conclusion is derived from the premises of an argument.
This way of thinking is sometimes called 'common sense.' A good example of its application 
to politics may be found in a sentence from Macaulay's celebrated attack on the Utilitarian 
followers of Bentham in the Edinburgh Review of March 1829. This extreme instance of the 
foundation of politics upon dogmatic psychology is, curiously enough, part of an argument 
intended to show that 'it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the 
principles of human nature.' 'What proposition,' Macaulay asks, 'is there respecting human 
nature which is absolutely and universally true? We know of only one: and that is not only 
true, but identical; that men always act from self-interest.... When we see the actions of a man, 
we know with certainty what he thinks his interest to be.'[3] Macaulay believes himself to be 
opposing Benthamism root and branch, but is unconsciously adopting and exaggerating the 
assumption which Bentham shared with most of the other eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century philosophers—that all motives result from the idea of some preconceived end.
If he had been pressed, Macaulay would probably have admitted that there are cases in which 
human acts and impulses to act occur independently of any idea of an end to be gained by 
them. If I have a piece of grit in my eye and ask some one to take it out with the corner of his 
handkerchief, I generally close the eye as soon as the handkerchief comes near, and always 
feel a strong impulse to do so. Nobody supposes that I close my eye because, after due 
consideration, I think it my interest to do so. Nor do most men choose to run away in battle, to 
fall in love, or to talk about the weather in order to satisfy their desire for a preconceived end. 
If, indeed, a man were followed through one ordinary day, without his knowing it, by a 
cinematographic camera and a phonograph, and if all his acts and sayings were reproduced 
before him next day, he would be astonished to find how few of them were the result of a 
deliberate search for the means of attaining ends. He would, of course, see that much of his 
activity consisted in the half-conscious repetition, under the influence of habit, of movements 
which were originally more fully conscious. But even if all cases of habit were excluded he 
would find that only a small proportion of the residue could be explained as being directly 
produced by an intellectual calculation. If a record were also kept of those of his impulses and 
emotions which did not result in action, it would be seen that they were of the same kind as 
those which did, and that very few of them were preceded by that process which Macaulay 
takes for granted.
If Macaulay had been pressed still further, he would probably have admitted that even when an 
act is preceded by a calculation of ends and means, it is not the inevitable result of that 
calculation. Even when we know what a man thinks it his interest to do, we do not know for 
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (19 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
certain what he will do. The man who studies the Stock Exchange list does not buy his 
Debentures, unless, apart from his intellectual inference on the subject, he has an impulse to 
write to his stockbroker sufficiently strong to overcome another impulse to put the whole thing 
off till the next day.
Macaulay might even further have admitted that the mental act of calculation itself results 
from, or is accompanied by, an impulse to calculate, which impulse may have nothing to do 
with any anterior consideration of means and ends, and may vary from the half-conscious 
yielding to a train of reverie up to the obstinate driving of a tired brain onto the difficult task of 
exact thought.
The text-books of psychology now warn every student against the 'intellectualist' fallacy which 
is illustrated by my quotation from Macaulay. Impulse, it is now agreed, has an evolutionary 
history of its own earlier than the history of those intellectual processes by which it is often 
directed and modified. Our inherited organisation inclines us to re-act in certain ways to 
certain stimuli because such reactions have been useful in the past in preserving our species. 
Some of the reactions are what we call specifically 'instincts,' that is to say, impulses towards 
definite acts or series of acts, independent of any conscious anticipation of their probable 
effects.[4] Those instincts are sometimes unconscious and involuntary; and sometimes, in the 
case of ourselves and apparently of other higher animals, they are conscious and voluntary. 
But the connection between means and ends which they exhibit is the result not of any 
contrivance by the actor, but of the survival, in the past, of the 'fittest' of many varying 
tendencies to act. Indeed the instinct persists when it is obviously useless, as in the case of a 
dog who turns round to flatten the grass before lying down on a carpet; and even when it is 
known to be dangerous, as when a man recovering from typhoid hungers for solid food.
The fact that impulse is not always the result of conscious foresight is most clearly seen in the 
case of children. The first impulses of a baby to suck, or to grasp, are obviously 'instinctive.' 
But even when the unconscious or unremembered condition of infancy has been succeeded by 
the connected consciousness of childhood, the child will fly to his mother and hide his face in 
her skirts when he sees a harmless stranger. Later on he will torture small beasts and run away 
from big beasts, or steal fruit, or climb trees, though no one has suggested such actions to him, 
and though he may expect disagreeable results from them.
We generally think of 'instinct' as consisting of a number of such separate tendencies, each 
towards some distinct act or series of acts. But there is no reason to suppose that the whole 
body of inherited impulse even among non-human animals has ever been divisible in that way. 
The evolutionary history of impulse must have been very complicated. An impulse which 
survived because it produced one result may have persisted with modifications because it 
produced another result; and side by side with impulses towards specific acts we can detect in 
all animals vague and generalised tendencies, often overlapping and contradictory, like 
curiosity and shyness, sympathy and cruelty, imitation and restless activity. It is possible, 
therefore, to avoid the ingenious dilemma by which Mr. Balfour argues that we must either 
demonstrate that the desire, e.g. for scientific truth, is lineally descended from some one of the 
specific instincts which teach us 'to fight, to eat, and to bring up children,' or must admit the 
supernatural authority of the Shorter Catechism.[5]
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The pre-rational character of many of our impulses is, however, disguised by the fact that 
during the lifetime of each individual they are increasingly modified by memory and habit and 
thought. Even the non-human animals are able to adapt and modify their inherited impulses 
either by imitation or by habits founded on individual experience. When telegraph wires, for 
instance, were first put up many birds flew against them and were killed. But although the 
number of those that were killed was obviously insufficient to produce a change in the 
biological inheritance of the species, very few birds fly against the wires now. The young birds 
must have imitated their elders, who had learnt to avoid the wires; just as the young of many 
hunting animals are said to learn devices and precautions which are the result of their parents' 
experience, and later to make and hand down by imitation inventions of their own.
Many of the directly inherited impulses, again, appear both in man and other animals at a 
certain point in the growth of the individual, and then, if they are checked, die away, or, if they 
are unchecked, form habits; and impulses, which were originally strong and useful, may no 
longer help in preserving life, and may, like the whale's legs or our teeth and hair, be 
weakened by biological degeneration. Such temporary or weakened impulses are especially 
liable to be transferred to new objects, or to be modified by experience and thought.
With all these complicated facts the schoolmaster has to deal. In Macaulay's time he used to be 
guided by his 'common-sense,' and to intellectualise the whole process. The unfortunate boys 
who acted upon an ancient impulse to fidget, to play truant, to chase cats, or to mimic their 
teacher, were asked, with repeated threats of punishment,'why' they had done so. They, being 
ignorant of their own evolutionary history, were forced to invent some far-fetched lie, and 
were punished for that as well. The trained schoolmaster of to-day takes the existence of such 
impulses as a normal fact; and decides how far, in each case, he shall check them by relying on 
that half-conscious imitation which makes the greater part of class-room discipline, and how 
far by stimulating a conscious recognition of the connection, ethical or penal, between acts and 
their consequences. In any case his power of controlling instinctive impulse is due to his 
recognition of its non-intellectual origin. He may even be able to extend this recognition to his 
own impulses, and to overcome the conviction that his irritability during afternoon school in 
July is the result of an intellectual conclusion as to the need of special severity in dealing with 
a set of unprecedentedly wicked boys.
The politician, however, is still apt to intellectualise impulse as completely as the schoolmaster 
did fifty years ago. He has two excuses, that he deals entirely with adults, whose impulses are 
more deeply modified by experience and thought than those of children, and that it is very 
difficult for any one who thinks about politics not to confine his consideration to those 
political actions and impulses which are accompanied by the greatest amount of conscious 
thought, and which therefore come first into his mind. But the politician thinks about men in 
large communities, and it is in the forecasting of the action of large communities that the 
intellectualist fallacy is most misleading. The results of experience and thought are often 
confined to individuals or small groups, and when they differ may cancel each other as 
political forces. The original human impulses are, with personal variations, common to the 
whole race, and increase in their importance with an increase in the number of those 
influenced by them.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (21 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
It may be worth while, therefore, to attempt a description of some of the more obvious or more 
important political impulses, remembering always that in politics we are dealing not with such 
clear-cut separate instincts as we may find in children and animals, but with tendencies often 
weakened by the course of human evolution, still more often transferred to new uses, and 
acting not simply but in combination or counteraction.
Aristotle, for instance, says that it is 'affection' (or 'friendship,' for the meaning of ril•a stands 
half way between the two words) which 'makes political union possible,' and 'which law-givers 
consider more important than justice.' It is, he says, a hereditary instinct among animals of the 
same race, and particularly among men.[6] If we look for this political affection in its simplest 
form, we see it in our impulse to feel 'kindly' towards any other human being of whose 
existence and personality we become vividly aware. This impulse can be checked and overlaid 
by others, but any one can test its existence and its prerationality in his own case by going, for 
instance, to the British Museum and watching the effect on his feelings of the discovery that a 
little Egyptian girl baby who died four thousand years ago rubbed the toes of her shoes by 
crawling upon the floor.
The tactics of an election consist largely of contrivances by which this immediate emotion of 
personal affection may be set up. The candidate is advised to 'show himself continually, to 
give away prizes, to 'say a few words' at the end of other people's speeches—all under 
circumstances which offer little or no opportunity for the formation of a reasoned opinion of 
his merits, but many opportunities for the rise of a purely instinctive affection among those 
present. His portrait is periodically distributed, and is more effective if it is a good, that is to 
say, a distinctive, than if it is a flattering likeness. Best of all is a photograph which brings his 
ordinary existence sharply forward by representing him in his garden smoking a pipe or 
reading a newspaper.
A simple-minded supporter whose affection has been so worked up will probably try to give 
an intellectual explanation of it. He will say that the man, of whom he may know really 
nothing except that he was photographed in a Panama hat with a fox-terrier, is 'the kind of man 
we want,' and that therefore he has decided to support him; just as a child will say that he loves 
his mother because she is the best mother in the world,[7] or a man in love will give an 
elaborate explanation of his perfectly normal feelings, which he describes as an intellectual 
inference from alleged abnormal excellences in his beloved. The candidate naturally 
intellectualises in the same way. One of the most perfectly modest men I know once told me 
that he was 'going round' a good deal among his future constituents 'to let them see what a 
good fellow I am.' Unless, indeed, the process can be intellectualised, it is for many men 
unintelligible.
A monarch is a life-long candidate, and there exists a singularly elaborate traditional art of 
producing personal affection for him. It is more important that he should be seen than that he 
should speak or act. His portrait appears on every coin and stamp, and apart from any question 
of personal beauty, produces most effect when it is a good likeness. Any one, for instance, 
who can clearly recall his own emotions during the later years of Queen Victoria's reign, will 
remember a measurable increase of his affection for her, when, in 1897, a thoroughly life-like 
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portrait took the place on the coins of the conventional head of 1837-1887, and the awkward 
compromise of the first Jubilee year. In the case of monarchy one can also watch the 
intellectualisation of the whole process by the newspapers, the official biographers, the 
courtiers, and possibly the monarch himself. The daily bulletin of details as to his walks and 
drives is, in reality, the more likely to create a vivid impression of his personality, and 
therefore to produce this particular kind of emotion, the more ordinary the events described are 
in themselves. But since an emotion arising out of ordinary events is difficult to explain on a 
purely intellectual basis, these events are written about as revealing a life of extraordinary 
regularity and industry. When the affection is formed it is even sometimes described as an 
inevitable reasoned conclusion arising from reflection upon a reign during which there have 
been an unusual number of good harvests or great inventions.
Sometimes the impulse of affection is excited to a point at which its non-rational character 
becomes obvious. George the Third was beloved by the English people because they realised 
intensely that, like themselves, he had been born in England, and because the published facts 
of his daily life came home to them. Fanny Burney describes, therefore, how when, during an 
attack of madness, he was to be taken in a coach to Kew, the doctors who were to accompany 
him were seriously afraid that the inhabitants of any village who saw that the King was under 
restraint would attack them.[8] The kindred emotion of personal and dynastic loyalty (whose 
origin is possibly to be found in the fact that the loosely organised companies of our prehuman 
ancestors could not defend themselves from their carnivorous enemies until the general 
instinct of affection was specialised into a vehement impulse to follow and protect their 
leader), has again and again produced destructive and utterly useless civil wars.
Fear often accompanies and, in politics, is confused with affection. A man, whose life's dream 
it has been to get sight and speech of his King, is accidentally brought face to face with him. 
He is 'rooted to the spot,' becomes pale, and is unable to speak, because a movement might 
have betrayed his ancestors to a lion or a bear, or earlier still, to a hungry cuttlefish. It would 
be an interesting experiment if some professor of experimental psychology would arrange his 
class in the laboratory with sphygmographs on their wrists ready to record those pulse 
movements which accompany the sensation of 'thrill,' and would then introduce into the room 
without notice, and in chance order, a bishop, a well-known general, the greatest living man of 
letters, and a minor member of the royal family. The resulting records of immediate pulse 
disturbances would be of real scientific importance, and it might even be possible to continue 
the record in each case say, for a quarter of a minute, and to trace the secondary effects of 
variations in political opinions, education, or the sense of humour among the students.
At present almost the only really scientific observation on the subject from its political side is 
contained in Lord Palmerston's protest against a purely intellectual account of aristocracy: 
'there is no damned nonsense about merit,' he said, 'in the case of the Garter.' Makers of new 
aristocracies are still, however, apt to intellectualise. The French government, for instance, 
have created an order, 'Pour le Mérite Agricole,' which ought, on the basis of mere logic, to be 
very successful; but one is told that the green ribbon of that order produces in France no thrill 
whatever.
The impulse to laugh is comparatively unimportant in politics, but it affords a good instance of 
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the way in which a practical politician has to allow for pre-rational impulse. It is apparently an 
immediate effect of the recognition of the incongruous, just as trembling is of the recognition 
of danger. It may have been evolved because an animal which suffered a slight spasm in the 
presence of the unexpected was more likely to be on its guard against enemies, or it may have 
been the merely accidental result of some fact in our nervous organisation which was 
otherwise useful. Incongruity is, however, so much a matter of habit and association and 
individual variation, that it is extraordinarily difficult to forecast whether any particular act 
will seem ridiculous to any particular class, or how long the sense of incongruity will in any 
case persist. Acts, for instance, which aim at producing exalted emotional effect among 
ordinary slow-witted people—Burke's dagger, Louis Napoleon's tame eagle, the German 
Kaiser's telegrams about Huns and mailed fists—may do so, and therefore be in the end 
politically successful, although they produce spontaneous laughter in men whose conception 
of good political manners is based upon the idea of self-restraint.
Again, almost the whole of the economic question between socialism and individualism turns 
on the nature and limitations of the desire for property. There seem to be good grounds for 
supposing that this is a true specific instinct, and not merely the result of habit or of the 
intellectual choice of means for satisfying the desire of power. Children, for instance, quarrel 
furiously at a very early age over apparently worthless things, and collect and hide them long 
before they can have any clear notion of the advantages to be derived from individual 
possession. Those children who in certain charity schools are brought up entirely without 
personal property, even in their clothes or pocket-handkerchiefs, show every sign of the bad 
effect on health and character which results from complete inability to satisfy a strong 
inherited instinct. The evolutionary origin of the desire for property is indicated also by many 
of the habits of dogs or squirrels or magpies. Some economist ought therefore to give us a 
treatise in which this property instinct is carefully and quantitatively examined. Is it, like the 
hunting instinct, an impulse which dies away if it is not indulged? How far can it be eliminated 
or modified by education? Is it satisfied by a leasehold or a life-interest, or by such an 
arrangement of corporate property as is offered by a collegiate foundation, or by the provision 
of a public park? Does it require for its satisfaction material and visible things such as land or 
houses, or is the holding, say, of colonial railway shares sufficient? Is the absence of unlimited 
proprietary rights felt more strongly in the case of personal chattels (such as furniture and 
ornaments) than in the case of land or machinery? Does the degree and direction of the instinct 
markedly differ among different individuals or races, or between the two sexes?
Pending such an inquiry my own provisional opinion is that, like a good many instincts of very 
early evolutionary origin, it can be satisfied by an avowed pretence; just as a kitten which is 
fed regularly on milk can be kept in good health if it is allowed to indulge its hunting instinct 
by playing with a bobbin, and a peaceful civil servant satisfies his instinct of combat and 
adventure at golf. If this is so, and if it is considered for other reasons undesirable to satisfy the 
property instinct by the possession, say, of slaves or of freehold land, one supposes that a good 
deal of the feeling of property may in the future be enjoyed even by persons in whom the 
instinct is abnormally strong, through the collection of shells or of picture postcards.
The property instinct is, it happens, one of two instances in which the classical economists 
deserted their usual habit of treating all desires as the result of a calculation of the means of 
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obtaining 'utility' or 'wealth.' The satisfaction of the instinct of absolute property by peasant 
proprietorship turned, they said, 'sand to gold,' although it required a larger expenditure of 
labour for every unit of income than was the case in salaried employment. The other instance 
was the instinct of family affection. This also still needs a special treatise on its stimulus, 
variation, and limitations. But the classical economists treated it as absolute and unvarying. 
The 'economic man,' who had no more concern than a lone wolf with the rest of the human 
species, was treated as possessing a perfect and permanent solidarity of feeling with his 
'family.' The family was apparently assumed as consisting of those persons for whose support 
a man in Western Europe is legally responsible, and no attempt was made to estimate whether 
the instinct extended in any degree to cousins or great uncles.
A treatise on political impulses which aimed at completeness would further include at least the 
fighting instinct (with the part which it plays, together with affection and loyalty, in the 
formation of parties), and the instincts of suspicion, curiosity, and the desire to excel.
All these primary impulses are greatly increased in immediate effectiveness when they are 
'pure,' that is to say, unaccompanied by competing or opposing impulses; and this is the main 
reason why art, which aims at producing one emotion at a time, acts on most men so much 
more easily than does the more varied appeal of real life. I once sat in a suburban theatre 
among a number of colonial troopers who had come over from South Africa for the King's 
Coronation. The play was 'Our Boys,' and between the acts my next neighbour gave me, 
without any sign of emotion, a hideous account of the scene at Tweefontein after De Wet had 
rushed the British camp on the Christmas morning of 1901—the militiamen slaughtered while 
drunk, and the Kaffir drivers tied to the blazing waggons. The curtain rose again, and, five 
minutes later, I saw that he was weeping in sympathy with the stage misfortunes of two able-
bodied young men who had to eat 'inferior Dorset' butter. My sympathy with the militiamen 
and the Kaffirs was 'pure,' whereas his was overlaid with remembered race-hatred, battle-fury, 
and contempt for British incompetence. His sympathy, on the other hand, with the stage 
characters was not accompanied, as mine was, by critical feelings about theatrical conventions, 
indifferent acting, and middle-Victorian sentiment.
It is this greater immediate effect of pure and artificial as compared with mixed and concrete 
emotion which explains the traditional maxim of political agents that it is better that a 
candidate should not live in his constituency. It is an advantage that he should be able to 
represent himself as a 'local candidate,' but his local character should be ad hoc, and should 
consist in the hiring of a large house each year in which he lives a life of carefully dramatised 
hospitality. Things in no way blameworthy in themselves—his choice of tradesmen, his 
childrens' hats and measles, his difficulties with his relations—will be, if he is a permanent 
resident, 'out of the picture,' and may confuse the impression which he produces. If one could, 
by the help of a time-machine, see for a moment in the flesh the little Egyptian girl who wore 
out her shoes, one might find her behaving so charmingly that one's pity for her death would 
be increased. But it is more probable that, even if she was, in fact, a very nice little girl, one 
would not.
This greater immediate facility of the emotions set up by artistic presentment, as compared 
with those resulting from concrete observation has, however, to be studied in its relation to 
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another fact—that impulses vary, in their driving force and in the depth of the nervous 
disturbance which they cause, in proportion, not to their importance in our present life, but to 
the point at which they appeared in our evolutionary past. We are quite unable to resist the 
impulse of mere vascular and nervous reaction, the watering of the mouth, the jerk of the limb, 
the closing of the eye which we share with some of the simplest vertebrates. We can only with 
difficulty resist the instincts of sex and food, of anger and fear, which we share with the higher 
animals. It is, on the other hand, difficult for us to obey consistently the impulses which attend 
on the mental images formed by inference and association. A man may be convinced by a long 
train of cogent reasoning that he will go to hell if he visits a certain house; and yet he will do 
so in satisfaction of a half conscious craving, whose existence he is ashamed to recognise. It 
may be that when a preacher makes hell real to him by physical images of fire and torment his 
conviction will acquire coercive force. But that force may soon die away as his memory fades, 
and even the most vivid description has little effect as compared with a touch of actual pain. 
At the theatre, because pure emotion is facile, three-quarters of the audience may cry, but 
because second-hand emotion is shallow, very few of them will be unable to sleep when they 
get home, or will even lose their appetite for a late supper. My South African trooper probably 
recovered from his tears over 'Our Boys' as soon as they were shed. The transient and 
pleasurable quality of the tragic emotions produced by novel reading is well known. A man 
may weep over a novel which he will forget in two or three hours, although the same man may 
be made insane, or may have his character changed for life, by actual experiences which are 
far less terrible than those of which he reads, experiences which at the moment may produce 
neither tears nor any other obvious nervous effect.
Both those facts are of first-rate political importance in those great modern communities in 
which all the events which stimulate political action reach the voters through newspapers. The 
emotional appeal of journalism, even more than that of the stage, is facile because it is pure, 
and transitory because it is second-hand. Battles and famines, murders and the evidence of 
inquiries into destitution, all are presented by the journalist in literary form, with a careful 
selection of 'telling' detail. Their effect is therefore produced at once, in the half-hour that 
follows the middle-class breakfast, or in the longer interval on the Sunday morning when the 
workman reads his weekly paper. But when the paper has been read the emotional effect fades 
rapidly away.
Any candidate at an election feels for this reason the strangeness of the conditions under which 
what Professor James calls the 'pungent sense of effective reality,'[9] reaches or fails to reach, 
mankind, in a civilisation based upon newspapers. I was walking along the street during my 
last election, thinking of the actual issues involved, and comparing them with the vague fog of 
journalistic phrases, the half-conscious impulses of old habit and new suspicion which make 
up the atmosphere of electioneering. I came round a street corner upon a boy of about fifteen 
returning from work, whose whole face lit up with genuine and lively interest as soon as he 
saw me. I stopped, and he said: 'I know you, Mr. Wallas, you put the medals on me.' All that 
day political principles and arguments had refused to become real to my constituents, but the 
emotion excited by the bodily fact that I had at a school ceremony pinned a medal for good 
attendance on a boy's coat, had all the pungency of a first-hand experience.
Throughout the contest the candidate is made aware, at every point, of the enormously greater 
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solidity for most men of the work-a-day world which they see for themselves, as compared 
with the world of inference and secondary ideas which they see through the newspapers. A 
London County Councillor, for instance, as his election comes near, and he begins to withdraw 
from the daily business of administrative committees into the cloud of the electoral campaign, 
finds that the officials whom he leaves behind, with their daily stint of work, and their hopes 
and fears about their salaries, seem to him much more real than himself. The old woman at her 
door in a mean street who refuses to believe that he is not being paid for canvassing, the 
prosperous and good-natured tradesman who says quite simply,' I expect you find politics 
rather an expensive amusement,' all seem to stand with their feet upon the ground. However 
often he assures himself that the great realities are on his side, and that the busy people round 
him are concerned only with fleeting appearances, yet the feeling constantly recurs to him that 
it is he himself who is living in a world of shadows.
This feeling is increased by the fact that a candidate has constantly to repeat the same 
arguments, and to stimulate in himself the same emotions, and that mere repetition produces a 
distressing sense of unreality. The preachers who have to repeat every Sunday the same 
gospel, find also that 'dry times' alternate with times of exaltation. Even among the voters the 
repetition of the same political thoughts is apt to produce weariness. The main cause of the 
recurring swing of the electoral pendulum seems to be that opinions which have been held 
with enthusiasm become after a year or two stale and flat, and that the new opinions seem 
fresh and vivid.
A treatise is indeed required from some trained psychologist on the conditions under which 
our nervous system shows itself intolerant of repeated sensations and emotions. The fact is 
obviously connected with the purely physiological causes which produce giddiness, tickling, 
sea-sickness, etc. But many things that are 'natural,' that is to say, which we have constantly 
experienced during any considerable part of the ages during which our nervous organisation 
was being developed, apparently do not so affect us. Our heartbeats, the taste of water, the 
rising and setting of the sun, or, in the case of a child, milk, or the presence of its mother, or of 
its brothers, do not seem to become, in sound health, distressingly monotonous. But 'artificial' 
things, however pleasant at first—a tune on the piano, the pattern of a garment, the greeting of 
an acquaintance—are likely to become unbearable if often exactly repeated. A newspaper is an 
artificial thing in this sense, and one of the arts of the newspaper-writer consists in presenting 
his views with that kind of repetition which, like the phrases of a fugue, constantly approaches, 
but never oversteps the limit of monotony. Advertisers again are now discovering that it pays 
to vary the monotony with which a poster appeals to the eye by printing in different colours 
those copies which are to hang near each other, or still better, by representing varied incidents 
in the career of 'Sunny Jim' or 'Sunlight Sue.'
A candidate is also an artificial thing. If he lives and works in his constituency, the daily vision 
of an otherwise admirable business man seated in a first-class carriage on the 8.47 A.M. train 
in the same attitude and reading the same newspaper may produce a slight and unrecognised 
feeling of discomfort among his constituents, although it would cause no such feeling in the 
wife whose relation to him is 'natural.' For the same reason when his election comes on, 
although he may declare himself to be the 'old member standing on the old platform,' he 
should be careful to avoid monotony by slightly varying his portrait, the form of his address, 
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and the details of his declaration of political faith.
Another fact, closely connected with our intolerance of repeated emotional adjustment, is the 
desire for privacy, sufficiently marked to approach the character of a specific instinct, and 
balanced by a corresponding and opposing dread of loneliness. Our ancestors in the ages 
during which our present nervous system became fixed, lived, apparently, in loosely organised 
family groups, associated for certain occasional purposes, into larger, but still more loosely 
organised, tribal groups. No one slept alone, for the more or less monogamic family assembled 
nightly in a cave or 'lean-to' shelter. The hunt for food which filled the day was carried on, one 
supposes, neither in complete solitude nor in constant intercourse. Even if the female were left 
at home with the young, the male exchanged some dozen times a day rough greetings with 
acquaintances, or joined in a common task. Occasionally, even before the full development of 
language, excited palavers attended by some hundreds would take place, or opposing tribes 
would gather for a fight.
It is still extremely difficult for the normal man to endure either much less or much more than 
this amount of intercourse with his fellows. However safe they may know themselves to be, 
most men find it difficult to sleep in an empty house, and would be distressed by anything 
beyond three days of absolute solitude. Even habit cannot do much in this respect. A man 
required to submit to gradually increasing periods of solitary confinement would probably go 
mad as soon as he had been kept for a year without a break. A settler, though he may be the 
son of a settler, and may have known no other way of living, can hardly endure existence 
unless his daily intercourse with his family is supplemented by a weekly chat with a neighbour 
or a stranger; and he will go long and dangerous journeys in order once a year to enjoy the 
noise and bustle of a crowd.
But, on the other hand, the nervous system of most men will not tolerate the frequent repetition 
of that adjustment of the mind and sympathies to new acquaintanceship, a certain amount of 
which is so refreshing and so necessary. One can therefore watch in great modern cities men 
half consciously striving to preserve the same proportion between privacy and intercourse 
which prevailed among their ancestors in the woods, and one can watch also the constant 
appearance of proposals or experiments which altogether ignore the primary facts of human 
nature in this respect. The habitual intellectualism of the writers of political Utopias prevents 
them from seeing any 'reason' why men should not find happiness as well as economy in a sort 
of huge extension of family life. The writer himself at his moments of greatest imaginative 
exaltation does not perhaps realise the need of privacy at all. His affections are in a state of 
expansion which, without fancifulness, one may refer back to the emotional atmosphere 
prevalent in the screaming assemblies of his prehuman ancestors; and he is ready, so long as 
this condition lasts, to take the whole world almost literally to his bosom. What he does not 
realise is that neither he nor any one else can keep himself permanently at this level. In 
William Morris's News from Nowhere the customs of family life extend to the streets, and the 
tired student from the British Museum talks with easy intimacy to the thirsty dustman. I 
remember reading an article written about 1850 by one of the early Christian Socialists. He 
said that he had just been riding down Oxford Street in an omnibus, and that he had noticed 
that when the omnibus passed over a section of the street in which macadam had been 
substituted for paving, all the passengers turned and spoke to each other. 'Some day,' he said, 
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'all Oxford Street will be macadamised, and then, because men will be able to hear each other's 
voices, the omnibus will become a delightful informal club.' Now nearly all London is paved 
with wood, and people as they sit in chairs on the top of omnibuses can hear each other 
whispering; but no event short of a fatal accident is held to justify a passenger who speaks to 
his neighbour.
Clubs were established in London, not so much for the sake of the cheapness and convenience 
of common sitting-rooms and kitchens, as to bring together bodies of men, each of whom 
should meet all the rest on terms of unrestrained social intercourse. One can see in Thackeray's 
Book of Snobs, and in the stories of Thackeray's own club quarrels, the difficulties produced 
by this plan. Nowadays clubs are successful exactly because it is an unwritten law in almost 
every one of them that no member must speak to any other who is not one of his own personal 
acquaintances. The innumerable communistic experiments of Fourier, Robert Owen, and 
others, all broke up essentially because of the want of privacy. The associates got on each 
other's nerves. In those confused pages of the Politics, in which Aristotle criticises from the 
point of view of experience the communism of Plato, the same point stands out: 'It is difficult 
to live together in community,' communistic colonists have always 'disputed with each other 
about the most ordinary matters'; 'we most often disagree with those slaves who are brought 
into daily contact with us.'[10]
The Charity Schools of 1700 to 1850 were experiments in the result of a complete refusal of 
scope, not only for the instinct of property, but for the entirely distinct instinct of privacy, and 
part of their disastrous nervous and moral effect must be put down to that. The boys in the 
contemporary public boarding-schools secured a little privacy by the adoption of strange and 
sometimes cruel social customs, and more has been done since then by systems of 'studies' and 
'houses.' Experience seems, however, to show that during childhood a day school with its 
alternation of home, class-room, and playing field, is better suited than a boarding-school to 
the facts of normal human nature.
This instinctive need of privacy is again a subject which would repay special and detailed 
study. It varies very greatly among different races, and one supposes that the much greater 
desire for privacy which is found among Northern, as compared to Southern Europeans, may 
be due to the fact that races who had to spend much or little of the year under cover, adjusted 
themselves biologically to a different standard in this respect. It is clear, also, that it is our 
emotional nature, and not the intellectual or muscular organs of talking, which is most easily 
fatigued. Light chatter, even among strangers, in which neither party 'gives himself away,' is 
very much less fatiguing than an intimacy which makes some call upon the emotions. An actor 
who accepts the second alternative of Diderot's paradox, and feels his part, is much more likely 
to break down from overstrain, than one who only simulates feeling and keeps his own 
emotional life to himself.
It is in democratic politics, however, that privacy is most neglected, most difficult, and most 
necessary. In America all observers are agreed as to the danger which results from looking on 
a politician as an abstract personification of the will of the people, to whom all citizens have 
an equal and inalienable right of access, and from whom every one ought to receive an equally 
warm and sincere welcome. In England our comparatively aristocratic tradition as to the 
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relation between a representative and his constituents has done something to preserve customs 
corresponding more closely to the actual nature of man. A tired English statesman at a big 
reception is still allowed to spend his time rather in chaffing with a few friends in a distant 
corner of the room than in shaking hands and exchanging effusive commonplaces with 
innumerable unknown guests. But there is a real danger lest this tradition of privacy may be 
abolished in English democracy, simply because of its connection with aristocratic manners. A 
young labour politician is expected to live in more than American conditions of intimate 
publicity. Having, perhaps, just left the working bench, and having to adjust his nerves and his 
bodily health to the difficult requirements of mental work, he is expected to receive every 
caller at any hour of the day or night with the same hearty good will, and to be always ready to 
share or excite the enthusiasm of his followers. After a year or two, in the case of a man of 
sensitive nervous organisation, the task is found to be impossible. The signs of nervous fatigue 
are at first accepted by him and his friends as proofs of his sincerity. He begins to suffer from 
the curate's disease, the bright-eyed, hysterical condition in which a man talks all day long to a 
succession of sympathetic hearers about his own overwork, and drifts into actual ill-health, 
though he is not making an hour's continuous exertion in the day. I knew a young agitator in 
that state who thought that he could not make a propagandist speech unless the deeply 
admiring pitman, in whose cottage he was staying, played the Marseillaise on a harmonium 
before he started. Often such a man takes to drink. In any case he is liable, as the East End 
clergymen who try to live the same life are liable, to the most pitiable forms of moral collapse.
Such men, however, are those who being unfit for a life without privacy, do not survive. 
Greater political danger comes perhaps from those who are comparatively fit. Any one who 
has been in America, who has stood among the crowd in a Philadelphian law-court during the 
trial of a political case, or has seen the thousands of cartoons in a contest in which Tammany is 
concerned, will find that he has a picture in his mind of one type at least of those who do 
survive. Powerfully built, with the big jaw and loose mouth of the dominant talker, practised 
by years of sitting behind saloon bars, they have learnt the way of 'selling cheap that which 
should be most dear.' But even they generally look as if they drank, and as if they would not 
live to old age.
Other and less dreadful types of politicians without privacy come into one's mind, the orator 
who night after night repeats the theatrical success of his own personality, and, like the actor, 
keeps his recurring fits of weary disgust to himself; the busy organising talkative man to 
whom it is a mere delight to take the chair at four smoking concerts a week. But there is no 
one of them who would not be the better, both in health and working power, if he were 
compelled to retire for six months from the public view, and to produce something with his 
own hand and brain, or even to sit alone in his own house and think.
These facts, in so far as they represent the nervous disturbance produced by certain conditions 
of life in political communities, are again closely connected with the one point in the special 
psychology of politics which has as yet received any extensive consideration—the so-called 
'Psychology of the Crowd,' on which the late M. Tarde, M. Le Bon, and others have written. In 
the case of human beings, as in the case of many other social and semi-social animals, the 
simpler impulses—especially those of fear and anger—when they are consciously shared by 
many physically associated individuals, may become enormously exalted, and may give rise to 
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (30 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
violent nervous disturbances. One may suppose that this fact, like the existence of laughter, 
was originally an accidental and undesirable result of the mechanism of nervous reaction, and 
that it persisted because when a common danger was realised (a forest fire, for instance, or an 
attack by beasts of prey), a general stampede, although it might be fatal to the weaker 
members of the herd, was the best chance of safety for the majority.
My own observation of English politics suggests that in a modern national state, this panic 
effect of the combination of nervous excitement with physical contact is not of great 
importance. London in the twentieth century is very unlike Paris in the eighteenth century, or 
Florence in the fourteenth, if only because it is very difficult for any considerable proportion 
of the citizens to be gathered under circumstances likely to produce the special 'Psychology of 
the Crowd.' I have watched two hundred thousand men assembled in Hyde Park for a Labour 
Demonstration. The scattered platforms, the fresh air, the wide grassy space, seemed to be an 
unsuitable environment for the production of purely instinctive excitement, and the attitude of 
such an assembly in London is good-tempered and lethargic. A crowd in a narrow street is 
more likely to get 'out of hand,' and one may see a few thousand men in a large hall reach a 
state approaching genuine pathological exaltation on an exciting occasion, and when they are 
in the hands of a practised speaker. But as they go out of the hall they drop into the cool ocean 
of London, and their mood is dissipated in a moment. The mob that took the Bastille would 
not seem or feel an overwhelming force in one of the business streets of Manchester. Yet such 
facts vary greatly among different races, and the exaggeration which one seems to notice when 
reading the French sociologists on this point may be due to their observations having been 
made among a Latin and not a Northern race.
So far I have dealt with the impulses illustrated by the internal politics of a modern State. But 
perhaps the most important section in the whole psychology of political impulse is that which 
is concerned not with the emotional effect of the citizens of any state upon each other, but with 
those racial feelings which reveal themselves in international politics. The future peace of the 
world largely turns on the question whether we have, as is sometimes said and often assumed, 
an instinctive affection for those human beings whose features and colour are like our own, 
combined with an instinctive hatred for those who are unlike us. On this point, pending a 
careful examination of the evidence by the psychologists, it is difficult to dogmatise. But I am 
inclined to think that those strong and apparently simple cases of racial hatred and affection 
which can certainly be found, are not instances of a specific and universal instinct but the 
result of several distinct and comparatively weak instincts combined and heightened by habit 
and association. I have already argued that the instinct of political affection is stimulated by 
the vivid realisation of its object. Since therefore it is easier, at least for uneducated men, to 
realise the existence of beings like than of beings unlike themselves, affection for one's like 
would appear to have a natural basis, but one likely to be modified as our powers of realisation 
are stimulated by education. Again, since most men live, especially in childhood, among 
persons belonging to the same race as themselves, any markedly unusual face or dress may 
excite the instinct of fear of that which is unknown. A child's fear, however, of a strangely 
shaped or coloured face is more easily obliterated by familiarity than it would be if it were the 
result of a specific instinct of race-hatred. White or Chinese children show, one is told, no 
permanent aversion for Chinese or white or Hindoo or negro nurses and attendants. Sex love, 
again, even when opposed by social tradition, springs up freely between very different human 
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types; and widely separated races have been thereby amalgamated. Between some of the non-
human species (horses and camels, for instance) instinctive mutual hatred, as distinguished 
from fear, does seem to exist, but nowhere, as far as I know, is it found between varieties so 
nearly related to each other and so readily interbreeding as the various human races.
Anglo-Indian officials sometimes explain, as a case of specific instinct, the fact that a man 
who goes out with an enthusiastic interest in the native races often finds himself, after a few 
years, unwillingly yielding to a hatred of the Hindoo racial type. But the account which they 
give of their sensations seems to me more like the nervous disgust which I described as arising 
from a constantly repeated mental and emotional adjustment to inharmonious surroundings. At 
the age when an English official reaches India most of his emotional habits are already set, and 
he makes, as a rule, no systematic attempt to modify them. Therefore, just as the unfamiliarity 
of French cookery or German beds, which at the beginning of a continental visit is a delightful 
change, may become after a month or two an intolerable gêne, so the servility and 
untruthfulness, and even the patience and cleverness of those natives with whom he is brought 
into official contact, get after a few years on the nerves of an Anglo-Indian. Intimate and 
uninterrupted contact during a long period, after his social habits have been formed, with 
people of his own race but of a different social tradition would produce the same effect.
Perhaps, however, intellectual association is a larger factor than instinct in the causation of 
racial affection and hatred. An American working man associates, for instance, the Far Eastern 
physical type with that lowering of the standard wage which overshadows as a dreadful 
possibility every trade in the industrial world. Fifty years ago the middle class readers to 
whom Punch appeals associated the same type with stories of tortured missionaries and 
envoys. After the battle of the Sea of Japan they associated it with that kind of heroism which, 
owing to our geographical position, we most admire; and drawings of the unmistakably Asiatic 
features of Admiral Togo, which would have excited genuine and apparently instinctive 
disgust in 1859, produced a thrill of affection in 1906.
But at this point we approach that discussion of the objects, sensible or imaginary, of political 




Man's impulses and thoughts and acts result from the relation between his nature and the 
environment into which he is born. The last chapter approached that relation (in so far as it 
affects politics) from the side of man's nature. This chapter will approach the same relation 
from the side of man's political environment.
The two lines of approach have this important difference, that the nature with which man is 
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born is looked on by the politician as fixed, while the environment into which man is born is 
rapidly and indefinitely changing. It is not to changes in our nature, but to changes in our 
environment only—using the word to include the traditions and expedients which we acquire 
after birth as well as our material surroundings—that all our political development from the 
tribal organisation of the Stone Ages to the modern nation has apparently been due.
The biologist looks on human nature itself as changing, but to him the period of a few 
thousands or tens of thousands of years which constitute the past of politics is quite 
insignificant. Important changes in biological types may perhaps have occurred in the history 
of the world during comparatively short periods, but they must have resulted either from a 
sudden biological 'sport' or from a process of selection fiercer and more discriminating than we 
believe to have taken place in the immediate past of our own species. The present descendants 
of those races which are pictured in early Egyptian tombs show no perceptible change in their 
bodily appearance, and there is no reason to believe that the mental faculties and tendencies 
with which they are born have changed to any greater degree.
The numerical proportions of different races in the world have, indeed, altered during that 
period, as one race proved weaker in war or less able to resist disease than another; and races 
have been mingled by marriage following upon conquest. But if a baby could now be 
exchanged at birth with one born of the same breeding-stock even a hundred thousand years 
ago, one may suppose that neither the ancient nor the modern mother would notice any 
startling difference. The child from the Stone Age would perhaps suffer more seriously than 
our children if he caught measles, or might show somewhat keener instincts in quarrelling and 
hunting, or as he grew up be rather more conscious than his fellows of the 'will to live' and 'the 
joy of life.' Conversely, a transplanted twentieth-century child would resist infectious disease 
better than the other children in the Stone Age, and might, as he grew up, be found to have a 
rather exceptionally colourless and adaptable character. But there apparently the difference 
would end. In essentials the type of each human stock may be supposed to have remained 
unchanged throughout the whole period. In the politics of the distant future that science of 
eugenics, which aims at rapidly improving our type by consciously directed selective breeding, 
may become a dominant factor, but it has had little influence on the politics of the present or 
the past.
Those new facts in our environment which have produced the enormous political changes 
which separate us from our ancestors have been partly new habits of thought and feeling, and 
partly new entities about which we can think and feel.
It is of these new political entities that this chapter will treat. They must have first reached us 
through our senses, and in this case almost entirely through the senses of seeing and hearing. 
But man, like other animals, lives in an unending stream of sense impressions, of innumerable 
sights and sounds and feelings, and is only stirred to deed or thought by those which he 
recognises as significant to him. How then did the new impressions separate themselves from 
the rest and become sufficiently significant to produce political results?
The first requisite in anything which is to stimulate us toward impulse or action is that it 
should be recognisable—that it should be like itself when we met it before, or like something 
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else which we have met before. If the world consisted of things which constantly and 
arbitrarily varied their appearance, if nothing was ever like anything else, or like itself for 
more than a moment at a time, living beings as at present constituted would not act at all. They 
would drift like seaweed among the waves.
The new-born chicken cowers beneath the shadow of the hawk, because one hawk is like 
another. Animals wake at sunrise, because one sunrise is like another; and find nuts or grass 
for food, because each nut and blade of grass is like the rest.
But the recognition of likeness is not in itself a sufficient stimulus to action. The thing 
recognised must also be significant, must be felt in some way to matter to us. The stars 
reappear nightly in the heavens, but, as far as we can tell, no animals but men are stimulated to 
action by recognising them. The moth is not stimulated by recognising a tortoise, nor the cow 
by a cobweb.
Sometimes this significance is automatically indicated to us by nature. The growl of a wild 
beast, the sight of blood, the cry of a child in distress, stand out, without need of experience or 
teaching, from the stream of human sensations, just as, to a hungry fox-cub, the movement or 
glimpse of a rabbit among the undergrowth separates itself at once from the sounds of the 
wind and the colours of the leaves and flowers. Sometimes the significance of a sensation has 
to be learned by the individual animal during its own life, as when a dog, who recognises the 
significance of a rat by instinct, learns to recognise that of a whip (provided it looks like the 
whip which he saw and felt before) by experience and association.
In politics man has to make like things as well as to learn their significance. Political tactics 
would indeed be a much simpler matter if ballot-papers were a natural product, and if on 
beholding a ballot-paper at about the age of twenty-one a youth who had never heard of one 
before were invariably seized with a desire to vote.
The whole ritual of social and political organisation among savages, therefore, illustrates the 
process of creating artificial and easily recognisable political likenesses. If the chief is to be 
recognised as a chief he must, like the ghost of Patroclus, 'be exceedingly like unto himself.' 
He must live in the same house, wear the same clothes, and do the same things year by year; 
and his successor must imitate him. If a marriage or an act of sale is to be recognised as a 
contract, it must be carried out in the customary place and with the customary gestures. In 
some few cases the thing thus artificially brought into existence and made recognisable still 
produces its impulsive effect by acting on those biologically inherited associations which 
enable man and other animals to interpret sensations without experience. The scarlet paint and 
wolfskin headdress of a warrior, or the dragon-mask of a medicine man, appeal, like the smile 
of a modern candidate, directly to our instinctive nature. But even in very early societies the 
recognition of artificial political entities must generally have owed its power of stimulating 
impulse to associations acquired during life. A child who had been beaten by the herald's rod, 
or had seen his father bow down before the king, or a sacred stone, learned to fear the rod, or 
the king, or the stone by association.
Recognition often attaches itself to certain special points (whether naturally developed or 
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artificially made) in the thing recognised. Such points then become symbols of the thing as a 
whole. The evolutionary facts of mimicry in the lower animals show that to some flesh-eating 
insects a putrid smell is a sufficiently convincing symbol of carrion to induce them to lay their 
eggs in a flower, and that the black and yellow bands of the wasp if imitated by a fly are a 
sufficient symbol to keep off birds.[11] In early political society most recognition is guided by 
such symbols. One cannot make a new king, who may be a boy, in all respects like his 
predecessor, who may have been an old man. But one can tattoo both of them with the same 
pattern. It is even more easy and less painful to attach a symbol to a king which is not a part of 
the man himself, a royal staff for instance, which may be decorated and enlarged until it is 
useless as a staff, but unmistakable as a symbol. The king is then recognised as king because 
he is the 'staff-bearer' ( skhpto•cos basile•s). Such a staff is very like a name, and there 
may, perhaps, have been an early Mexican system of sign-writing in which a model of a staff 
stood for a king.
At this point it is already difficult not to intellectualise the whole process. Our own 'common-
sense' and the systematised common-sense of the eighteenth-century philosophers would alike 
explain the fear of tribal man for a royal staff by saying that he was reminded thereby of the 
original social contract between ruler and ruled, or of the pleasure and pain which experience 
had shown to be derived from royal leadership and royal punishments, and that he therefore 
decided by a process of reasoning on seeing the staff to fear the king.
When the symbol by which our impulse is stimulated is actual language, it is still more 
difficult not to confuse acquired emotional association with the full process of logical 
inference. Because one of the effects of those sounds and signs which we call language is to 
stimulate in us a process of deliberate logical thought we tend to ignore all their other effects. 
Nothing is easier than to make a description of the logical use of language, the breaking up by 
abstraction of a bundle of sensations—one's memory, for instance, of a royal person; the 
selection of a single quality—kingship, for instance—shared by other such bundles of 
sensations, the giving to that quality the name king, and the use of the name to enable us to 
repeat the process of abstraction. When we are consciously trying to reason correctly by the 
use of language all this does occur, just as it would occur if we had not evolved the use of 
voice-language at all, and were attempting to construct a valid logic of colours and models and 
pictures. But any text-book of psychology will explain why it errs, both by excess and defect, 
if taken as a description of that which actually happens when language is used for the purpose 
of stimulating us to action.
Indeed the 'brass-instrument psychologists,' who do such admirable work in their laboratories, 
have invented an experiment on the effect of significant words which every one may try for 
himself. Let him get a friend to write in large letters on cards a series of common political 
terms, nations, parties, principles, and so on. Let him then sit before a watch recording tenths 
of seconds, turn up the cards, and practise observation of the associations which successively 
enter his consciousness. The first associations revealed will be automatic and obviously 
'illogical.' If the word be 'England' the white and black marks on the paper will, if the 
experimenter is a 'visualiser,' produce at once a picture of some kind accompanied by a vague 
and half conscious emotional reaction of affection, perhaps, or anxiety, or the remembrance of 
puzzled thought. If the experimenter is 'audile,' the marks will first call up a vivid sound image 
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with which a like emotional reaction may be associated. I am a 'visualiser,' and the picture in 
my case was a blurred triangular outline. Other 'visualisers' have described to me the picture of 
a red flag, or of a green field (seen from a railway carriage), as automatically called up by the 
word England. After the automatic picture or sound image and its purely automatic emotional 
accompaniment comes the 'meaning' of the word, the things one knows about England, which 
are presented to the memory by a process semi-automatic at first, but requiring before it is 
exhausted a severe effort. The question as to what images and feelings shall appear at each 
stage is, of course, settled by all the thoughts and events of our past life, but they appear, in the 
earlier moments at least of the experiment, before we have time consciously to reflect or 
choose.
A corresponding process may be set up by other symbols besides language. If in the 
experiment the hats belonging to members of a family be substituted for the written cards, the 
rest of the process will go on—the automatic 'image,' automatically accompanied by emotional 
association, being succeeded in the course of a second or so by the voluntary realisation of 
'meaning,' and finally by a deliberate effort of recollection and thought. Tennyson, partly 
because he was a born poet and partly perhaps because his excessive use of tobacco put his 
brain occasionally a little out of focus, was extraordinarily accurate in his account of those 
separate mental states which for most men are merged into one by memory. A song, for 
instance, in the 'Princess,' describes the succession which I have been discussing:—
'Thy voice is heard through rolling drums,
That beat to battle where he stands.
Thy face across his fancy comes,
And gives the battle to his hands:
A moment, while the trumpets blow,
He sees his brood about thy knee;
The next, like fire he meets the foe,
And strikes him dead for thine and thee.'
'Thine and thee' at the end seem to me to express precisely the change from the automatic 
images of 'voice' and 'face' to the reflective mood in which the full meaning of that for which 
he fights is realised.
But it is the 'face' that 'gives the battle to his hands.' Here again, as we saw when comparing 
impulses themselves, it is the evolutionarily earlier more automatic, fact that has the greater, 
and the later intellectual fact which has the less impulsive power. Even as one sits in one's 
chair one can feel that that is so.
Still more clearly can one feel it if one thinks of the phenomena of religion. The only religion 
of any importance which has ever been consciously constructed by a psychologist is the 
Positivism of Auguste Comte. In order to produce a sufficiently powerful stimulus to ensure 
moral action among the distractions and temptations of daily life, he required each of his 
disciples to make for himself a visual image of Humanity. The disciple was to practice mental 
contemplation for a definite period each morning of the remembered figure of some known 
and loved woman—his mother, or wife, or sister. He was to keep the figure always in the same 
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attitude and dress, so that it should always present itself automatically as a definite mental 
image in immediate association with the word Humanité.[12] With that would be automatically 
associated the original impulse of affection for the person imaged. As soon as possible after 
that would come the meaning of the word, and the fuller but less cogent emotional associations 
connected with that meaning. This invention was partly borrowed from certain forms of 
mental discipline in the Roman Catholic Church and partly suggested by Comte's own 
experiences of the effect on him of the image of Madame de Vaux. One of the reasons that it 
has not come into greater use may have been that men in general are not quite such good 
'visualisers' as Comte found himself to be.
Cardinal Newman, in an illuminating passage of his Apologia, explains how he made for 
himself images of personified nations, and hints that behind his belief in the real existence of 
such images was his sense of the convenience of creating them. He says that he identified the 
'character and instinct' of 'states' and of those 'governments of religious communities,' from 
which he suffered so much, with spirits 'partially fallen, capricious, wayward; noble or crafty, 
benevolent or malicious, as the case might he.... My preference of the Personal to the Abstract 
would naturally lead me to this view. I thought it countenanced by the mention of the "Prince 
of Persia" in the prophet Daniel: and I think I considered that it was of such intermediate 
beings that the Apocalypse spoke, when it introduced "the angels of the seven churches."[13] In 
1837 ... I said ... 'Take England with many high virtues and yet a low Catholicism. It seems to 
me that John Bull is a spirit neither of Heaven nor Hell.'
Harnack, in the same way, when describing the causes of the expansion of Christianity, lays 
stress on the use of the word 'church' and the 'possibilities of personification which it 
offered.'[14] This use may have owed its origin to a deliberate intellectual effort of abstraction 
applied by some Christian philosopher to the common qualities of all Christian congregations, 
though it more likely resulted from a half conscious process of adaptation in the employment 
of a current term. But when it was established the word owed its tremendous power over most 
men to the emotions automatically stimulated by the personification, and not to those which 
would follow on a full analysis of the meaning. Religious history affords innumerable such 
instances. The 'truth embodied in a tale' has more emotional power than the unembodied truth, 
and the visual realisation of the central figure of the tale more power than the tale itself. The 
sound-image of a sacred name at which 'every knee shall bow,' or even of one which may be 
formed in the mind but may not be uttered by the lips, has more power at the moment of 
intensest feeling than the realisation of its meaning. Things of the senses—the sacred food 
which one can taste, the Virgin of Kevlaar whom one can see and touch, are apt to be more 
real than their heavenly anti-types.
If we turn to politics for instances of the same fact, we again discover how much harder it is 
there than in religion, or morals, or education, to resist the habit of giving intellectual 
explanations of emotional experiences. For most men the central political entity is their 
country. When a man dies for his country, what does he die for? The reader in his chair thinks 
of the size and climate, the history and population, of some region in the atlas, and explains the 
action of the patriot by his relation to all these things. But what seems to happen in the crisis of 
battle is not the logical building up or analysing of the idea of one's country, but that automatic 
selection by the mind of some thing of sense accompanied by an equally automatic emotion of 
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affection which I have already described. Throughout his life the conscript has lived in a 
stream of sensations, the printed pages of the geography book, the sight of streets and fields 
and faces, the sound of voices or of birds or rivers, all of which go to make up the infinity of 
facts from which he might abstract an idea of his country. What comes to him in the final 
charge? Perhaps the row of pollard elms behind his birth-place. More likely some 
personification of his country, some expedient of custom or imagination for enabling an entity 
which one can love to stand out from the unrealised welter of experience. If he is an Italian it 
may be the name, the musical syllables, of Italia. If he is a Frenchman, it may be the marble 
figure of France with her broken sword, as he saw it in the market-square of his native town, 
or the maddening pulse of the 'Marseillaise.' Romans have died for a bronze eagle on a 
wreathed staff, Englishmen for a flag, Scotchmen for the sound of the pipes.
Once in a thousand years a man may stand in a funeral crowd after the fighting is over, and his 
heart may stir within him as he hears Pericles abstract from the million qualities of individual 
Athenians in the present and the past just those that make the meaning of Athens to the world. 
But afterwards all that he will remember may be the cadence of Pericles' voice, the movement 
of his hand, or the sobbing of some mother of the dead.
In the evolution of politics, among the most important events have been the successive 
creations of new moral entities—of such ideals as justice, freedom, right. In their origin that 
process of conscious logical abstraction, which we are tempted to accept as the explanation of 
all mental phenomena, must have corresponded in great part to the historical fact. We have, for 
instance, contemporary accounts of the conversations in which Socrates compared and 
analysed the unwilling answers of jurymen and statesmen, and we know that the word Justice 
was made by his work an infinitely more effective political term. It is certain too that for many 
centuries before Socrates the slow adaptation of the same word by common use was from time 
to time quickened by some forgotten wise man who brought to bear upon it the intolerable 
effort of conscious thought. But as soon as, at each stage, the work was done, and Justice, like 
a rock statue on whom successive generations of artists have toiled, stood out in compelling 
beauty, she was seen not as an abstraction but as a direct revelation. It is true that this 
revelation made the older symbols mean and dead, but that which overcame them seemed a 
real and visible thing, not a difficult process of comparison and analysis. Antigone in the play 
defied in the name of Justice the command which the sceptre-bearing king had sent through 
the sacred person of his herald. But Justice to her was a goddess, 'housemate of the nether 
gods'—and the sons of those Athenian citizens who applauded the Antigone condemned 
Socrates to death because his dialectic turned the gods back into abstractions.
The great Jewish prophets owed much of their spiritual supremacy to the fact that they were 
able to present a moral idea with intense emotional force without stiffening it into a 
personification; but that was because they saw it always in relation to the most personal of all 
gods. Amos wrote, 'I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will not smell the savour of your 
assemblies.... Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of 
thy viols. But let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as an ever-flowing 
stream.'[15] 'Judgment' and 'righteousness' are not goddesses, but the voice which Amos heard 
was not the voice of an abstraction.
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Sometimes a new moral or political entity is created rather by immediate insight than by the 
slow process of deliberate analysis. Some seer of genius perceives in a flash the essential 
likeness of things hitherto kept apart in men's minds—the impulse which leads to anger with 
one's brother, and that which leads to murder, the charity of the widow's mite and of the rich 
man's gold, the intemperance of the debauchee and of the party leader. But when the master 
dies the vision too often dies with him. Plato's 'ideas' became the formulae of a system of 
magic, and the command of Jesus that one should give all that one had to the poor handed over 
one-third of the land of Europe to be the untaxed property of wealthy ecclesiastics.
It is this last relation between words and things which makes the central difficulty of thought 
about politics. The words are so rigid, so easily personified, so associated with affection and 
prejudice; the things symbolised by the words are so unstable. The moralist or the teacher 
deals, as a Greek would say, for the most part, with 'natural,' the politician always with 
'conventional' species. If one forgets the meaning of motherhood or childhood, Nature has yet 
made for us unmistakable mothers and children who reappear, true to type, in each generation. 
The chemist can make sure whether he is using a word in precisely the same sense as his 
predecessor by a few minutes' work in his laboratory. But in politics the thing named is always 
changing, may indeed disappear and may require hundreds of years to restore. Aristotle 
defined the word 'polity' to mean a state where 'the citizens as a body govern in accordance 
with the general good.'[16] As he wrote, self-government in those States from which he 
abstracted the idea was already withering beneath the power of Macedonia. Soon there were 
no such States at all, and, now that we are struggling back to Aristotle's conception, the name 
which he defined is borne by the 'police' of Odessa. It is no mere accident of philology that 
makes 'Justices' Justice' a paradox. From the time that the Roman jurisconsults resumed the 
work of the Greek philosophers, and by laborious question and answer built up the conception 
of 'natural justice, it, like all other political conceptions, was exposed to the two dangers. On 
the one hand, since the original effort of abstraction was in its completeness incommunicable, 
each generation of users of the word subtly changed its use. On the other hand, the actions and 
institutions of mankind, from which the conception was abstracted, were as subtly changing. 
Even although the manuscripts of the Roman lawyers survived, Roman law and Roman 
institutions had both ceased to be. When the phrases of Justinian were used by a Merovingian 
king or a Spanish Inquisitor not only was the meaning of the words changed, but the facts to 
which the words could have applied in their old sense were gone. Yet the emotional power of 
the bare words remained. The civil law and canon law of the Middle Ages were able to enforce 
all kinds of abuses because the tradition of reverence still attached itself to the sound of 
'Rome.' For hundreds of years, one among the German princes was made somewhat more 
powerful than his neighbours by the fact that he was 'Roman Emperor,' and was called by the 
name of Caesar.
The same difficulties and uncertainties as those which influence the history of a political entity 
when once formed confront the statesman who is engaged in making a new one. The great 
men, Stein, Bismarck, Cavour, or Metternich, who throughout the nineteenth century worked 
at the reconstruction of the Europe which Napoleon's conquests shattered, had to build up new 
States which men should respect and love, whose governments they should willingly obey, 
and for whose continued existence they should be prepared to die in battle. Races and 
languages and religions were intermingled throughout central Europe, and the historical 
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memories of the kingdoms and dukedoms and bishoprics into which the map was divided were 
confused and unexciting. Nothing was easier than to produce and distribute new flags and 
coins and national names. But the emotional effect of such things depends upon associations 
which require time to produce, and which may have to contend against associations already 
existing. The boy in Lombardy or Galicia saw the soldiers and the schoolmaster salute the 
Austrian flag, but the real thrill came when he heard his father or mother whisper the name of 
Italy or Poland. Perhaps, as in the case of Hanover, the old associations and the new are for 
many years almost equally balanced.
In such times men fall back from the immediate emotional associations of the national name 
and search for its meaning. They ask what is the Austrian or the German Empire. As long as 
there was only one Pope men handed on unexamined the old reverence from father to son. 
When for forty years there had been two Popes, at Rome and at Avignon, men began to ask 
what constituted a Pope. And in such times some men go further still. They may ask not only 
what is the meaning of the word Austrian Empire, or Pope, but what in the nature of things is 
the ultimate reason why the Austrian Empire or the Papacy should exist.
The work therefore of nation-building must be carried forward on each plane. The national 
name and flag and anthem and coinage all have their entirely non-logical effect based on 
habitual association. Meanwhile the statesmen strive to create as much meaning as possible for 
such symbols. If all the subjects of a State serve in one army and speak, or understand, one 
language, or even use a black-letter alphabet which has been abandoned elsewhere, the 
national name will mean more to them. The Saxon or the Savoyard will have a fuller answer to 
give himself when he asks 'What does it mean, that I am a German or a Frenchman?' A single 
successful war waged in common will create not only a common history, but a common 
inheritance of passionate feeling. 'Nationalists,' meanwhile, may be striving, by songs and 
pictures and appeals to the past, to revive and intensify the emotional associations connected 
with older national areas—and behind all this will go on the deliberate philosophical 
discussion of the advantages to be derived from large or small, racial or regional States, which 
will reach the statesman at second-hand and the citizen at third-hand. As a result, Italy, 
Belgium, and the German Empire succeed in establishing themselves as States resting upon a 
sufficient basis of patriotism, and Austria-Hungary may, when the time of stress comes, be 
found to have failed.
But if the task of State building in Europe during the nineteenth century was difficult, still 
more difficult is the task before the English statesmen of the twentieth century of creating an 
imperial patriotism. We have not even a name, with any emotional associations, for the United 
Kingdom itself. No Englishman is stirred by the name 'British,' the name 'English' irritates all 
Scotchmen, and the Irish are irritated by both alike. Our national anthem is a peculiarly flat 
and uninspiring specimen of eighteenth-century opera libretto and opera music. The little 
naked St. George on the gold coins, or the armorial pattern on the silver coins never inspired 
any one. The new copper coinage bears, it is true, a graceful figure of Miss Hicks Beach. But 
we have made it so small and ladylike that it has none of the emotional force of the glorious 
portrait heads of France or Switzerland.
The only personification of his nation which the artisan of Oldham or Middlesbrough can 
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recognise is the picture of John Bull as a fat, brutal, early nineteenth-century Midland farmer. 
One of our national symbols alone, the 'Union Jack,' though it is as destitute of beauty as a 
patchwork quilt, is fairly satisfactory. But all its associations so far are with naval warfare.
When we go outside the United Kingdom we are in still worse case. 'The United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland together with its Colonies and Dependencies' has no shorter or more 
inspiring name. Throughout the Colonial Conference of 1907 statesmen and leader writers 
tried every expedient of periphrasis and allusion to avoid hurting any one's feelings even by 
using such a term as 'British Empire.' To the Sydney Bulletin, and to the caricaturists of 
Europe, the fact that any territory on the map of the world is coloured red still recalls nothing 
but the little greedy eyes, huge mouth, and gorilla hands of 'John Bull.'
If, again, the young Boer or Hindoo or ex-American Canadian asks himself what is the 
meaning of membership ('citizenship,' as applied to five-sixths of the inhabitants of the 
Empire, would be misleading) of the Empire, he finds it extraordinarily difficult to give an 
answer. When he goes deeper and asks for what purpose the Empire exists, he is apt to be told 
that the inhabitants of Great Britain conquered half the world in a fit of absence of mind and 
have not yet had time to think out an ex post facto justification for so doing. The only product 
of memory or reflection that can stir in him the emotion of patriotism is the statement that so 
far the tradition of the Empire has been to encourage and trust to political freedom. But 
political freedom, even in its noblest form, is a negative quality, and the word is apt to bear 
different meanings in Bengal and Rhodesia and Australia.
States, however, constitute only one among many types of political entities. As soon as any 
body of men have been grouped under a common political name, that name may acquire 
emotional associations as well as an intellectually analysable meaning. For the convenience, 
for instance, of local government the suburbs of Birmingham are divided into separate 
boroughs. Partly because these boroughs occupy the site of ancient villages, partly because 
football teams of Scotch professionals are named after them, partly because human emotions 
must have something to attach themselves to, they are said to be developing a fierce local 
patriotism, and West Bromwich is said to hate Aston as the Blues hated the Greens in the 
Byzantine theatre. In London, largely under the influence of the Birmingham instance, twenty-
nine new boroughs were created in 1899, with names—at least in the case of the City of 
Westminster—deliberately selected in order to revive half-forgotten emotional associations. 
However, in spite of Mr. Chesterton's prophecy in The Napoleon of Notting Hill, very few 
Londoners have learnt to feel or think primarily as citizens of their boroughs. Town Halls are 
built which they never see, coats of arms are invented which they would not recognise; and 
their boroughs are mere electoral wards in which they vote for a list of unknown names 
grouped under the general title adopted by their political party.
The party is, in fact, the most effective political entity in the modern national State. It has 
come into existence with the appearance of representative government on a large scale; its 
development has been unhampered by legal or constitutional traditions, and it represents the 
most vigorous attempt which has been made to adapt the form of our political institutions to 
the actual facts of human nature. In a modern State there may be ten million or more voters. 
Every one of them has an equal right to come forward as a candidate and to urge either as 
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candidate or agitator the particular views which he may hold on any possible political 
question. But to each citizen, living as he does in the infinite stream of things, only a few of 
his ten million fellow-citizens could exist as separate objects of political thought or feeling, 
even if each one of them held only one opinion on one subject without change during his life. 
Something is required simpler and more permanent, something which can be loved and 
trusted, and which can be recognised at successive elections as being the same thing that was 
loved and trusted before; and a party is such a thing.
The origin of any particular party may be due to a deliberate intellectual process. It may be 
formed, as Burke said, by 'a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the 
national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.'[17] But when a 
party has once come into existence its fortunes depend upon facts of human nature of which 
deliberate thought is only one. It is primarily a name, which, like other names, calls up when it 
is heard or seen an 'image' that shades imperceptibly into the voluntary realisation of its 
meaning. As in other cases, emotional reactions can be set up by the name and its automatic 
mental associations. It is the business of the party managers to secure that these automatic 
associations shall be as clear as possible, shall be shared by as large a number as possible, and 
shall call up as many and as strong emotions as possible. For this purpose nothing is more 
generally useful than the party colour. Our distant ancestors must have been able to recognise 
colour before they recognised language, and the simple and stronger emotions more easily 
attach themselves to a colour than to a word. The poor boy who died the other day with the 
ribbon of the Sheffield Wednesday Football Club on his pillow loved the colour itself with a 
direct and intimate affection.
A party tune is equally automatic in its action, and, in the case of people with a musical 'ear,' 
even more effective than a party colour as an object of emotion. As long as the Marseillaise, 
which is now the national tune of France, was the party tune of the revolution its influence was 
enormous. Even now, outside of France, it is a very valuable party asset. It was a wise 
suggestion which an experienced political organiser made in the Westminster Gazette at the 
time of Gladstone's death, that part of the money collected in his honour should be spent in 
paying for the composition of the best possible marching tune, which should be identified for 
all time with the Liberal Party.[18] One of the few mistakes made by the very able men who 
organised Mr. Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Campaign was their failure to secure even a 
tolerably good tune.
Only less automatic than those of colour or tune come the emotional associations called up by 
the first and simplest meaning of the word or words used for the party name. A Greek father 
called his baby 'Very Glorious' or 'Good in Counsel,' and the makers of parties in the same 
way choose names whose primary meanings possess established emotional associations. From 
the beginning of the existence and activity of a party new associations are, however, being 
created which tend to take the place, in association, of the original meaning of the name. No 
one in America when he uses the terms Republican or Democrat thinks of their dictionary 
meanings. Any one, indeed, who did so would have acquired a mental habit as useless and as 
annoying as the habit of reading Greek history with a perpetual recognition of the dictionary 
meanings of names like Aristobulus and Theocritus. Long and precise names which make 
definite assertions as to party policy are therefore soon shortened into meaningless syllables 
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with new associations derived from the actual history of the party. The Constitutional 
Democrats in Russia become Cadets, and the Independent Labour Party becomes the I.L.P. On 
the other hand, the less conscious emotional associations which are automatically excited by 
less precise political names may last much longer. The German National Liberals were 
valuable allies for Bismarck during a whole generation because their name vaguely suggested 
a combination of patriotism and freedom. When the mine-owners in the Transvaal decided 
some years ago to form a political party they chose, probably after considerable discussion, the 
name of 'Progressive.' It was an excellent choice. In South Africa the original associations of 
the word were apparently soon superseded, but elsewhere it long suggested that Sir Percy 
Fitzpatrick and his party had the same sort of democratic sympathies as Mr. M'Kinnon Wood 
and his followers on the London County Council. No one speaking to an audience whose 
critical and logical faculties were fully aroused would indeed contend that because a certain 
body of people had chosen to call themselves Progressives, therefore a vote against them was 
necessarily a vote against progress. But in the dim and shadowy region of emotional 
association a good name, if its associations are sufficiently subconscious, has a real political 
value.
Conversely, the opponents of a party attempt to label it with a name that will excite feelings of 
opposition. The old party terms of Whig and Tory are striking instances of such names given 
by opponents and lasting perhaps half a century before they lost their original abusive 
associations. More modern attempts have been less successful, because they have been more 
precise. 'Jingo' had some of the vague suggestiveness of an effectively bad name, but 
'Separatist,' 'Little Englander,' 'Food Taxer,' remain as assertions to be consciously accepted or 
rejected.
The whole relation between party entities and political impulse can perhaps be best illustrated 
from the art of advertisement. In advertisement the intellectual process can be watched apart 
from its ethical implications, and advertisement and party politics are becoming more and 
more closely assimilated in method. The political poster is placed side by side with the trade or 
theatrical poster on the hoardings, it is drawn by the same artist and follows the same 
empirical rules of art. Let us suppose therefore that a financier thinks that there is an opening 
for a large advertising campaign in connection, say, with the tea trade. The actual tea-leaves in 
the world are as varied and unstable as the actual political opinions of mankind. Every leaf in 
every tea-garden is different from every other leaf, and a week of damp weather may change 
the whole stock in any warehouse. What therefore should the advertiser do to create a 
commercial 'entity,' a 'tea' which men can think and feel about? A hundred years ago he would 
have made a number of optimistic and detailed statements with regard to his opportunities and 
methods of trade. He would have printed in the newspapers a statement that 'William Jones, 
assisted by a staff of experienced buyers, will attend the tea-sales of the East India Company, 
and will lay in parcels from the best Chinese Gardens, which he will retail to his customers at 
a profit of not more than five per centum.' This, however, is an open appeal to the critical 
intellect, and by the critical intellect it would now be judged. We should not consider Mr. 
Jones to be an unbiassed witness as to the excellence of his choice, or think that he would have 
sufficient motive to adhere to his pledge about his rate of profit if he thought he could get 
more.
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Nowadays, therefore, such an advertiser would practice on our automatic and subconscious 
associations. He would choose some term, say 'Parramatta Tea,' which would produce in most 
men a vague suggestion of the tropical East, combined with the subconscious memory of a 
geography lesson on Australia. He would then proceed to create in connection with the word 
an automatic picture-image having previous emotional associations of its own. By the time 
that a hundred thousand pounds had been cleverly spent, no one in England would be able to 
see the word 'Parramatta' on a parcel without a vague impulse to buy, founded on a day-dream 
recollection of his grandmother, or of the British fleet, or of a pretty young English matron, or 
of any other subject that the advertiser had chosen for its association with the emotions of trust 
or affection. When music plays a larger part in English public education it may be possible to 
use it effectively for advertisement, and a 'Parramatta Motif' would in that case appear in all 
the pantomimes, in connection, say, with a song about the Soldier's Return, and would be 
squeaked by a gramophone in every grocer's shop.
This instance has the immense advantage, as an aid to clearness of thought, that up to this 
point no Parramatta Tea exists, and no one has even settled what sort of tea shall be provided 
under that name. Parramatta tea is still a commercial entity pure and simple. It may later on be 
decided to sell very poor tea at a large profit until the original associations of the name have 
been gradually superseded by the association of disappointment. Or it may be decided to 
experiment by selling different teas under that name in different places, and to push the sale of 
the flavour which 'takes on.' But there are other attractive names of teas on the hoardings, with 
associations of babies, and bull-dogs, and the Tower of London. If it is desired to develop a 
permanent trade in competition with these it will probably be found wisest to supply tea of a 
fairly uniform quality, and with a distinctive flavour which may act as its 'meaning.' The great 
difficulty will then come when there is a change of public taste, and when the sales fall off 
because the chosen flavour no longer pleases. The directors may think it safest to go on selling 
the old flavour to a diminishing number of customers, or they may gradually substitute another 
flavour, taking the risk that the number of housewives who say, 'This is not the real Parramatta 
Tea,' may be balanced by the number of those who say, 'Parramatta Tea has improved.' If 
people will not buy the old flavour at all, and prefer to buy the new flavour under a new name, 
the Parramatta Tea Company must be content to disappear, like a religion which has made an 
unsuccessful attempt to put new wine into old bottles.
All these conditions are as familiar to the party politician as they are to the advertiser. The 
party candidate is, at his first appearance, to most of his constituents merely a packet with the 
name of Liberal or Conservative upon it. That name has associations of colour and music, of 
traditional habit and affection, which, when once formed, exist independently of the party 
policy. Unless he bears the party label—unless he is, as the Americans say, a 'regular' candidate
—not only will those habits and affections be cut off from him, but he will find it 
extraordinarily difficult to present himself as a tangible entity to the electors at all. A 
proportion of the electors, varying greatly at different times and at different places, will vote 
for the 'regular' nominee of their party without reference to his programme, though to the rest 
of them, and always to the nominating committee, he must also present a programme which 
can be identified with the party policy. But, in any case, as long as he is a party candidate, he 
must remember that it is in that character that he speaks and acts. The party prepossessions and 
party expectations of his constituents alone make it possible for them to think and feel with 
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him. When he speaks there is between him and his audience the party mask, larger and less 
mobile than his own face, like the mask which enabled actors to be seen and heard in the vast 
open-air theatres of Greece. If he can no longer act the part with sincerity he must either leave 
the stage or present himself in the mask of another party.
Party leaders again have always to remember that the organisation which they control is an 
entity with an existence in the memory and emotions of the electors, independent of their own 
opinions and actions. This does not mean that party leaders cannot be sincere. As individuals 
they can indeed only preserve their political life by being in constant readiness to lose it. 
Sometimes they must even risk the existence of their party itself. When Sir Robert Peel was 
converted to Free Trade in 1845, he had to decide whether he and his friends should shatter the 
Tory Party by leaving it, or should so transform its policy that it might not be recognised, even 
in the half-conscious logic of habit and association, as that entity for which men had voted and 
worked four years before. In either case Peel was doing something other and more serious than 
the expression of his individual opinion on a question of the moment. And yet, if, recognising 
this, he had gone on advocating corn duties for the sake of his party, his whole personal force 
as a politician, and therefore even his party value, would have been lost.
If a celestial intelligence were now to look down from heaven on the earth with the power of 
observing every fact about all human beings at once, he might ask, as the newspaper editors 
are asking as I write, what that Socialism is which influences so many lives? He might answer 
himself with a definition which could be clumsily translated as 'a movement towards greater 
social equality, depending for its force upon three main factors, the growing political power of 
the working classes, the growing social sympathy of many members of all classes, and the 
belief, based on the growing authority of scientific method, that social arrangements can be 
transformed by means of conscious and deliberate contrivance.' He would see men trying to 
forward this movement by proposals as to taxation, wages, and regulative or collective 
administration; some of which proposals would prove to be successfully adapted to the facts of 
human existence and some would in the end be abandoned, either because no nation could be 
persuaded to try them or because when tried they failed. But he would also see that this 
definition of a many-sided and ever-varying movement drawn by abstraction from 
innumerable socialistic proposals and desires is not a description of 'Socialism' as it exists for 
the greater number of its supporters. The need of something which one may love and for 
which one may work has created for thousands of working men a personified 'Socialism,' a 
winged goddess with stern eyes and drawn sword to be the hope of the world and the protector 
of those that suffer. The need of some engine of thought which one may use with absolute 
faith and certainty has also created another Socialism, not a personification, but a final and 
authoritative creed. Such a creed appeared in England in 1884, and William Morris took it 
down in his beautiful handwriting from Mr. Hyndman's lectures. It was the revelation which 
made a little dimly educated working man say to me three years later, with tears of genuine 
humility in his eyes, 'How strange it is that this glorious truth has been hidden from all the 
clever and learned men of the world and shown to me.'
Meanwhile Socialism is always a word, a symbol used in common speech and writing. A 
hundred years hence it may have gone the way of its predecessors—Leveller, Saint-Simonism, 
Communism, Chartism—and may survive only in histories of a movement which has since 
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undergone other transformations and borne other names. It may, on the other hand, remain, as 
the Republic has remained in France, to be the title on coins and public buildings of a 
movement which after many disappointments and disillusionments has succeeded in 
establishing itself as a government.
But the use of a word in common speech is only the resultant of its use by individual men and 
women, and particularly by those who accept it as a party name. Each one of them, as long as 
the movement is really alive, will find that while the word must be used, because otherwise the 
movement will have no political existence, yet its use creates a constant series of difficult 
problems in conduct. Any one who applies the name to himself or others in a sense so 
markedly different from common use as to make it certain or probable that he is creating a 
false impression is rightly charged with want of ordinary veracity. And yet there are cases 
where enormous practical results may depend upon keeping wide the use of a word which is 
tending to be narrowed. The 'Modernist' Roman Catholic who has studied the history of 
religion uses the term 'Catholic Church' to mean a society which has gone through various 
intellectual stages in the past, and which depends for its vitality upon the existence of 
reasonable freedom of change in the future. He therefore calls himself a Catholic. To the Pope 
and his advisers, on the other hand, the Church is an unchanging miracle based on an 
unchanging revelation. Father Tyrrell, when he says that he 'believes' in the Catholic Church, 
though he obviously disbelieves in the actual occurrence of most of the facts which constitute 
the original revelation, seems to them to be simply a liar, who is stealing their name for his 
own fraudulent purposes. They can no more understand him than can the Ultramontanes 
among the German Social-Democrats understand Bernstein and his Modernist allies. Bernstein 
himself, on the other hand, has to choose whether he ought to try to keep open the common 
use of the name Socialist, or whether in the end he will have to abandon it, because his claim 
to use it merely creates bad feeling and confusion of thought.
Sometimes a man of exceptional personal force and power of expression is, so to speak, a party
—a political entity—in himself. He may fashion a permanent and recognisable mask for 
himself as 'Honest John' or 'The Grand Old Man.' But this can as a rule only be done by those 
who learn the main condition of their task, the fact that if an individual statesman's intellectual 
career is to exist for the mass of the present public at all, it must be based either on an 
obstinate adherence to unchanging opinions or on a development, slow, simple, and consistent. 
The indifferent and half attentive mind which most men turn towards politics is like a very 
slow photograph plate. He who wishes to be clearly photographed must stand before it in the 
same attitude for a long time. A bird that flies across the plate leaves no mark.
'Change of opinion,' wrote Gladstone in 1868, 'in those to whose judgment the public looks 
more or less to assist its own, is an evil to the country, although a much smaller evil than their 
persistence in a course which they know to be wrong. It is not always to be blamed. But it is 
always to be watched with vigilance; always to be challenged and put upon its trial.'[19] Most 
statesmen avoid this choice between the loss of force resulting from a public change of 
opinion, and the loss of character resulting from the public persistence in an opinion privately 
abandoned, not only by considering carefully every change in their own conclusions, but by a 
delay, which often seems cowardly and absurd, in the public expression of their thoughts upon 
all questions except those which are ripe for immediate action. The written or reported word 
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remains, and becomes part of that entity outside himself which the stateman is always building 
or destroying or transforming.
The same conditions affect other political entities besides parties and statesmen. If a 
newspaper is to live as a political force it must impress itself on men's minds as holding day by 
day to a consistent view. The writers, not only from editorial discipline, but from the 
instinctive desire to be understood, write in the character of their paper's personality. If it is 
sold to a proprietor holding or wishing to advocate different opinions, it must either frankly 
proclaim itself as a new thing or must make it appear by slow and solemn argumentative steps 
that the new attitude is a necessary development of the old. It is therefore rightly felt that a 
capitalist who buys a paper for the sake of using its old influence to strengthen a new 
movement is doing something to be judged by other moral standards than those which apply to 
the purchase of so much printing-machinery and paper. He may be destroying something 
which has been a stable and intelligible entity for thousands of plain people living in an 
otherwise unintelligible world, and which has collected round it affection and trust as real as 
was ever inspired by an orator or a monarch.
CHAPTER III
NON-RATIONAL INFERENCE IN POLITICS
The assumption—which is so closely interwoven with our habits of political and economic 
thought—that men always act on a reasoned opinion as to their interests, may be divided into 
two separate assumptions: first, that men always act on some kind of inference as to the best 
means of reaching a preconceived end, and secondly, that all inferences are of the same kind, 
and are produced by a uniform process of 'reasoning.'
In the two preceding chapters I dealt with the first assumption, and attempted to show that it is 
important for a politician to realise that men do not always act on inferences as to means and 
ends. I argued that men often act in politics under the immediate stimulus of affection and 
instinct, and that affection and interest may be directed towards political entities which are 
very different from those facts in the world around us which we can discover by deliberate 
observation and analysis.
In this chapter I propose to consider the second assumption, and to inquire how far it is true 
that men, when they do form inferences as to the result of their political actions, always form 
them by a process of reasoning.
In such an inquiry one meets the preliminary difficulty that it is very hard to arrive at a clear 
definition of reasoning. Any one who watches the working of his own mind will find that it is 
by no means easy to trace these sharp distinctions between various mental states, which seem 
so obvious when they are set out in little books on psychology. The mind of man is like a harp, 
all of whose strings throb together; so that emotion, impulse, inference, and the special kind of 
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inference called reasoning, are often simultaneous and intermingled aspects of a single mental 
experience.
This is especially true in moments of action and excitement; but when we are sitting in passive 
contemplation we would often find it hard to say whether our successive states of 
consciousness are best described as emotions or inferences. And when our thought clearly 
belongs to the type of inference it is often hard to say whether its steps are controlled by so 
definite a purpose of discovering truth that we are entitled to call it reasoning.
Even when we think with effort and with a definite purpose, we do not always draw inferences 
or form beliefs of any kind. If we forget a name we say the alphabet over to ourselves and 
pause at each letter to see if the name we want will be suggested to us. When we receive bad 
news we strive to realise it by allowing successive mental associations to arise of themselves, 
and waiting to discover what the news will mean for us. A poet broods with intense creative 
effort on the images which appear in his mind and arranges them, not in order to discover 
truth, but in order to attain an artistic and dramatic end. In Prospero's great speech in The 
Tempest the connection between the successive images—the baseless fabric of this vision—
the cloud-capped towers—the gorgeous palaces—the solemn temples—the great globe itself—
is, for instance, one not of inference but of reverie, heightened by creative effort, and 
subordinated to poetic intention.
Most of the actual inferences which we draw during any day belong, indeed, to a much 
humbler type of thought than do some of the higher forms of non-inferential association. Many 
of our inferences, like the quasi-instinctive impulses which they accompany and modify, take 
place when we are making no conscious effort at all. In such a purely instinctive action as 
leaping backwards from a falling stone, the impulse to leap and the inference that there is 
danger, are simply two names for a single automatic and unconscious process. We can speak 
of instinctive inference as well as of instinctive impulse; we draw, for instance, by an 
instinctive mental process, inferences as to the distance and solidity of objects from the 
movements of our eye-muscles in focussing, and from the difference between the images on 
our two retinas. We are unaware of the method by which we arrive at these inferences, and 
even when we know that the double photograph in the stereoscope is flat, or that the conjurer 
has placed two converging sheets of looking-glass beneath his table, we can only say that the 
photograph 'looks' solid, or that we 'seem' to see right under the table.
The whole process of inference, rational or non-rational, is indeed built up from the primary 
fact that one mental state may call up another, either because the two have been associated 
together in the history of the individual, or because a connection between the two has proved 
useful in the history of the race. If a man and his dog stroll together down the street they turn 
to the right hand or the left, hesitate or hurry in crossing the road, recognise and act upon the 
bicycle bell and the cabman's shout, by using the same process of inference to guide the same 
group of impulses. Their inferences are for the most part effortless, though sometimes they 
will both be seen to pause until they have settled some point by wordless deliberation. It is 
only when a decision has to be taken affecting the more distant purposes of his life that the 
man enters on a region of definitely rational thought where the dog cannot follow him, in 
which he uses words, and is more or less conscious of his own logical methods.
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But the weakness of inference by automatic association as an instrument of thought consists in 
the fact that either of a pair of associated ideas may call up the other without reference to their 
logical connection. The effect calls up the cause as freely as the cause calls up the effect. A 
patient under a hypnotic trance is wonderfully rapid and fertile in drawing inferences, but he 
hunts the scent backward as easily as he does forward. Put a dagger in his hand and he believes 
that he has committed a murder. The sight of an empty plate convinces him that he has had 
dinner. If left to himself he will probably go through routine actions well enough. But any one 
who understands his condition can make him act absurdly.
In the same way when we dream we draw absurd inferences by association. The feeling of 
discomfort due to slight indigestion produces a belief that we are about to speak to a large 
audience and have mislaid our notes, or are walking along the Brighton Parade in a night-shirt. 
Even when men are awake, those parts of their mind to which for the moment they are not 
giving full attention are apt to draw equally unfounded inferences. A conjurer who succeeds in 
keeping the attention of his audience concentrated on the observation of what he is doing with 
his right hand can make them draw irrational conclusions from the movements of his left hand. 
People in a state of strong religious emotion sometimes become conscious of a throbbing 
sound in their ears, due to the increased force of their circulation. An organist, by opening the 
thirty-two foot pipe, can create the same sensation, and can thereby induce in the congregation 
a vague and half-conscious belief that they are experiencing religious emotion.
The political importance of all this consists in the fact that most of the political opinions of 
most men are the result, not of reasoning tested by experience, but of unconscious or half-
conscious inference fixed by habit. It is indeed mainly in the formation of tracks of thought 
that habit shows its power in politics. In our other activities habit is largely a matter of 
muscular adaptation, but the bodily movements of politics occur so seldom that nothing like a 
habit can be set up by them. One may see a respectable voter, whose political opinions have 
been smoothed and polished by the mental habits of thirty years, fumbling over the act of 
marking and folding his ballot paper like a child with its first copybook.
Some men even seem to reverence most those of their opinions whose origin has least to do 
with deliberate reasoning. When Mr. Barrie's Bowie Haggart said: 'I am of opeenion that the 
works of Burns is of an immoral tendency. I have not read them myself, but such is my 
opeenion,'[20] he was comparing the merely rational conclusion which might have resulted 
from a reading of Burns's works with the conviction about them which he found ready-made in 
his mind, and which was the more sacred to him and more intimately his own, because he did 
not know how it was produced.
Opinion thus unconsciously formed is a fairly safe guide in the affairs of our daily life. The 
material world does not often go out of its way to deceive us, and our final convictions are the 
resultant of many hundreds of independent fleeting inferences, of which the valid are more 
numerous and more likely to survive than the fallacious. But even in our personal affairs our 
memory is apt to fade, and we can often remember the association between two ideas, while 
forgetting the cause which created that association. We discover in our mind a vague 
impression that Simpson is a drunkard, and cannot recollect whether we ever had any reason to 
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believe it, or whether some one once told us that Simpson had a cousin who invented a cure 
for drunkenness. When the connection is remembered in a telling phrase, and when its origin 
has never been consciously noticed, we may find ourselves with a really vivid belief for which 
we could, if cross-examined, give no account whatever. When, for instance, we have heard an 
early-Victorian Bishop called 'Soapy Sam' half a dozen times we get a firm conviction of his 
character without further evidence.
Under ordinary circumstances not much harm is done by this fact; because a name would not 
be likely to 'catch on' unless a good many people really thought it appropriate, and unless it 
'caught on' we should not be likely to hear it more than once or twice. But in politics, as in the 
conjuring trade, it is often worth while for some people to take a great deal of trouble in order 
to produce such an effect without waiting for the idea to enforce itself by merely accidental 
repetition. I have already said that political parties try to give each other bad names by an 
organised system of mental suggestion. If the word 'Wastrel,' for instance, appears on the 
contents bills of the Daily Mail one morning as a name for the Progressives during a County 
Council election, a passenger riding on an omnibus from Putney to the Bank will see it half-
consciously at least a hundred times, and will have formed a fairly stable mental association by 
the end of the journey. If he reflected, he would know that only one person has once decided to 
use the word, but he does not reflect, and the effect on him is the same as if a hundred persons 
had used it independently of each other. The contents-bills, indeed, of the newspapers, which 
were originally short and pithy merely from considerations of space, have developed in a way 
which threatens to turn our streets (like the advertisement pages of an American magazine) 
into a psychological laboratory for the unconscious production of permanent associations. 
'Another German Insult,' 'Keir Hardie's Crime,' 'Balfour Backs Down,' are intended to stick 
and do stick in the mind as ready-made opinions.
In all this again the same rule holds as in the production of impulse. Things that are nearer 
sense, nearer to our more ancient evolutionary past, produce a readier inference as well as a 
more compelling impulse. When a new candidate on his first appearance smiles at his 
constituents exactly as if he were an old friend, not only does he appeal, as I said in an earlier 
chapter, to an ancient and immediate instinct of human affection, but he produces at the same 
time a shadowy belief that he is an old friend; and his agent may even imply this, provided that 
he says nothing definite enough to arouse critical and rational attention. By the end of the 
meeting one can safely go as far as to call for three cheers for 'good old Jones.'[21]
Mr. G.K. Chesterton some years ago quoted from a magazine article on American elections a 
sentence which said: 'A little sound common-sense often goes further with an audience of 
American working men than much high-flown argument. A speaker who, as he brought 
forward his points, hammered nails into a board, won hundreds of votes for his side at the last 
Presidential election.'[22] The 'sound common-sense' consisted, not, as Mr. Chesterton 
pretended to believe, in the presentation of the hammering as a logical argument, but in the 
orator's knowledge of the way in which force is given to non-logical inference and his 
willingness to use that knowledge.
When a vivid association has been once formed it sinks into the mass of our mental 
experience, and may then undergo developments and transformations with which deliberate 
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ratiocination had very little to do. I have been told that when an English agitation against the 
importation of Chinese contract labour into South Africa was proposed, an important 
personage said that 'there was not a vote in it.' But the agitation was set on foot, and was based 
on a rational argument that the conditions enacted by the Ordinance amounted to a rather cruel 
kind of slavery imposed upon unusually intelligent Asiatics. Any one, however, who saw 
much of politics in the winter of 1905-6 must have noticed that the pictures of Chinamen on 
the hoardings aroused among very many of the voters an immediate hatred of the Mongolian 
racial type.
This hatred was transferred to the Conservative party, and towards the end of the general 
election of 1906 a picture of a Chinaman thrown suddenly on a lantern screen before a 
working-class audience would have aroused an instantaneous howl of indignation against Mr. 
Balfour.
After the election, however, the memory of the Chinese faces on the posters tended slowly to 
identify itself, in the minds of the Conservatives, with the Liberals who had used them. I had at 
the general election worked in a constituency in which many such posters were displayed by 
my side, and where we were beaten. A year later I stood for the London County Council in the 
same constituency. An hour before the close of the poll I saw, with the unnatural clearness of 
polling-day fatigue, a large white face at the window of the ward committee-room, while a 
hoarse voice roared: 'Where's your bloody pigtail? We cut it off last time: and now we'll put it 
round your bloody neck and strangle you.'
In February 1907, during the County Council election, there appeared on the London 
hoardings thousands of posters which were intended to create a belief that the Progressive 
members on the Council made their personal livelihood by defrauding the ratepayers. If a 
statement had been published to that effect it would have been an appeal to the critical 
intellect, and could have been met by argument, or in the law courts. But the appeal was made 
to the process of subconscious inference. The poster consisted of a picture of a man supposed 
to represent the Progressive Party, pointing a foreshortened finger and saying, with sufficient 
ambiguity to escape the law of libel: 'It's your money we want.' Its effectiveness depended on 
its exploitation of the fact that most men judge of the truth of a charge of fraud by a series of 
rapid and unconscious inferences from the appearance of the man accused. The person 
represented was, if judged by the shape of his hat, the fashion of his watch-chain and ring, the 
neglected condition of his teeth, and the redness of his nose, obviously a professional sharper. 
He was, I believe, drawn by an American artist, and his face and clothes had a vaguely 
American appearance, which, in the region of subconscious association, further suggested to 
most onlookers the idea of Tammany Hall. This poster was brilliantly successful, but, now that 
the election is over, it, like the Chinese pictures, seems likely to continue a career of irrational 
transference. One notices that one Progressive evening paper uses a reduced copy of it 
whenever it wishes to imply that the Moderates are influenced by improper pecuniary motives. 
I myself find that it tends to associate itself in my mind with the energetic politician who 
induced the railway companies and others to pay for it, and who, for all I know, may in his 
own personal appearance recall the best traditions of the English gentleman.
Writers on the 'psychology of the crowd' have pointed out the effect of excitement and 
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numbers in substituting non-rational for rational inference. Any cause, however, which 
prevents a man from giving full attention to his mental processes may produce the phenomena 
of non-rational inference in an extreme degree. I have often watched in some small sub-
committee the method by which either of the two men with a real genius for committee work 
whom I know could control his colleagues. The process was most successful towards the end 
of an afternoon, when the members were tired and somewhat dazed with the effort of 
following a rapid talker through a mass of unfamiliar detail. If at that point the operator 
slightly quickened the flow of his information, and slightly emphasised the assumption that he 
was being thoroughly understood, he could put some at least of his colleagues into a sort of 
waking trance, in which they would have cheerfully assented to the proposition that the best 
means of securing, e.g., the permanence of private schools was a large and immediate increase 
in the number of public schools.
It is sometimes argued that such non-rational inferences are merely the loose fringe of our 
political thinking, and that responsible decisions in politics, whether they are right or wrong, 
are always the result of conscious ratiocination. American political writers, for instance, of the 
traditional intellectualist type are sometimes faced with the fact that the delegates to national 
party conventions, when they select candidates and adopt programmes for Presidential 
elections, are not in a condition in which they are likely to examine the logical validity of their 
own mental processes. Such writers fall back on the reflection that the actual choice of 
President is decided not by excited conventions, but by voters coming straight from the 
untroubled sanctuary of the American home.
President Garfield illustrated this point of view in an often-quoted passage of his speech to the 
Republican Convention of 1880:—
'I have seen the sea lashed into fury and tossed into spray, and its grandeur moves the soul of 
the dullest man. But I remember that it is not the billows, but the calm level of the sea from 
which all heights and depths are measured.... Not here, in this brilliant circle where fifteen 
thousand men and women are gathered, is the destiny of the Republic to be decreed for the 
next four years ... but by four millions of Republican firesides, where the thoughtful voters, 
with wives and children about them, with the calm thoughts inspired by love of home and 
country, with the history of the past, the hopes of the future, and knowledge of the great men 
who have adorned and blessed our nation in days gone by. There God prepares the verdict that 
shall determine the wisdom of our work to-night.'[23]
But the divine oracle, whether in America or in England, turns out, too often, only to be a tired 
householder, reading the headlines and personal paragraphs of his party newspaper, and half-
consciously forming mental habits of mean suspicion or national arrogance. Sometimes, 
indeed, during an election, one feels that it is, after all, in big meetings, where big thoughts can 
be given with all their emotional force, that the deeper things of politics have the best chance 
of recognition.
The voter as he reads his newspaper may adopt by suggestion, and make habitual by 
repetition, not only political opinions but whole trains of political argument; and he does not 
necessarily feel the need of comparing them with other trains of argument already in his mind. 
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A lawyer or a doctor will on quite general principles argue for the most extreme trade-
unionism in his own profession, while he thoroughly agrees with a denunciation of trade-
unionism addressed to him as a railway shareholder or ratepayer. The same audience can 
sometimes be led by way of 'parental rights' to cheer for denominational religious instruction, 
and by way of 'religious freedom' to hoot it. The most skilled political observer that I know, 
speaking of an organised newspaper attack, said, 'As far as I can make out every argument 
used in attack and in defence has its separate and independent effect. They hardly ever meet, 
even if they are brought to bear upon the same mind.' From the purely tactical point of view 
there is therefore much to be said for Lord Lyndhurst's maxim, 'Never defend yourself before a 
popular assemblage, except with and by retorting the attack; the hearers, in the pleasure which 
the assault gives them, will forget the previous charge.'[24]
CHAPTER IV
THE MATERIAL OF POLITICAL REASONING
But man is fortunately not wholly dependent in his political thinking upon those forms of 
inference by immediate association which come so easily to him, and which he shares with the 
higher brutes. The whole progress of human civilisation beyond its earliest stages has been 
made possible by the invention of methods of thought which enable us to interpret and forecast 
the working of nature more successfully than we could if we merely followed the line of least 
resistance in the use of our minds.
These methods, however, when applied in politics, still represent a difficult and uncertain art 
rather than a science producing its effects with mechanical accuracy.
When the great thinkers of Greece laid down rules for valid reasoning, they had, it is true, the 
needs of politics specially in their minds. After the prisoners in Plato's cave of illusion should 
be unbound by true philosophy it was to the service of the State that they were to devote 
themselves, and their first triumph was to be the control of passion by reason in the sphere of 
government. Yet if Plato could visit us now, he would learn that while our glass-makers 
proceed by rigorous and confident processes to exact results, our statesmen, like the glass-
makers of ancient Athens, still trust to empirical maxims and personal skill. Why is it, he 
would ask us, that valid reasoning has proved to be so much more difficult in politics than in 
the physical sciences?
Our first answer might be found in the character of the material with which political reasoning 
has to deal. The universe which presents itself to our reason is the same as that which presents 
itself to our feelings and impulses—an unending stream of sensations and memories, every 
one of which is different from every other, and before which, unless we can select and 
recognise and simplify, we must stand helpless and unable either to act or think. Man has 
therefore to create entities that shall be the material of his reasoning, just as he creates entities 
to be the objects of his emotions and the stimulus of his instinctive inferences.
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Exact reasoning requires exact comparison, and in the desert or the forest there were few 
things which our ancestors could compare exactly. The heavenly bodies seem, indeed, to have 
been the first objects of consciously exact reasoning, because they were so distant that nothing 
could be known of them except position and movement, and their position and movement 
could be exactly compared from night to night.
In the same way the foundation of the terrestrial sciences came from two discoveries, first, that 
it was possible to abstract single qualities, such as position and movement, in all things 
however unlike, from the other qualities of those things and to compare them exactly; and 
secondly, that it was possible artificially to create actual uniformities for the purpose of 
comparison, to make, that is to say, out of unlike things, things so like that valid inferences 
could be drawn as to their behaviour under like circumstances. Geometry, for instance, came 
into the service of man when it was consciously realised that all units of land and water were 
exactly alike in so far as they were extended surfaces. Metallurgy, on the other hand, only 
became a science when men could actually take two pieces of copper ore, unlike in shape and 
appearance and chemical constitution, and extract from them two pieces of copper so nearly 
alike that they would give the same results when treated in the same way.
This second power over his material the student of politics can never possess. He can never 
create an artificial uniformity in man. He cannot, after twenty generations of education or 
breeding render even two human beings sufficiently like each other for him to prophesy with 
any approach to certainty that they will behave alike under like circumstances.
How far has he the first power? How far can he abstract from the facts of man's state qualities 
in respect of which men are sufficiently comparable to allow of valid political reasoning?
On April 5th, 1788, a year before the taking of the Bastille John Adams, then American 
Ambassador to England, and afterwards President of the United States, wrote to a friend 
describing the 'fermentation upon the subject of government' throughout Europe. 'Is 
Government a science or not?' he describes men as asking. 'Are there any principles on which 
it is founded? What are its ends? If indeed there is no rule, no standard, all must be accident 
and chance. If there is a standard, what is it?'[25]
Again and again in the history of political thought men have believed themselves to have 
found this 'standard,' this fact about man which should bear the same relation to politics which 
the fact that all things can be weighed bears to physics, and the fact that all things can be 
measured bears to geometry.
Some of the greatest thinkers of the past have looked for it in the final causes of man's 
existence. Every man differed, it is true, from every other man, but these differences all 
seemed related to a type of perfect manhood which, though few men approached, and none 
attained it, all were capable of conceiving. May not, asked Plato, this type be the pattern—the 
'idea'—of man formed by God and laid up 'in a heavenly place'? If so, men would have 
attained to a valid science of politics when by careful reasoning and deep contemplation they 
had come to know that pattern. Henceforward all the fleeting and varying things of sense 
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would be seen in their due relation to the eternal and immutable purposes of God.
Or the relation of man to God's purpose was thought of not as that between the pattern and the 
copy, but as that between the mind of a legislator as expressed in enacted law, and the 
individual instance to which the law is applied. We can, thought Locke, by reflecting on the 
moral facts of the world, learn God's law. That law confers on us certain rights which we can 
plead in the Court of God, and from which a valid political science can be deduced. We know 
our rights with the same certainty that we know his law.
'Men,' wrote Locke, 'being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker, 
all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order and about his 
business; they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one 
another's, pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of 
nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorise us to 
destroy another as if we were made for one another's uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are 
for ours.'[26]
When the leaders of the American revolution sought for certainty in their argument against 
George the Third they too found it in the fact that men 'are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights.'
Rousseau and his French followers rested these rights on a presumed social contract. Human 
rights stood upon that contract as the elephant upon the tortoise, though the contract itself, like 
the tortoise, was apt to stand upon nothing at all.
At this point Bentham, backed by the sense of humour of mankind, swept aside the whole 
conception of a science of politics deduced from natural right. 'What sort of a thing,' he asked, 
'is a natural right, and where does the maker live, particularly in Atheist's Town, where they 
are most rife?'[27]
Bentham himself believed that he had found the standard in the fact that all men seek pleasure 
and avoid pain. In that respect men were measurable and comparable. Politics and 
jurisprudence could therefore be made experimental sciences in exactly the same sense as 
physics or chemistry. 'The present work,' wrote Bentham, 'as well as any other work of mine 
that has been or will be published on the subject of legislation or any other branch of moral 
science, is an attempt to extend the experimental method of reasoning from the physical 
branch to the moral.'[28]
Bentham's standard of 'pleasure and pain' constituted in many ways an important advance upon 
'natural right.' It was in the first place founded upon a universally accepted fact; all men 
obviously do feel both pleasure and pain. That fact was to a certain extent measurable. One 
could, for instance, count the number of persons who suffered this year from an Indian famine, 
and compare it with the number of those who suffered last year. It was clear also that some 
pains and pleasures were more intense than others, and that therefore the same man could in a 
given number of seconds experience varying amounts of pleasure or pain. Above all, the 
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standard of pleasure and pain was one external to the political thinker himself. John Stuart Mill 
quotes Bentham as saying of all philosophies which competed with his Utilitarianism: 'They 
consist, all of them, in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any 
external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept the author's sentiment or 
opinion as a reason for itself.'[29]
A 'Benthamite,' therefore, whether he was a member of Parliament like Grote or Molesworth, 
or an official like Chadwick, or an organising politician like Francis Place, could always check 
his own feelings about 'rights of property,' 'mischievous agitators,' 'spirit of the Constitution,' 
'insults to the flag,' and so on, by examining statistical facts as to the numerical proportion, the 
income, the hours of work, and the death rate from disease, of the various classes and races 
who inhabited the British Empire.
But as a complete science of politics Benthamism is no longer possible. Pleasure and pain are 
indeed facts about human nature, but they are not the only facts which are important to the 
politician. The Benthamites, by straining the meaning of words, tried to classify such motives 
as instinctive impulse, ancient tradition, habit, or personal and racial idiosyncrasy as being 
forms of pleasure and pain. But they failed; and the search for a basis of valid political 
reasoning has to begin again, among a generation more conscious than were Bentham and his 
disciples of the complexity of the problem, and less confident of absolute success.
In that search one thing at least is becoming clear. We must aim at finding as many relevant 
and measurable facts about human nature as possible, and we must attempt to make all of them 
serviceable in political reasoning. In collecting, that is to say, the material for a political 
science, we must adopt the method of the biologist, who tries to discover how many common 
qualities can be observed and measured in a group of related beings, rather than that of the 
physicist, who constructs, or used to construct, a science out of a single quality common to the 
whole material world.
The facts when collected must, because they are many, be arranged. I believe that it would be 
found convenient by the political student to arrange them under three main heads: descriptive 
facts as to the human type; quantitative facts as to inherited variations from that type observed 
either in individuals or groups of individuals; and facts, both quantitative and descriptive, as to 
the environment into which men are born, and the observed effect of that environment upon 
their political actions and impulses.
A medical student already attempts to master as many as possible of those facts about the 
human type that are relevant to his science. The descriptive facts, for instance, of typical 
human anatomy alone which he has to learn before he can hope to pass his examinations must 
number many thousands. If he is to remember them so that he can use them in practice, they 
must be carefully arranged in associated groups. He may find, for instance, that he remembers 
the anatomical facts about the human eye most easily and correctly by associating them with 
their evolutionary history, or the facts about the bones of the hand by associating them with 
the visual image of a hand in an X-ray photograph.
The quantitative facts as to variations from the anatomical human type are collected for him in 
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statistical form, and he makes an attempt to acquire the main facts as to hygienic environment 
when and if he takes the Diploma of Public Health.
The student teacher, too, during his period of training acquires a series of facts about the 
human type, though in his case they are as yet far less numerous, less accurate and less 
conveniently arranged than those in the medical text-books.
If the student of politics followed such an arrangement, he would at least begin his course by 
mastering a treatise on psychology, containing all those facts about the human type which 
have been shown by experience to be helpful in politics, and so arranged that the student's 
knowledge could be most easily recalled when wanted.
At present, however, the politician who is trained for his work by reading the best-known 
treatises on political theory is still in the condition of the medical student trained by the study 
of Hippocrates or Galen. He is taught a few isolated, and therefore distorted, facts about the 
human type, about pleasure and pain, perhaps, and the association of ideas, or the influence of 
habit. He is told that these are selected from the other facts of human nature in order that he 
may think clearly on the hypothesis of there being no others. What the others may be he is left 
to discover for himself; but he is likely to assume that they cannot be the subject of effective 
scientific thought. He learns also a few empirical maxims about liberty and caution and the 
like, and, after he has read a little of the history of institutions, his political education is 
complete. It is no wonder that the average layman prefers old politicians, who have forgotten 
their book-learning, and young doctors who remember theirs.[30]
A political thinker so trained is necessarily apt to preserve the conception of human nature 
which he learnt in his student days in a separate and sacred compartment of his mind, into 
which the facts of experience, however laboriously and carefully gathered, are not permitted to 
enter. Professor Ostrogorski published, for instance, in 1902, an important and extraordinarily 
interesting book on Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, containing the 
results of fifteen years' close observation of the party system in America and England. The 
instances given in the book might have been used as the basis of a fairly full account of those 
facts in the human type which are of importance to the politician—the nature of our impulses, 
the necessary limitations of our contact with the external world, and the methods of that 
thinking brain which was evolved in our distant past, and which we have now to put to such 
new and strange uses. But no indication was given that Professor Ostrogorski's experience had 
altered in the least degree the conception of human nature with which he started. The facts 
observed are throughout regretfully contrasted with 'free reason,'[31] 'the general idea of 
liberty,'[32] 'the sentiments which inspired the men of 1848,'[33] and the book ends with a 
sketch of a proposed constitution in which the voters are to be required to vote for candidates 
known to them through declarations of policy 'from which all mention of party is rigorously 
excluded.'[34] One seems to be reading a series of conscientious observations of the 
Copernican heavens by a loyal but saddened believer in the Ptolemaic astronomy.
Professor Ostrogorski was a distinguished member of the Constitutional Democratic Party in 
the first Duma of Nicholas II., and must have learnt for himself that if he and his fellows were 
to get force enough behind them to contend on equal terms with the Russian autocracy they 
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must be a party, trusted and obeyed as a party, and not a casual collection of free individuals. 
Some day the history of the first Duma will be written, and we shall then know whether 
Professor Ostrogorski's experience and his faith were at last fused together in the heat of that 
great struggle.
The English translation of Professor Ostrogorski's book is prefaced by an introduction from 
Mr. James Bryce. This introduction shows that even in the mind of the author of The American 
Constitution the conception of human nature which he learnt at Oxford still dwells apart.
'In the ideal democracy,' says Mr. Bryce, 'every citizen is intelligent, patriotic, disinterested. 
His sole wish is to discover the right side in each contested issue, and to fix upon the best man 
among competing candidates. His common sense, aided by a knowledge of the constitution of 
his country, enables him to judge wisely between the arguments submitted to him, while his 
own zeal is sufficient to carry him to the polling booth.'[35]
A few lines further on Mr. Bryce refers to 'the democratic ideal of the intelligent independence 
of the individual voter, an ideal far removed from the actualities of any State.'
What does Mr. Bryce mean by 'ideal democracy'? If it means anything it means the best form 
of democracy which is consistent with the facts of human nature. But one feels, on reading the 
whole passage, that Mr. Bryce means by those words the kind of democracy which might be 
possible if human nature were as he himself would like it to be, and as he was taught at Oxford 
to think that it was. If so, the passage is a good instance of the effect of our traditional course 
of study in politics. No doctor would now begin a medical treatise by saying, 'the ideal man 
requires no food, and is impervious to the action of bacteria, but this ideal is far removed from 
the actualities of any known population.' No modern treatise on pedagogy begins with the 
statement that 'the ideal boy knows things without being taught them, and his sole wish is the 
advancement of science, but no boys at all like this have ever existed.'
And what, in a world where causes have effects and effects causes, does 'intelligent 
independence' mean?
Mr. Herman Merivale, successively Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, under-Secretary 
for the Colonies, and under-Secretary for India, wrote in 1861:
'To retain or to abandon a dominion is not an issue which will ever be determined on the mere 
balance of profit and loss, or on the more refined but even less powerful motives supplied by 
abstract political philosophy. The sense of national honour; the pride of blood, the tenacious 
spirit of self-defence, the sympathies of kindred communities, the instincts of a dominant race, 
the vague but generous desire to spread our civilisation and our religion over the world; these 
are impulses which the student in his closet may disregard, but the statesman dares not....'[36]
What does 'abstract political philosophy' here mean? No medical writer would speak of an 
'abstract' anatomical science in which men have no livers, nor would he add that though the 
student in his closet may disregard the existence of the liver the working physician dares not.
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Apparently Merivale means the same thing by 'abstract' political philosophy that Mr. Bryce 
means by 'ideal' democracy. Both refer to a conception of human nature constructed in all 
good faith by certain eighteenth-century philosophers, which is now no longer exactly 
believed in, but which, because nothing else has taken its place, still exercises a kind of 
shadowy authority in a hypothetical universe.
The fact that this or that writer speaks of a conception of human nature in which he is ceasing 
to believe as 'abstract' or 'ideal' may seem to be of merely academic interest. But such half-
beliefs produce immense practical effects. Because Merivale saw that the political philosophy 
which his teachers studied in their closets was inadequate, and because he had nothing to 
substitute for it, he frankly abandoned any attempt at valid thought on so difficult a question as 
the relation of the white colonies to the rest of the British Empire. He therefore decided in 
effect that it ought to be settled by the rule-of-thumb method of 'cutting the painter'; and, since 
he was the chief official in the Colonial Office at a critical time, his decision, whether it was 
right or wrong, was not unimportant.
Mr. Bryce has been perhaps prevented by the presence in his mind of such a half-belief from 
making that constructive contribution to general political science for which he is better 
equipped than any other man of his time. 'I am myself,' he says in the same Introduction, 'an 
optimist, almost a professional optimist, as indeed politics would be intolerable were not a 
man grimly resolved to see between the clouds all the blue sky he can.'[37] Imagine an 
acknowledged leader in chemical research who, finding that experiment did not bear out some 
traditional formula, should speak of himself as nevertheless 'grimly resolved' to see things 
from the old and comfortable point of view!
The next step in the course of political training which I am advocating would be the 
quantitative study of the inherited variations of individual men when compared with the 
'normal' or 'average' man who had so far served for the study of the type. 
How is the student to approach this part of the course? Every man differs quantitatively from 
every other man in respect of every one of his qualities. The student obviously cannot carry in 
his mind or use for the purposes of thought all the variations even of a single inherited quality 
which are to be found among the fifteen hundred millions or so of human beings who even at 
any one moment are in existence. Much less can he ascertain or remember the inter-relation of 
thousands of inherited qualities in the past history of a race in which individuals are at every 
moment dying and being born.
Mr. H.G. Wells faces this fact in that extremely stimulating essay on 'Scepticism of the 
Instrument,' which he has appended to his Modern Utopia. His answer is that the difficulty is 
'of the very smallest importance in all the practical affairs of life, or indeed in relation to 
anything but philosophy and wide generalisations. But in philosophy it matters profoundly. If I 
order two new-laid eggs for breakfast, up come two unhatched but still unique avian 
individuals, and the chances are they serve my rude physiological purpose.'[38]
To the politician, however, the uniqueness of the individual is of enormous importance, not 
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only when he is dealing with 'philosophy and wide generalisations' but in the practical affairs 
of his daily activity. Even the fowl-breeder does not simply ask for 'two eggs' to put under a 
hen when he is trying to establish a new variety, and the politician, who is responsible for 
actual results in an amazingly complicated world, has to deal with more delicate distinctions 
than the breeder. A statesman who wants two private secretaries, or two generals, or two 
candidates likely to receive equally enthusiastic support from nonconformists and trade-
unionists, does not ask for 'two men.'
On this point, however, most writers on political science seem to suggest that after they have 
described human nature as if all men were in all respects equal to the average man, and have 
warned their readers of the inexactness of their description, they can do no more. All 
knowledge of individual variations must be left to individual experience.
John Stuart Mill, for instance, in the section on the Logic of the Moral Sciences at the end of 
his System of Logic implies this, and seems also to imply that any resulting inexactness in the 
political judgments and forecasts made by students and professors of politics does not involve 
a large element of error.
'Excepting,' he says, 'the degree of uncertainty, which still exists as to the extent of the natural 
differences of individual minds, and the physical circumstances on which these may be 
dependent, (considerations which are of secondary importance when we are considering 
mankind in the average or en masse), I believe most competent judges will agree that the 
general laws of the different constituent elements of human nature are even now sufficiently 
understood to render it possible for a competent thinker to deduce from those laws, with a 
considerable approach to certainty, the particular type of character which would be formed, in 
mankind generally, by any assumed set of circumstances.'[39]
Few people nowadays would be found to share Mill's belief. It is just because we feel 
ourselves unable to deduce with any 'approach to certainty' the effect of circumstances upon 
character, that we all desire to obtain, if it is possible, a more exact idea of human variation 
than can be arrived at by thinking of mankind 'in the average or en masse.'
Fortunately the mathematical students of biology, of whom Professor Karl Pearson is the most 
distinguished leader, are already showing us that facts of inherited variation can be so arranged 
that we can remember them without having to get by heart millions of isolated instances. 
Professor Pearson and the other writers in the periodical Biometrika have measured 
innumerable beech leaves, snails' tongues, human skulls, etc. etc., and have recorded in each 
case the variations of any quality in a related group of individuals by that which Professor 
Pearson calls an 'observation frequency polygon,' but which I, in my own thinking, find that I 
call (from a vague memory of its shape) a 'cocked hat.'
Here is a tracing of such a figure, founded on the actual measurement of 25,878 recruits for the 
United States army.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (60 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
The line ABC records, by its distance at successive points from the line AC, the number of 
recruits reaching successive inches of height. It shows, e.g. (as indicated by the dotted lines) 
that the number of recruits between 5 ft. 11 in. and 6 ft. was about 1500, and the number of 
those between 5 ft. 7 in. and 5 ft. 8 in. about 4000.[40]
Such figures, when they simply record the results of the fact that the likeness of the offspring 
to the parent in evolution is constantly inexact, are (like the records of other cases of 'chance' 
variation) fairly symmetrical, the greatest number of instances being found at the mean, and 
the descending curves of those above and those below the mean corresponding pretty closely 
with each other. Boot manufacturers, as the result of experience, construct in effect such a 
curve, making a large number of boots of the sizes which in length or breadth are near the 
mean, and a symmetrically diminishing number of the sizes above and below it.
In the next chapter I shall deal with the use in reasoning of such curves, either actually 'plotted' 
or roughly imagined. In this chapter I point out, firstly, that they can be easily remembered 
(partly because our visual memory is extremely retentive of the image made by a black line on 
a white surface) and that we can in consequence carry in our minds the quantitative facts as to 
a number of variations enormously beyond the possibility of memory if they were treated as 
isolated instances; and secondly, that we can by imagining such curves form a roughly 
accurate idea of the character of the variations to be expected as to any inherited quality 
among groups of individuals not yet born or not yet measured.
The third and last division under which knowledge of man can be arranged for the purposes of 
political study consists of the facts of man's environment, and of the effect of environment 
upon his character and actions. It is the extreme instability and uncertainty of this element 
which constitutes the special difficulty of politics. The human type and the quantitative 
distribution of its variations are for the politician, who deals with a few generations only, 
practically permanent. Man's environment changes with ever-increasing rapidity. The inherited 
nature of every human being varies indeed from that of every other, but the relative frequency 
of the most important variations can be forecasted for each generation. The difference, on the 
other hand, between one man's environment and that of other men can be arranged on no curve 
and remembered or forecasted by no expedient. Buckle, it is true, attempted to explain the 
present and prophesy the future intellectual history of modern nations by the help of a few 
generalisations as to the effect of that small fraction of their environment which consisted of 
climate. But Buckle failed, and no one has attacked the problem again with anything like his 
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (61 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
confidence.
We can, of course, see that in the environment of any nation or class at any given time there 
are some facts which constitute for all its members a common experience, and therefore a 
common influence. Climate is such a fact, or the discovery of America, or the invention of 
printing, or the rates of wages and prices. All nonconformists are influenced by their memory 
of certain facts of which very few churchmen are aware, and all Irishmen by facts which most 
Englishmen try to forget. The student of politics must therefore read history, and particularly 
the history of those events and habits of thought in the immediate past which are likely to 
influence the generation in which he will work. But he must constantly be on his guard against 
the expectation that his reading will give him much power of accurate forecast. Where history 
shows him that such and such an experiment has succeeded or failed he must always attempt 
to ascertain how far success or failure was due to facts of the human type, which he may 
assume to have persisted into his own time, and how far to facts of environment. When he can 
show that failure was due to the ignoring of some fact of the type and can state definitely what 
that fact is, he will be able to attach a real meaning to the repeated and unheeded maxims by 
which the elder members of any generation warn the younger that their ideas are 'against 
human nature.' But if it is possible that the cause was one of mental environment, that is to say, 
of habit or tradition, or memory, he should be constantly on his guard against generalisations 
about national or racial 'character.'
One of the most fertile sources of error in modern political thinking consists, indeed, in the 
ascription to collective habit of that comparative permanence which only belongs to biological 
inheritance. A whole science can be based upon easy generalisations about Celts and Teutons, 
or about East and West, and the facts from which the generalisations are drawn may all 
disappear in a generation. National habits used to change slowly in the past, because new 
methods of life were seldom invented and only gradually introduced, and because the means 
of communicating ideas between man and man or nation and nation were extremely imperfect; 
so that a true statement about a national habit might, and probably would, remain true for 
centuries. But now an invention which may produce profound changes in social or industrial 
life is as likely to be taken up with enthusiasm in some country on the other side of the globe 
as in the place of its origin. A statesman who has anything important to say says it to an 
audience of five hundred millions next morning, and great events like the Battle of the Sea of 
Japan begin to produce their effects thousands of miles off within a few hours of their 
happening. Enough has already occurred under these new conditions to show that the 
unchanging East may to-morrow enter upon a period of revolution, and that English 
indifference to ideas or French military ambition are habits which, under a sufficiently 
extended stimulus, nations can shake off as completely as can individual men.
CHAPTER V
THE METHOD OF POLITICAL REASONING
The traditional method of political reasoning has inevitably shared the defects of its subject-
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matter. In thinking about politics we seldom penetrate behind those simple entities which form 
themselves so easily in our minds, or approach in earnest the infinite complexity of the actual 
world. Political abstractions, such as Justice, or Liberty, or the State, stand in our minds as 
things having a real existence. The names of political species, 'governments,' or 'rights,' or 
'Irishmen,' suggest to us the idea of single 'type specimens'; and we tend, like medieval 
naturalists, to assume that all the individual members of a species are in all respects identical 
with the type specimen and with each other.
In politics a true proposition in the form of 'All A is B' almost invariably means that a number 
of individual persons or things possess the quality B in degrees of variation as numerous as are 
the individuals themselves. We tend, however, under the influence of our words and the 
mental habits associated with them to think of A either as a single individual possessing the 
quality B, or as a number of individuals equally possessing that quality. As we read in the 
newspaper that 'the educated Bengalis are disaffected' we either see, in the half-conscious 
substratum of visual images which accompanies our reading, a single Babu with a disaffected 
expression or the vague suggestion of a long row of identical Babus all equally disaffected.
These personifications and uniformities, in their turn, tempt us to employ in our political 
thinking that method of a priori deduction from large and untried generalisations against 
which natural science from the days of Bacon has always protested. No scientist now argues 
that the planets move in circles, because planets are perfect, and the circle is a perfect figure, 
or that any newly discovered plant must be a cure for some disease because nature has given 
healing properties to all plants. But 'logical' democrats still argue in America that, because all 
men are equal, political offices ought to go by rotation, and 'logical' collectivists sometimes 
argue from the 'principle' that the State should own all the means of production to the 
conclusion that all railway managers should be elected by universal suffrage.
In natural science, again, the conception of the plurality and interaction of causes has become 
part of our habitual mental furniture; but in politics both the book-learned student and the man 
in the street may be heard to talk as if each result had only one cause. If the question, for 
instance, of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is raised, any two politicians, whether they are tramps 
on the outskirts of a Hyde Park crowd or Heads of Colleges writing to the Times, are not 
unlikely to argue, one, that all nations are suspicious, and that therefore the alliance must 
certainly fail, and the other that all nations are guided by their interests, and that therefore the 
alliance must certainly succeed. The Landlord of the 'Rainbow' in Silas Marner had listened to 
many thousands of political discussions before he adopted his formula, 'The truth lies atween 
you: you're both right and both wrong, as I allays say.'
In Economics the danger of treating abstract and uniform words as if they were equivalent to 
abstract and uniform things has now been recognised for the last half century. When this 
recognition began, it was objected by the followers of the 'classical' Political Economy that 
abstraction was a necessary condition of thought, and that all dangers arising from it would be 
avoided if we saw clearly what it was that we were doing. Bagehot, who stood at the meeting-
point of the old Economics and the new, wrote about 1876:—
'Political Economy ... is an abstract science, just as statics and dynamics are deductive 
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sciences. And in consequence, it deals with an unreal and imaginary subject, ... not with the 
entire real man as we know him in fact, but with a simpler imaginary man....'[41]
He goes on to urge that the real and complex man can be depicted by printing on our minds a 
succession of different imaginary simple men. 'The maxim of science,' he says, 'is that of 
common-sense—simple cases first; begin with seeing how the main force acts when there is as 
little as possible to impede it, and when you thoroughly comprehend that, add to it in 
succession the separate effects of each of the encumbering and interfering agencies.'[42]
But this process of mental chromolithography, though it is sometimes a good way of learning a 
science, is not a way of using it; and Bagehot gives no indication how his complex picture of 
man, formed from successive layers of abstraction, is to be actually employed in forecasting 
economic results.
When Jevons published his Theory of Political Economy in 1871, it was already widely felt 
that a simple imaginary man, or even a composite picture made up of a series of different 
simple imaginary men, although useful in answering examination questions, was of very little 
use in drafting a Factory Act or arbitrating on a sliding scale of wages. Jevons therefore based 
his economic method upon the variety and not the uniformity of individual instances. He 
arranged the hours of labour in a working day, or the units of satisfaction from spending 
money, on curves of increase and decrease, and employed mathematical methods to indicate 
the point where one curve, whether representing an imaginary estimate or a record of 
ascertained facts, would cut the others to the best advantage.
Here was something which corresponded, however roughly, to the process by which practical 
people arrive at practical and responsible results. A railway manager who wishes to discover 
the highest rate of charges which his traffic will bear is not interested if he is told that the rate 
when fixed will have been due to the law that all men seek to obtain wealth with as little effort 
as possible, modified in its working by men's unwillingness to break an established business 
habit. He wants a method which, instead of merely providing him with a verbal 'explanation' 
of what has happened, will enable him to form a quantitative estimate of what under given 
circumstances will happen. He can, however, and, I believe, now often does, use the Jevonian 
method to work out definite results in half-pennies and tons from the intersection of plotted 
curves recording actual statistics of rates and traffic.
Since Jevons's time the method which he initiated has been steadily extended; economic and 
statistical processes have become more nearly assimilated, and problems of fatigue or acquired 
skill, of family affection and personal thrift, of management by the entrepreneur or the paid 
official, have been stated and argued in quantitative form. As Professor Marshall said the other 
day, qualitative reasoning in economics is passing away and quantitative reasoning is 
beginning to take its place.[43]
How far is a similar change of method possible in the discussion not of industrial and financial 
processes but of the structure and working of political institutions?
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It is of course easy to pick out political questions which can obviously be treated by 
quantitative methods. One may take, for instance, the problem of the best size for a debating 
hall, to be used, say, by the Federal Deliberative Assembly of the British Empire—assuming 
that the shape is already settled. The main elements of the problem are that the hall should be 
large enough to accommodate with dignity a number of members sufficient both for the 
representation of interests and the carrying out of committee work, and not too large for each 
member to listen without strain to a debate. The resultant size will represent a compromise 
among these elements, accommodating a number smaller than would be desirable if the need 
of representation and dignity alone were to be considered, and larger than it would be if the 
convenience of debate alone were considered.
A body of economists could agree to plot out or imagine a succession of 'curves' representing 
the advantage to be obtained from each additional unit of size in dignity, adequacy of 
representation, supply of members for committee work, healthiness, etc., and the disadvantage 
of each additional unit of size as affecting convenience of debate, etc. The curves of dignity 
and adequacy might be the result of direct estimation. The curve of marginal convenience in 
audibility would be founded upon actual 'polygons of variation' recording measurements of the 
distance at which a sufficient number of individuals of the classes and ages expected could 
hear and make themselves heard in a room of that shape. The economists might further, after 
discussion, agree on the relative importance of each element to the final decision, and might 
give effect to their agreement by the familiar statistical device of 'weighting.'
The answer would perhaps provide fourteen square feet on the floor in a room twenty-six feet 
high for each of three hundred and seventeen members. There would, when the answer was 
settled, be a 'marginal' man in point of hearing (representing, perhaps, an average healthy man 
of seventy-four), who would be unable or just able to hear the 'marginal' man in point of 
clearness of speech—who might represent (on a polygon specially drawn up by the Oxford 
Professor of Biology) the least audible but two of the tutors at Balliol. The marginal point on 
the curve of the decreasing utility of successive increments of members from the point of view 
of committee work might show, perhaps, that such work must either be reduced to a point far 
below that which is usual in national parliaments, or must be done very largely by persons not 
members of the assembly itself. The aesthetic curve of dignity might be cut at the point where 
the President of the Society of British Architects could just be induced not to write to the 
Times.
Any discussion which took place on such lines, even although the curves were mere forms of 
speech, would be real and practical. Instead of one man reiterating that the Parliament Hall of 
a great empire ought to represent the dignity of its task, and another man answering that a 
debating assembly which cannot debate is of no use, both would be forced to ask 'How much 
dignity'? and 'How much debating convenience'? As it is, this particular question seems often 
to be settled by the architect, who is deeply concerned with aesthetic effect, and not at all 
concerned with debating convenience. The reasons that he gives in his reports seem 
convincing, because the other considerations are not in the minds of the Building Committee, 
who think of one element only of the problem at a time and make no attempt to co-ordinate all 
the elements. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the fact that the Debating Hall, for 
instance, of the House of Representatives at Washington is no more fitted for debates carried 
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on by human beings than would a spoon ten feet broad be fitted for the eating of soup. The 
able leaders of the National Congress movement in India made the same mistake in 1907, 
when they arranged, with their minds set only on the need of an impressive display, that 
difficult and exciting questions of tactics should be discussed by about fifteen hundred 
delegates in a huge tent, and in the presence of a crowd of nearly ten thousand spectators. I am 
afraid that it is not unlikely that the London County Council may also despise the quantitative 
method of reasoning on such questions, and may find themselves in 1912 provided with a new 
hall admirably adapted to illustrate the dignity of London and the genius of their architect, but 
unfitted for any other purpose.
Nor is the essence of the quantitative method changed when the answer is to be found, not in 
one, but in several 'unknown quantities.' Take, for instance, the question as to the best types of 
elementary school to be provided in London. If it were assumed that only one type of school 
was to be provided, the problem would be stated in the same form as that of the size of the 
Debating Hall. But it is possible in most London districts to provide within easy walking 
distance of every child four or five schools of different types, and the problem becomes that of 
so choosing a limited number of types as to secure that the degree of 'misfit' between child and 
curriculum shall be as small as possible. If we treat the general aptitude (or 'cleverness') of the 
children as differing only by more or less, the problem becomes one of fitting the types of 
school to a fairly exactly ascertainable polygon of intellectual variation. It might appear then 
that the best results would come from the provision, say, of five types of schools providing 
respectively for the 2 per cent, of greatest natural cleverness, the succeeding 10 per cent., the 
intermediate 76 per cent., the comparatively sub-normal 10 per cent., and the 2 per cent, of 
'mentally deficient.' That is to say the local authority would have to provide in that proportion 
Secondary, Higher Grade, Ordinary, Sub-Normal, and Mentally Deficient schools.
A general improvement in nutrition and other home circumstances might tend to 'steepen' the 
polygon of variation, i.e. to bring more children near the normal, or it might increase the 
number of children with exceptional inherited cleverness who were able to reveal that fact, and 
so 'flatten' it; and either case might make a change desirable in the best proportion between the 
types of schools or even in the number of the types.
It would be more difficult to induce a committee of politicians to agree on the plotting of 
curves, representing the social advantage to be obtained by the successive increments of 
satisfaction in an urban industrial population of those needs which are indicated by the terms 
Socialism and Individualism. They could, however, be brought to admit that the discovery of 
curves for that purpose is a matter of observation and inquiry, and that the best possible 
distribution of social duties between the individual and the state would cut both at some point 
or other. For many Socialists and Individualists the mere attempt to think in such a way of 
their problem would be an extremely valuable exercise. If a Socialist and an Individualist were 
required even to ask themselves the question, 'How much Socialism'? or 'How much 
Individualism'? a basis of real discussion would be arrived at—even in the impossible case that 
one should answer, 'All Individualism and no Socialism,' and the other, 'All Socialism and no 
Individualism.'
The fact, of course, that each step towards either Socialism or Individualism changes the 
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character of the other elements in the problem, or the fact that an invention like printing, or 
representative government, or Civil Service examinations, or the Utilitarian philosophy, may 
make it possible to provide greatly increased satisfaction both to Socialist and Individualist 
desires, complicates the question, but does not alter its quantitative character. The essential 
point is that in every case in which a political thinker is able to adopt what Professor Marshall 
calls the quantitative method of reasoning, his vocabulary and method, instead of constantly 
suggesting a false simplicity, warn him that every individual instance with which he deals is 
different from any other, that any effect is a function of many variable causes, and, therefore, 
that no estimate of the result of any act can be accurate unless all its conditions and their 
relative importance are taken into account.
But how far are such quantitative methods possible when a statesman is dealing, neither with 
an obviously quantitative problem, like the building of halls or schools, nor with an attempt to 
give quantitative meaning to abstract terms like Socialism or Individualism, but with the 
enormous complexity of responsible legislation?
In approaching this question we shall be helped if we keep before us a description of the way 
in which some one statesman has, in fact, thought of a great constitutional problem.
Take, for instance, the indications which Mr. Morley gives of the thinking done by Gladstone 
on Home Rule during the autumn and winter of 1885-86. Gladstone, we are told, had already, 
for many years past, pondered anxiously at intervals about Ireland, and now he describes 
himself as 'thinking incessantly about the matter' (vol. iii. p. 268), and 'preparing myself by 
study and reflection' (p. 273).
He has first to consider the state of feeling in England and Ireland, and to calculate to what 
extent and under what influences it may be expected to change. As to English feeling, 'what I 
expect,' he says, 'is a healthy slow fermentation in many minds working towards the final 
product' (p. 261). The Irish desire for self-government, on the other hand, will not change, and 
must be taken, within the time-limit of his problem, as 'fixed' (p. 240). In both England and 
Ireland, however, he believes that 'mutual attachment' may grow (p. 292).
Before making up his mind in favour of some kind of Home Rule, he examines every 
thinkable alternative, especially the development of Irish County Government, or a Federal 
arrangement in which all three of the united kingdoms would be concerned. Here and there he 
finds suggestions in the history of Austria-Hungary, of Norway and Sweden, or of the 'colonial 
type' of government. Nearly every day he reads Burke, and exclaims 'what a magazine of 
wisdom on Ireland and America' (p. 280). He gets much help from 'a chapter on semi-
sovereign assemblies in Dicey's Law of the Constitution (p. 280). He tries to see the question 
from fresh points of view in intimate personal discussions, and by imagining what 'the 
civilised world' (p. 225) will think. As he gets nearer to his subject, he has definite statistical 
reports made for him by 'Welby and Hamilton on the figures' (p. 306), has 'stiff conclaves 
about finance and land' (p. 298), and nearly comes to a final split with Parnell on the question 
whether the Irish contribution to Imperial taxation shall be a fifteenth or a twentieth.
Time and persons are important factors in his calculation. If Lord Salisbury will consent to 
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introduce some measure of Irish self-government, the problem will be fundamentally altered, 
and the same will happen if the general election produces a Liberal majority independent of 
both Irish and Conservatives; and Mr. Morley describes as underlying all his calculations 'the 
irresistible attraction for him of all the grand and eternal commonplaces of liberty and self-
government' (p. 260).
It is not likely that Mr. Morley's narrative touches on more than a fraction of the questions 
which must have been in Gladstone's mind during these months of incessant thought. No 
mention is made, for instance, of religion, or of the military position, or of the permanent 
possibility of enforcing the proposed restrictions on self-government. But enough is given to 
show the complexity of political thought at that stage when a statesman, still uncommitted, is 
considering what will be the effect of a new political departure.
What then was the logical process by which Gladstone's final decision was arrived at?
Did he for instance deal with a succession of simple problems or with one complex problem? 
It is, I think, clear that from time to time isolated and comparatively simple trains of reasoning 
were followed up; but it is also clear that Gladstone's main effort of thought was involved in 
the process of co-ordinating all the laboriously collected contents of his mind onto the whole 
problem. This is emphasised by a quotation in which Mr. Morley, who was closely associated 
with Gladstone's intellectual toil during this period, indicates his own recollection.
'Historians,' he quotes from Professor Gardiner, 'coolly dissect a man's thoughts as they please; 
and label them like specimens in a naturalist's cabinet. Such a thing, they argue, was done for 
mere personal aggrandisement; such a thing for national objects, such a thing from high 
religious motives. In real life we may be sure it was not so' (p. 277).
And it is clear that in spite of the ease and delight with which Gladstone's mind moved among 
'the eternal commonplaces of liberty and self-government,' he is seeking throughout for a 
quantitative solution. 'Home Rule' is no simple entity for him. He realises that the number of 
possible schemes for Irish government is infinite, and he attempts to make at every point in his 
own scheme a delicate adjustment between many varying forces.
A large part of this work of complex co-ordination was apparently in Mr. Gladstone's case 
unconscious. Throughout the chapters one has the feeling—which any one who has had to 
make less important political decisions can parallel from his own experience—that Gladstone 
was waiting for indications of a solution to appear in his mind. He was conscious of his effort, 
conscious also that his effort was being directed simultaneously towards many different 
considerations, but largely unconscious of the actual process of inference, which went on 
perhaps more rapidly when he was asleep, or thinking of something else, than when he was 
awake and attentive. A phrase of Mr. Morley's indicates a feeling with which every politician 
is familiar. 'The reader,' he says,'knows in what direction the main current of Mr. Gladstone's 
thought must have been setting' (p. 236).
That is to say, we are watching an operation rather of art than of science, of long experience 
and trained faculty rather than of conscious method.
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But the history of human progress consists in the gradual and partial substitution of science for 
art, of the power over nature acquired in youth by study, for that which comes in late middle 
age as the half-conscious result of experience. Our problem therefore involves the further 
question, whether those forms of political thought which correspond to the complexity of 
nature are teachable or not? At present they are not often taught. In every generation thousands 
of young men and women are attracted to politics because their intellects are keener, and their 
sympathies wider than those of their fellows. They become followers of Liberalism or 
Imperialism, of Scientific Socialism or the Rights of Men or Women. To them, at first, 
Liberalism and the Empire, Rights and Principles, are real and simple things. Or, like Shelley, 
they see in the whole human race an infinite repetition of uniform individuals, the 'millions on 
millions' who 'wait, firm, rapid, and elate.'[44]
About all these things they argue by the old a priori methods which we have inherited with 
our political language. But after a time a sense of unreality grows upon them. Knowledge of 
the complex and difficult world forces itself into their minds. Like the old Chartists with 
whom I once spent an evening, they tell you that their politics have been 'all talk'—all words—
and there are few among them, except those to whom politics has become a profession or a 
career, who hold on until through weariness and disappointment they learn new confidence 
from new knowledge. Most men, after the first disappointment, fall back on habit or party 
spirit for their political opinions and actions. Having ceased to think of their unknown fellow 
citizens as uniform repetitions of a simple type, they cease to think of them at all; and content 
themselves with using party phrases about the mass of mankind, and realising the individual 
existence of their casual neighbours.
Wordsworth's Prelude describes with pathetic clearness a mental history, which must have 
been that of many thousands of men who could not write great poetry, and whose moral and 
intellectual forces have been blunted and wasted by political disillusionment. He tells us that 
the 'man' whom he loved in 1792, when the French Revolution was still at its dawn, was seen 
in 1798 to be merely 'the composition of the brain.' After agonies of despair and baffled 
affection, he saw 'the individual man ... the man whom we behold with our own eyes.'[45] But 
in that change from a false simplification of the whole to the mere contemplation of the 
individual, Wordsworth's power of estimating political forces or helping in political progress 
was gone for ever.
If this constantly repeated disappointment is to cease, quantitative method must spread in 
politics and must transform the vocabulary and the associations of that mental world into 
which the young politician enters. Fortunately such a change seems at least to be beginning. 
Every year larger and more exact collections of detailed political facts are being accumulated; 
and collections of detailed facts, if they are to be used at all in political reasoning, must be 
used quantitatively. The intellectual work of preparing legislation, whether carried on by 
permanent officials or Royal Commissions or Cabinet Ministers takes every year a more 
quantitative and a less qualitative form.
Compare for instance the methods of the present Commission on the Poor Law with those of 
the celebrated and extraordinarily able Commission which drew up the new Poor Law in 1833-
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34. The argument of the earlier Commissioners' Report runs on lines which it would be easy to 
put in a priori syllogistic form. All men seek pleasure and avoid pain. Society ought to secure 
that pain attaches to anti-social, and pleasure to social conduct. This may be done by making 
every man's livelihood and that of his children normally dependent upon his own exertions, by 
separating those destitute persons who cannot do work useful to the community from those 
who can, and by presenting these last with the alternative of voluntary effort or painful 
restriction. This leads to 'a principle which we find universally admitted, even by those whose 
practice is at variance with it, that the situation [of the pauper] on the whole shall not be made 
really or apparently so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest 
class.'[46] The a priori argument is admirably illustrated by instances, reported by the sub-
commissioners or given in evidence before the Commission, indicating that labouring men 
will not exert themselves unless they are offered the alternative of starvation or rigorous 
confinement, though no attempt is made to estimate the proportion of the working population 
of England whose character and conduct is represented by each instance.
This a priori deduction, illustrated, but not proved by particular instances, is throughout so 
clear and so easily apprehended by the ordinary man that the revolutionary Bill of 1834, which 
affected all sorts of vested interests, passed the House of Commons by a majority of four to 
one and the House of Lords by a majority of six to one.
The Poor Law Commission of 1905, on the other hand, though it contains many members 
trained in the traditions of 1834, is being driven, by the mere necessity of dealing with the 
mass of varied evidence before it, onto new lines. Instead of assuming half consciously that 
human energy is dependent solely on the working of the human will in the presence of the 
ideas of pleasure and pain, the Commissioners are forced to tabulate and consider innumerable 
quantitative observations relating to the very many factors affecting the will of paupers and 
possible paupers. They cannot, for instance, avoid the task of estimating the relative industrial 
effectiveness of health, which depends upon decent surroundings; of hope, which may be 
made possible by State provision for old age; and of the imaginative range which is the result 
of education; and of comparing all these with the 'purely economic' motive created by ideas of 
future pleasure and pain.
The evidence before the Commission is, that is to say, collected not to illustrate general 
propositions otherwise established, but to provide quantitative answers to quantitative 
questions; and instances are in each case accumulated according to a well-known statistical 
rule until the repetition of results shows that further accumulation would be useless.
In 1834 it was enough, in dealing with the political machinery of the Poor Law, to argue that, 
since all men desire their own interest, the ratepayers would elect guardians who would, up to 
the limit of their knowledge, advance the interests of the whole community; provided that 
electoral areas were created in which all sectional interests were represented, and that voting 
power were given to each ratepayer in proportion to his interest. It did not then seem to matter 
much whether the areas chosen were new or old, or whether the body elected had other duties 
or not.
In 1908, on the other hand, it is felt to be necessary to seek for all the causes which are likely 
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to influence the mind of the ratepayer or candidate during an election, and to estimate by such 
evidence as is available their relative importance. It has to be considered, for instance, whether 
men vote best in areas where they keep up habits of political action in connection with 
parliamentary as well as municipal contests; and whether an election involving other points 
besides poor-law administration is more likely to create interest among the electorate. If more 
than one election, again, is held in a district in any year it may be found by the record of the 
percentage of votes that electoral enthusiasm diminishes for each additional contest along a 
very rapidly descending curve.
The final decisions that will be taken either by the Commission or by Parliament on questions 
of administrative policy and electoral machinery must therefore involve the balancing of all 
these and many other considerations by an essentially quantitative process. The line, that is to 
say, which ultimately cuts the curves indicated by the evidence will allow less weight either to 
anxiety for the future as a motive for exertion, or to personal health as increasing personal 
efficiency, than would be given to either if it were the sole factor to be considered. There will 
be more 'bureaucracy' than would be desirable if it were not for the need of economising the 
energies of the elected representatives, and less bureaucracy than there would be if it were not 
desirable to retain popular sympathy and consent. Throughout the argument the population of 
England will be looked upon not (as John Stuart Mill would have said) 'on the average or en 
masse,'[47] but as consisting of individuals who can be arranged in 'polygons of variation' 
according to their nervous and physical strength, their 'character' and the degree to which ideas 
of the future are likely to affect their present conduct.
Meanwhile the public which will discuss the Report has changed since 1834. Newspaper 
writers, in discussing the problem of destitution, tend now to use, not general terms applied to 
whole social classes like the 'poor,' 'the working class,' or 'the lower orders,' but terms 
expressing quantitative estimates of individual variations, like 'the submerged tenth,' or the 
'unemployable'; while every newspaper reader is fairly familiar with the figures in the Board of 
Trade monthly returns which record seasonal and periodical variations of actual 
unemployment among Trade Unionists.
One could give many other instances of this beginning of a tendency in political thinking, to 
change from qualitative to quantitative forms of argument. But perhaps it will be sufficient to 
give one relating to international politics. 'Sixty years ago sovereignty was a simple question 
of quality. Austin had demonstrated that there must be a sovereign everywhere, and that 
sovereignty, whether in the hands of an autocracy or a republic, must be absolute. But the 
Congress which in 1885 sat at Berlin to prevent the partition of Africa from causing a series of 
European wars as long as those caused by the partition of America, was compelled by the 
complexity of the problems before it to approach the question of sovereignty on quantitative 
lines. Since 1885 therefore every one has become familiar with the terms then invented to 
express gradations of sovereignty: 'Effective occupation,' 'Hinterland,' 'Sphere of Influence'—
to which the Algeçiras Conference has perhaps added a lowest grade, 'Sphere of Legitimate 
Aspiration.' It is already as unimportant to decide whether a given region is British territory or 
not, as it is to decide whether a bar containing a certain percentage of carbon should be called 
iron or steel.
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Even in thinking of the smallest subdivisions of observed political fact some men escape the 
temptation to ignore individual differences. I remember that the man who has perhaps done 
more than any one else in England to make a statistical basis for industrial legislation possible, 
once told me that he had been spending the whole day in classifying under a few heads 
thousands of 'railway accidents,' every one of which differed in its circumstances from any 
other; and that he felt like the bewildered porter in Punch, who had to arrange the subleties of 
nature according to the unsubtle tariff-schedule of his company. 'Cats,' he quoted the porter as 
saying, 'is dogs, and guinea-pigs is dogs, but this 'ere tortoise is a hinsect.'
But it must constantly be remembered that quantitative thinking does not necessarily or even 
generally mean thinking in terms of numerical statistics. Number, which obliterates all 
distinction between the units numbered, is not the only, nor always even the most exact means 
of representing quantitative facts. A picture, for instance, may be sometimes nearer to 
quantitative truth, more easily remembered and more useful for purposes of argument and 
verification than a row of figures. The most exact quantitative political document that I ever 
saw was a set of photographs of all the women admitted into an inebriate home. The 
photographs demonstrated, more precisely than any record of approximate measurements 
could have done, the varying facts of physical and nervous structure. It would have been easily 
possible for a committee of medical men to have arranged the photographs in a series of 
increasing abnormality, and to have indicated the photograph of the 'marginal' woman in 
whose case, after allowing for considerations of expense, and for the desirability of 
encouraging individual responsibility, the State should undertake temporary or permanent 
control. And the record was one which no one who had ever seen it could forget.
The political thinker has indeed sometimes to imitate the cabinet-maker, who discards his most 
finely divided numerical rule for some kinds of specially delicate work, and trusts to his sense 
of touch for a quantitative estimation. The most exact estimation possible of a political 
problem may have been contrived when a group of men, differing in origin, education, and 
mental type, first establish an approximate agreement as to the probable results of a series of 
possible political alternatives involving, say, increasing or decreasing state interference, and 
then discover the point where their 'liking' turns into 'disliking.' Man is the measure of man, 
and he may still be using a quantitative process even though he chooses in each case that 
method of measurement which is least affected by the imperfection of his powers. But it is just 
in the cases where numerical calculation is impossible or unsuitable that the politician is likely 
to get most help by using consciously quantitative conceptions.
An objection has been urged against the adoption of political reasoning either implicitly or 
explicitly quantitative, that it involves the balancing against each other of things essentially 
disparate. How is one, it is asked, to balance the marginal unit of national honour involved in 
the continuance of a war with that marginal unit of extra taxation which is supposed to be its 
exact equivalent? How is one to balance the final sovereign spent on the endowment of science 
with the final sovereign spent on a monument to a deceased scientist, or on the final detail in a 
scheme of old age pensions? The obvious answer is that statesmen have to act, and that 
whoever acts does somehow balance all the alternatives which are before him. The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in his annual allocation of grants and remissions of taxation balances no 
stranger things than does the private citizen, who, having a pound or two to spend at 
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (72 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
Christmas, decides between subscribing to a Chinese Mission and providing a revolving hatch 
between his kitchen and his dining-room.
A more serious objection is that we ought not to allow ourselves to think quantitatively in 
politics, that to do so fritters away the plain consideration of principle. 'Logical principles' may 
be only an inadequate representation of the subtlety of nature, but to abandon them is, it is 
contended, to become a mere opportunist.
In the minds of these objectors the only alternative to deductive thought from simple principles 
seems to be the attitude of Prince Bülow, in his speech in the Reichstag on universal suffrage. 
He is reported to have said:—'Only the most doctrinaire Socialists still regarded universal and 
direct suffrage as a fetish and as an infallible dogma. For his own part he was no worshipper of 
idols, and he did not believe in political dogmas. The welfare and the liberty of a country did 
not depend either in whole or in part upon the form of its Constitution or of its franchise. Herr 
Bebel had once said that on the whole he preferred English conditions even to conditions in 
France. But in England the franchise was not universal, equal, and direct. Could it be said that 
Mecklenburg, which had no popular suffrage at all, was governed worse than Haiti, of which 
the world had lately heard such strange news, although Haiti could boast of possessing 
universal suffrage?'[48]
But what Prince Bülow's speech showed, was that he was either deliberately parodying a style 
of scholastic reasoning with which he did not agree, or he was incapable of grasping the first 
conception of quantitative political thought. If the 'dogma' of universal suffrage means the 
assertion that all men who have votes are thereby made identical with each other in all 
respects, and that universal suffrage is the one condition of good government, then, and then 
only, is his attack on it valid. If, however, the desire for universal suffrage is based on the 
belief that a wide extension of political power is one of the most important elements in the 
conditions of good government—racial aptitude, ministerial responsibility, and the like, being 
other elements—then the speech is absolutely meaningless.
But Prince Bülow was making a parliamentary speech, and in parliamentary oratory that 
change from qualitative to quantitative method which has so deeply affected the procedure of 
Conferences and Commissions has not yet made much progress. In a 'full-dress' debate even 
those speeches which move us most often recall Mr. Gladstone, in whose mind, as soon as he 
stood up to speak, his Eton and Oxford training in words always contended with his 
experience of things, and who never made it quite clear whether the 'grand and eternal 
commonplaces of liberty and self-government' meant that certain elements must be of great 
and permanent importance in every problem of Church and State, or that an a priori solution 
of all political problems could be deduced by all good men from absolute and authoritative 
laws.
PART II




In the preceding chapters I have argued that the efficiency of political science, its power, that 
is to say, of forecasting the results of political causes, is likely to increase. I based my 
argument on two facts, firstly, that modern psychology offers us a conception of human nature 
much truer, though more complex, than that which is associated with the traditional English 
political philosophy; and secondly, that, under the influence and example of the natural 
sciences, political thinkers are already beginning to use in their discussions and inquiries 
quantitative rather than merely qualitative words and methods, and are able therefore both to 
state their problems more fully and to answer them with a greater approximation to accuracy.
In this argument it was not necessary to ask how far such an improvement in the science of 
politics is likely to influence the actual course of political history. Whatever may be the best 
way of discovering truth will remain the best, whether the mass of mankind choose to follow it 
or not.
But politics are studied, as Aristotle said, 'for the sake of action rather than of knowledge,'[49] 
and the student is bound, sooner or later, to ask himself what will be the effect of a change in 
his science upon that political world in which he lives and works.
One can imagine, for instance, that a professor of politics in Columbia University, who had 
just taken part as a 'Mugwump' in a well-fought but entirely unsuccessful campaign against 
Tammany Hall, might say: 'The finer and more accurate the processes of political science 
become, the less do they count in politics. Astronomers invent every year more delicate 
methods of forecasting the movements of the stars, but cannot with all their skill divert one 
star an inch from its course. So we students of politics will find that our growing knowledge 
brings us only a growing sense of helplessness. We may learn from our science to estimate 
exactly the forces exerted by the syndicated newspaper press, by the liquor saloons, or by the 
blind instincts of class and nationality and race; but how can we learn to control them? The 
fact that we think about these things in a new way will not win elections or prevent wars.'
I propose, therefore, in this second part of my book to discuss how far the new tendencies 
which are beginning to transform the science of politics are likely also to make themselves felt 
as a new political force. I shall try to estimate the probable influence of these tendencies, not 
only on the student or the trained politician, but on the ordinary citizen whom political science 
reaches only at second or third hand; and, with that intention, shall treat in successive chapters 
their relation to our ideals of political morality, to the form and working of the representative 
and official machinery of the State, and to the possibilities of international and inter-racial 
understanding.
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This chapter deals from that point of view with their probable influence on political morality. 
In using that term I do not mean to imply that certain acts are moral when done from political 
motives which would not be moral if done from other motives, or vice versâ, but to emphasise 
the fact that there are certain ethical questions which can only be studied in close connection 
with political science. There are, of course, points of conduct which are common to all 
occupations. We must all try to be kind, and honest, and industrious, and we expect the general 
teachers of morals to help us to do so. But every occupation has also its special problems, 
which must be stated by its own students before they can be dealt with by the moralist at all.
In politics the most important of these special questions of conduct is concerned with the 
relation between the process by which the politician forms his own opinions and purposes, and 
that by which he influences the opinions and purposes of others.
A hundred or even fifty years ago, those who worked for a democracy of which they had had 
as yet no experience felt no misgivings on this point They looked on reasoning, not as a 
difficult and uncertain process, but as the necessary and automatic working of man's mind 
when faced by problems affecting his interest. They assumed, therefore, that the citizens under 
a democracy would necessarily be guided by reason in the use of their votes, that those 
politicians would be most successful who made their own conclusions and the grounds for 
them most clear to others, and that good government would be secured if the voters had 
sufficient opportunities of listening to free and sincere discussion.
A candidate to-day who comes fresh from his books to the platform almost inevitably begins 
by making the same assumption.
He prepares his speeches and writes his address with the conviction that on his demonstration 
of the relation between political causes and effects will depend the result of the election. 
Perhaps his first shock will come from that maxim which every professional agent repeats over 
and over again to every candidate, 'Meetings are no good.' Those who attend meetings are, he 
is told, in nine cases out of ten, already loyal and habitual supporters of his party. If his 
speeches are logically unanswerable the chief political importance of that fact is to be found, 
not in his power of convincing those who are already convinced, but in the greater enthusiasm 
and willingness to canvass which may be produced among his supporters by their admiration 
of him as a speaker.
Later on he learns to estimate the way in which his address and that of his opponent appeal to 
the constituents. He may, for instance, become suddenly aware of the attitude of mind with 
which he himself opens the envelopes containing other candidates addresses in some election 
(of Poor Law Guardians, for instance), in which he is not specially interested, and of the fact 
that his attention is either not aroused at all, or is only aroused by words and phrases which 
recall some habitual train of thought. By the time that he has become sufficiently confident or 
important to draw up a political programme for himself, he understands the limits within 
which any utterance must be confined that is addressed to large numbers of voters—the fact 
that proposals are only to be brought 'within the sphere of practical politics' which are simple, 
striking, and carefully adapted to the half-conscious memories and likes and dislikes of busy 
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men.
All this means that his own power of political reasoning is being trained. He is learning that 
every man differs from every other man in his interests, his intellectual habits and powers, and 
his experience, and that success in the control of political forces depends on a recognition of 
this and a careful appreciation of the common factors of human nature. But meanwhile it is 
increasingly difficult for him to believe that he is appealing to the same process of reasoning in 
his hearers as that by which he reaches his own conclusions. He tends, that is to say, to think 
of the voters as the subject-matter rather than the sharers of his thoughts. He, like Plato's 
sophist, is learning what the public is, and is beginning to understand 'the passions and desires' 
of that 'huge and powerful brute, how to approach and handle it, at what times it becomes 
fiercest and most gentle, on what occasions it utters its several cries, and what sounds made by 
others soothe or irritate it.'[50] If he resolutely guards himself against the danger of passing 
from one illusion to another, he may still remember that he is not the only man in the 
constituency who has reasoned and is reasoning about politics. If he does personal canvassing 
he may meet sometimes a middle-aged working man, living nearer than himself to the facts of 
life, and may find that this constituent of his has reasoned patiently and deeply on politics for 
thirty years, and that he himself is a rather absurd item in the material of that reasoning. Or he 
may talk with a business man, and be forced to understand some one who sees perhaps more 
clearly than himself the results of his proposals, but who is separated from him by the gulf of a 
difference of desire: that which one hopes the other fears.
Yet however sincerely such a candidate may respect the process by which the more thoughtful 
both of those who vote for him and of those who vote against him reach their conclusions, he 
is still apt to feel that his own part in the election has little to do with any reasoning process at 
all. I remember that before my first election my most experienced political friend said to me, 
'Remember that you are undertaking a six weeks' advertising campaign.' Time is short, there 
are innumerable details to arrange, and the candidate soon returns from the rare intervals of 
mental contact with individual electors to that advertising campaign which deals with the 
electors as a whole. As long as he is so engaged, the maxim that it is wrong to appeal to 
anything but the severest process of logical thought in his constituents will seem to him, if he 
has time to think of it, not so much untrue as irrelevant.
After a time the politician may cease even to desire to reason with his constituents, and may 
come to regard them as purely irrational creatures of feeling and opinion, and himself as the 
purely rational 'over-man' who controls them. It is at this point that a resolute and able 
statesman may become most efficient and most dangerous. Bolingbroke, while he was trying 
to teach his 'Patriot King' how to govern men by understanding them, spoke in a haunting 
phrase of 'that staring timid creature man.'[51] A century before Darwin he, like Swift and 
Plato, was able by sheer intellectual detachment to see his fellow-men as animals. He himself, 
he thought, was one of those few 'among the societies of men ... who engross almost the whole 
reason of the species, who are born to instruct, to guide, and to preserve, who are designed to 
be the tutors and the guardians of human kind.'[52] For the rest, 'Reason has small effect upon 
numbers: a turn of imagination, often as violent and as sudden as a gust of wind, determines 
their conduct.'[53]
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The greatest of Bolingbroke's disciples was Disraeli, who wrote, 'We are not indebted to the 
Reason of man for any of the great achievements which are the landmarks of human action 
and human progress.... Man is only truly great when he acts from the passions; never 
irresistible but when he appeals to the imagination. Even Mormon accounts more votaries than 
Bentham.'[54] It was Disraeli who treated Queen Victoria 'like a woman,' and Gladstone, with 
the Oxford training from which he never fully recovered, who treated her 'like a public 
meeting.'
In spite of Disraeli's essentially kindly spirit, his calculated play upon the instincts of the 
nation which he governed seemed to many in his time to introduce a cold and ruthless element 
into politics, which seemed colder and more ruthless when it appeared in the less kindly 
character of his disciple Lord Randolph Churchill. But the same ruthlessness is often found 
now, and may perhaps be more often found in the future, whenever any one is sufficiently 
concentrated on some political end to break through all intellectual or ethical conventions that 
stand in his way. I remember a long talk, a good many years ago, with one of the leaders of the 
Russian terrorist movement. He said, 'It is no use arguing with the peasants even if we were 
permitted to do so. They are influenced by events not words. If we kill a Tzar, or a Grand 
Duke, or a minister, our movement becomes something which exists and counts with them, 
otherwise, as far as they are concerned, it does not exist at all.'
In war, the vague political tradition that there is something unfair in influencing the will of 
one's fellow-men otherwise than by argument does not exist. This was what Napoleon meant 
when he said, 'À la guerre, tout est moral, et le moral et l'opinion font plus de la moitié de la 
réalité.'[55] And it is curious to observe that when men are consciously or half-consciously 
determining to ignore that tradition they drop into the language of warfare. Twenty years ago, 
the expression 'Class-war' was constantly used among English Socialists to justify the proposal 
that a Socialist party should adopt those methods of parliamentary terrorism (as opposed to 
parliamentary argument) which had been invented by Parnell. When Lord Lansdowne in 1906 
proposed to the House of Lords that they should abandon any calculation of the good or bad 
administrative effect of measures sent to them from the Liberal House of Commons, and 
consider only the psychological effect of their acceptance or rejection on the voters at the next 
general election, he dropped at once into military metaphor. 'Let us' he said, 'be sure that if we 
join issue we do so upon ground which is as favourable as possible to ourselves. In this case I 
believe the ground would be unfavourable to this House, and I believe the juncture is one 
when, even if we were to win for the moment, our victory would be fruitless in the end.'[56]
At first sight, therefore, it might appear that the change in political science which is now going 
on will simply result in the abandonment by the younger politicians of all ethical traditions, 
and the adoption by them, as the result of their new book-learning, of those methods of 
exploiting the irrational elements of human nature which have hitherto been the trade secret of 
the elderly and the disillusioned.
I have been told, for instance, that among the little group of women who in 1906 and 1907 
brought the question of Women's Suffrage within the sphere of practical politics, was one who 
had received a serious academic training in psychology, and that the tactics actually employed 
were in large part due to her plea that in order to make men think one must begin by making 
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them feel.[57]
A Hindoo agitator, again, Mr. Chandra Pal, who also had read psychology, imitated Lord 
Lansdowne a few months ago by saying, 'Applying the principles of psychology to the 
consideration of political problems we find it is necessary that we ... should do nothing that 
will make the Government a power for us. Because if the Government becomes easy, if it 
becomes pleasant, if it becomes good government, then our signs of separation from it will be 
gradually lost.'[58] Mr. Chandra Pal, unlike Lord Lansdowne, was shortly afterwards 
imprisoned, but his words have had an important political effect in India.
If this mental attitude and the tactics based on it succeed, they must, it may be argued, spread 
with constantly increasing rapidity; and just as, by Gresham's Law in commerce, base coin, if 
there is enough of it, must drive out sterling coin, so in politics, must the easier and more 
immediately effective drive out the more difficult and less effective method of appeal.
One cannot now answer such an argument by a mere statement that knowledge will make men 
wise. It was easy in the old days to rely on the belief that human life and conduct would 
become perfect if men only learnt to know themselves. Before Darwin, most political 
speculators used to sketch a perfect polity which would result from the complete adoption of 
their principles, the republics of Plato and of More, Bacon's Atlantis, Locke's plea for a 
government which should consciously realise the purposes of God, or Bentham's Utilitarian 
State securely founded upon the Table of the Springs of Action. We, however, who live after 
Darwin, have learnt the hard lesson that we must not expect knowledge, however full, to lead 
us to perfection. The modern student of physiology believes that if his work is successful, men 
may have better health than they would have if they were more ignorant, but he does not 
dream of producing a perfectly healthy nation; and he is always prepared to face the discovery 
that biological causes which he cannot control may be tending to make health worse. Nor does 
the writer on education now argue that he can make perfect characters in his schools. If our 
imaginations ever start on the old road to Utopia, we are checked by remembering that we are 
blood-relations of the other animals, and that we have no more right than our kinsfolk to 
suppose that the mind of the universe has contrived that we can find a perfect life by looking 
for it. The bees might to-morrow become conscious of their own nature, and of the waste of 
life and toil which goes on in the best ordered hive. And yet they might learn that no greatly 
improved organisation was possible for creatures hampered by such limited powers of 
observation and inference, and enslaved by such furious passions. They might be forced to 
recognise that as long as they were bees their life must remain bewildered and violent and 
short. Political inquiry deals with man as he now is, and with the changes in the organisation 
of his life that can be made during the next few centuries. It may be that some scores of 
generations hence, we shall have discovered that the improvements in government which can 
be brought about by such inquiry, are insignificant when compared with the changes which 
will be made possible when, through the hazardous experiment of selective breeding, we have 
altered the human type itself.
But however anxious we are to see the facts of our existence without illusion, and to hope 
nothing without cause, we can still draw some measure of comfort from the recollection that 
during the few thousand years through which we can trace political history in the past, man, 
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without changing his nature, has made enormous improvements in his polity, and that those 
improvements have often been the result of new moral ideals formed under the influence of 
new knowledge.
The ultimate and wider effect on our conduct of any increase in our knowledge may indeed be 
very different from, and more important than, its immediate and narrower effect. We each of 
us live our lives in a pictured universe, of which only a small part is contributed by our own 
observation and memory, and by far the greater part by what we have learnt from others. The 
changes in that mental picture of our environment made for instance by the discovery of 
America, or the ascertainment of the true movements of the nearer heavenly bodies, exercised 
an influence on men's general conception of their place in the universe, which proved 
ultimately to be more important than their immediate effect in stimulating explorers and 
improving the art of navigation. But none of the changes of outlook in the past have 
approached in their extent and significance those which have been in progress during the last 
fifty years, the new history of man and his surroundings, stretching back through hitherto 
unthought-of ages, the substitution of an illimitable vista of ever changing worlds for the 
imagined perfection of the ordered heavens, and above all the intrusion of science into the 
most intimate regions of ourselves. The effects of such changes often come, it is true, more 
slowly than we hope. I was talking not long ago to one of the ablest of those who were 
beginning their intellectual life when Darwin published the Origin of Species. He told me how 
he and his philosopher brother expected that at once all things should become new, and how 
unwillingly as the years went on they had accepted their disappointment. But though slow, 
they are far-reaching.
To myself it seems that the most important political result of the vast range of new knowledge 
started by Darwin's work may prove to be the extension of the idea of conduct so as to include 
the control of mental processes of which at present most men are either unconscious or 
unobservant. The limits of our conscious conduct are fixed by the limits of our self-
knowledge. Before men knew anger as something separable from the self that knew it, and 
before they had made that knowledge current by the invention of a name, the control of anger 
was not a question of conduct. Anger was a part of the angry man himself, and could only be 
checked by the invasion of some other passion, love, for instance, or fear, which was equally, 
while it lasted, a part of self. The man survived to continue his race if anger or fear or love 
came upon him at the right time, and with the right intensity. But when man had named his 
anger, and could stand outside it in thought, anger came within the region of conduct, 
Henceforth, in that respect, man could choose either the old way of half-conscious obedience 
to an impulse which on the whole had proved useful in his past evolution, or the new way of 
fully conscious control directed by a calculation of results.
A man who has become conscious of the nature of fear, and has acquired the power of 
controlling it, if he sees a boulder bounding towards him down a torrent bed, may either obey 
the immediate impulse to leap to one side, or may substitute conduct for instinct, and stand 
where he is because he has calculated that at the next bound the course of the boulder will be 
deflected. If he decides to stand he may be wrong. It may prove by the event that the 
immediate impulse of fear was, owing to the imperfection of his powers of conscious 
inference, a safer guide than the process of calculation. But because he has the choice, even the 
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decision to follow impulse is a question of conduct. Burke was sincerely convinced that men's 
power of political reasoning was so utterly inadequate to their task, that all his life long he 
urged the English nation to follow prescription, to obey, that is to say, on principle their 
habitual political impulses. But the deliberate following of prescription which Burke 
advocated was something different, because it was the result of choice, from the uncalculated 
loyalty of the past. Those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge cannot forget.
In other matters than politics the influence of the fruit of that tree is now spreading further 
over our lives. Whether we will or not, the old unthinking obedience to appetite in eating is 
more and more affected by our knowledge, imperfect though that be, of the physiological 
results of the quantity and kind of our food. Mr. Chesterton cries out, like the Cyclops in the 
play, against those who complicate the life of man, and tells us to eat 'caviare on impulse,' 
instead of 'grape nuts on principle.'[59] But since we cannot unlearn our knowledge, Mr. 
Chesterton is only telling us to eat caviare on principle. The physician, when he knows the part 
which mental suggestion plays in the cure of disease, may hate and fear his knowledge, but he 
cannot divest himself of it. He finds himself watching the unintended effects of his words and 
tones and gestures, until he realises that in spite of himself he is calculating the means by 
which such effects can be produced. After a time, even his patients may learn to watch the 
effect of 'a good bedside manner' on themselves.
So in politics, now that knowledge of the obscurer impulses of mankind is being spread (if 
only by the currency of new words), the relation both of the politician and the voter to those 
impulses is changing. As soon as American politicians called a certain kind of specially paid 
orator a 'spell-binder,' the word penetrated through the newspapers from politicians to 
audiences. The man who knows that he has paid two dollars to sit in a hall and be 'spell-
bound,' feels, it is true, the old sensations, but feels them with a subtle and irrevocable 
difference. The English newspaper reader who has once heard the word 'sensational,' may try 
to submit every morning the innermost sanctuary of his consciousness to the trained 
psychologists of the halfpenny journals. He may, according to the suggestion of the day, loathe 
the sixty million crafty scoundrels who inhabit the German Empire, shudder at a coming 
comet, pity the cowards on the Government Front Bench, or tremble lest a pantomime lady 
should throw up her part. But he cannot help the existence in the background of his 
consciousness of a self which watches, and, perhaps, is a little ashamed of his 'sensations.' 
Even the rapidly growing psychological complexity of modern novels and plays helps to 
complicate the relation of the men of our time to their emotional impulses. The young 
tradesman who has been reading either Evan Harrington, or a novel by some writer who has 
read Evan Harrington, goes to shake hands with a countess at an entertainment given by the 
Primrose League, or the Liberal Social Council, conscious of pleasure, but to some degree 
critical of his pleasure. His father, who read John Halifax, Gentleman, would have been 
carried away by a tenth part of the condescension which is necessary in the case of the son. A 
voter who has seen John Bull's Other Island at the theatre, is more likely than his father, who 
only saw The Shaughraun, to realise that one's feelings on the Irish question can be thought 
about as well as felt.
In so far as this change extends, the politician may find in the future that an increasing 
proportion of his constituents half-consciously 'see through' the cruder arts of emotional 
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exploitation.
But such an unconscious or half-conscious extension of self-knowledge is not likely of itself to 
keep pace with the parallel development of the political art of controlling impulse. The 
tendency, if it is to be effective, must be strengthened by the deliberate adoption and 
inculcation of new moral and intellectual conceptions—new ideal entities to which our 
affections and desires may attach themselves.
'Science' has been such an entity ever since Francis Bacon found again, without knowing it, 
the path of Aristotle's best thought. The conception of 'Science,' of scientific method and the 
scientific spirit, was built up in successive generations by a few students. At first their 
conception was confined to themselves. Its effects were seen in the discoveries which they 
actually made; but to the mass of mankind they seemed little better than magicians. Now it has 
spread to the whole world. In every class-room and laboratory in Europe and America the 
conscious idea of Science forms the minds and wills of thousands of men and women who 
could never have helped to create it. It has penetrated, as the political conceptions of Liberty or 
of Natural Right never penetrated, to non-European races. Arab engineers in Khartoum, 
doctors and nurses and generals in the Japanese army, Hindoo and Chinese students make of 
their whole lives an intense activity inspired by absolute submission to Science, and not only 
English or American or German town working men, but villagers in Italy or Argentina are 
learning to respect the authority and sympathise with the methods of that organised study 
which may double at any moment the produce of their crops or check a plague among their 
cattle.
'Science,' however, is associated by most men, even in Europe, only with things exterior to 
themselves, things that can be examined by test-tubes and microscopes. They are dimly aware 
that there exists a science of the mind, but that knowledge suggests to them, as yet, no ideal of 
conduct.
It is true that in America, where politicians have learnt more successfully than elsewhere the 
art of controlling other men's unconscious impulses from without, there have been of late some 
noteworthy declarations as to the need of conscious control from within. Some of those 
especially who have been trained in scientific method at the American Universities are now 
attempting to extend to politics the scientific conception of intellectual conduct. But it seems 
to me that much of their preaching misses its mark, because it takes the old form of an 
opposition between 'reason' and 'passion.' The President of the University of Yale said, for 
instance, the other day in a powerful address, 'Every man who publishes a newspaper which 
appeals to the emotions rather than to the intelligence of its readers ... attacks our political life 
at a most vulnerable point.'[60] If forty years ago Huxley had in this way merely preached 
'intelligence' as against 'emotion' in the exploration of nature, few would have listened to him. 
Men will not take up the 'intolerable disease of thought' unless their feelings are first stirred, 
and the strength of the idea of Science has been that it does touch men's feelings, and draws 
motive power for thought from the passions of reverence, of curiosity, and of limitless hope.
The President of Yale seems to imply that in order to reason men must become passionless. He 
would have done better to have gone back to that section of the Republic where Plato teaches 
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that the supreme purpose of the State realises itself in men's hearts by a 'harmony' which 
strengthens the motive force of passion, because the separate passions no longer war among 
themselves, but are concentrated on an end discovered by the intellect.[61]
In politics, indeed, the preaching of reason as opposed to feeling is peculiarly ineffective, 
because the feelings of mankind not only provide a motive for political thought but also fix the 
scale of values which must be used in political judgment. One finds oneself when trying to 
realise this, falling back (perhaps because one gets so little help from current language) upon 
Plato's favourite metaphor of the arts. In music the noble and the base composer are not 
divided by the fact that the one appeals to the intellect and the other to the feelings of his 
hearers. Both must make their appeal to feeling, and both must therefore realise intensely the 
feelings of their audience, and stimulate intensely their own feelings. The conditions under 
which they succeed or fail are fixed, for both, by facts in our emotional nature which they 
cannot change. One, however, appeals by easy tricks to part only of the nature of his hearers, 
while the other appeals to their whole nature, requiring of those who would follow him that for 
the time their intellect should sit enthroned among the strengthened and purified passions.
But what, besides mere preaching, can be done to spread the conception of such a harmony of 
reason and passion, of thought and impulse, in political motive? One thinks of education, and 
particularly of scientific education. But the imaginative range which is necessary if students 
are to transfer the conception of intellectual conduct from the laboratory to the public meeting 
is not common. It would perhaps more often exist if part of all scientific education were given 
to such a study of the lives of scientific men as would reveal their mental history as well as 
their discoveries, if, for instance, the young biologist were set to read the correspondence 
between Darwin and Lyell, when Lyell was preparing to abandon the conclusions on which his 
great reputation was based, and suspending his deepest religious convictions, in the cause of a 
truth not yet made clear.
But most school children, if they are to learn the facts on which the conception of intellectual 
conduct depends, must learn them even more directly. I myself believe that a very simple 
course on the well-ascertained facts of psychology would, if patiently taught, be quite 
intelligible to any children of thirteen or fourteen who had received some small preliminary 
training in scientific method. Mr. William James's chapter on Habit in his Principles of 
Psychology would, for instance, if the language were somewhat simplified, come well within 
their range. A town child, again, lives nowadays in the constant presence of the psychological 
art of advertisement, and could easily be made to understand the reason why, when he is sent 
to get a bar of soap, he feels inclined to get that which is most widely advertised, and what 
relation his inclination has to that mental process which is most likely to result in the buying of 
good soap. The basis of knowledge necessary for the conception of intellectual duty could 
further be enlarged at school by the study in pure literature of the deeper experiences of the 
mind. A child of twelve might understand Carlyle's Essay on Burns if it were carefully read in 
class, and a good sixth form might learn much from Wordsworth's Prelude.
The whole question, however, of such deliberate instruction in the emotional and intellectual 
facts of man's nature as may lead men to conceive of the co-ordination of reason and passion 
as a moral ideal is one on which much steady thinking and observation is still required. The 
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/My%20eBooks/wallas/humannature.htm (82 of 148)4/14/2005 3:45:02 PMHuman Nature in Politics, by Graham Wallas.
instincts of sex, for instance, are becoming in all civilised countries more and more the subject 
of serious thought. Conduct based upon a calculation of results is in that sphere claiming to an 
ever increasing degree control over mere impulse. Yet no one is sure that he has found the way 
to teach the barest facts as to sexual instinct either before or during the period of puberty, 
without prematurely exciting the instincts themselves.
Doctors, again, are more and more recognising that nutrition depends not only upon the 
chemical composition of food but upon our appetite, and that we can become aware of our 
appetite and to some extent control and direct it by our will. Sir William Macewen said not 
long ago, 'We cannot properly digest our food unless we give it a warm welcome from a free 
mind with the prospect of enjoyment.'[62] But it would not be easy to create by teaching that 
co-ordination of the intellect and impulse at which Sir William Macewen hints. If you tell a 
boy that one reason why food is wholesome is because we like it, and that it is therefore our 
duty to like that food which other facts of our nature have made both wholesome and likeable, 
you may find yourself stimulating nothing except his sense of humour.
So, in the case of the political emotions, it is very easy to say that the teacher should aim first 
at making his pupils conscious of the existence of those emotions, then at increasing their 
force, and finally at subordinating them to the control of deliberate reasoning on the 
consequences of political action. But it is extraordinarily difficult to discover how this can be 
done under the actual conditions of school teaching. Mr. Acland, when he was Education 
Minister in 1893, introduced into the Evening School Code a syllabus of instruction on the 
Life and Duties of the Citizen. It consisted of statements of the part played in social life by the 
rate-collector, the policeman, and so on, accompanied by a moral for each section, such as 
'serving personal interest is not enough,' 'need of public spirit and intelligence for good 
Government,' 'need of honesty in giving a vote,' 'the vote a trust as well as a right.' Almost 
every school publisher rushed out a text-book on the subject, and many School Boards 
encouraged its introduction; and yet the experiment, after a careful trial, was an acknowledged 
failure. The new text-books (all of which I had at the time to review), constituted perhaps the 
most worthless collection of printed pages that have ever occupied the same space on a 
bookshelf, and the lessons, with their alternations of instruction and edification, failed to 
stimulate any kind of interest in the students. If our youths and maidens are to be stirred as 
deeply by the conception of the State as were the pupils of Socrates, teachers and the writers of 
text-books must apparently approach their task with something of Socrates' passionate love of 
truth and of the searching courage of his dialectic.
If again, at an earlier age, children still in school are to be taught what Mr. Wells calls 'the 
sense of the State,'[63] we may, by remembering Athens, get some indication of the conditions 
on which success depends. Children will not learn to love London while getting figures by 
heart as to the millions of her inhabitants and the miles of her sewers. If their love is to be 
roused by words, the words must be as beautiful and as simple as the chorus in praise of 
Athens in the Oedipus Coloneus. But such words are not written except by great poets who 
actually feel what they write, and perhaps before we have a poet who loves London as 
Sophocles loved Athens it may be necessary to make London itself somewhat more lovely.
The emotions of children are, however, most easily reached not by words but by sights and 
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sounds. If therefore, they are to love the State, they should either be taken to see the noblest 
aspects of the State or those aspects should be brought to them. And a public building or 
ceremony, if it is to impress the unflinching eyes of childhood, must, like the buildings of 
Ypres or Bruges or the ceremonies of Japan, be in truth impressive. The beautiful aspect of 
social life is fortunately not to be found in buildings and ceremonies only, and no Winchester 
boy used to come back uninfluenced from a visit to Father Dolling in the slums of Landport; 
though boys' eyes are even quicker to see what is genuine in personal motive than in external 
pomp.
More subtle are the difficulties in the way of the deliberate intensification by adult politicians 
of their own political emotions. A life-long worker for education on the London School Board 
once told me that when he wearied of his work—when the words of reports become mere 
words, and the figures in the returns mere figures—he used to go down to a school and look 
closely at the faces of the children in class after class, till the freshness of his impulse came 
back. But for a man who is about to try such an experiment on himself even the word 'emotion' 
is dangerous. The worker in full work should desire cold and steady not hot and disturbed 
impulse, and should perhaps keep the emotional stimulus of his energy, when it is once 
formed, for the most part below the level of full consciousness. The surgeon in a hospital is 
stimulated by every sight and sound in the long rows of beds, and would be less devoted to his 
work if he only saw a few patients brought to his house. But all that he is conscious of during 
the working hours is the one purpose of healing, on which the half-conscious impulses of brain 
and eye and hand are harmoniously concentrated.
Perhaps indeed most adult politicians would gain rather by becoming conscious of new vices 
than of new virtues. Some day, for instance, the word 'opinion' itself may become the 
recognised name of the most dangerous political vice. Men may teach themselves by habit and 
association to suspect those inclinations and beliefs which, if they neglect the duty of thought, 
appear in their minds they know not how, and which, as long as their origin is not examined, 
can be created by any clever organiser who is paid to do so. The most easily manipulated State 
in the world would be one inhabited by a race of Nonconformist business men who never 
followed up a train of political reasoning in their lives, and who, as soon as they were aware of 
the existence of a strong political conviction in their minds, should announce that it was a 
matter of 'conscience' and therefore beyond the province of doubt or calculation.
But, it may be still asked, is it not Utopian to suppose that Plato's conception of the Harmony 
of the Soul—the intensification both of passion and of thought by their conscious co-ordination
—can ever become a part of the general political ideals of a modern nation? Perhaps most men 
before the war between Russia and Japan would have answered, Yes. Many men would now 
answer, No. The Japanese are apparently in some respects less advanced in their conceptions 
of intellectual morality than, say, the French. One hears, for instance, of incidents which seem 
to show that liberty of thought is not always valued in Japanese universities. But both during 
the years of preparation for the war, and during the war itself, there was something in what one 
was told of the combined emotional and intellectual attitude of the Japanese, which to a 
European seemed wholly new. Napoleon contended against the 'idéologues' who saw things as 
they wished them to be, and until he himself submitted to his own illusions he ground them to 
powder. But we associate Napoleon's clearness of vision with personal selfishness. Here was a 
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nation in which every private soldier outdid Napoleon in his determination to see in warfare 
not great principles nor picturesque traditions, but hard facts; and yet the fire of their 
patriotism was hotter than Gambetta's. Something of this may have been due to the inherited 
organisation of the Japanese race, but more seemed to be the effect of their mental 
environment. They had whole-heartedly welcomed that conception of Science which in 
Europe, where it was first elaborated, still struggles with older ideals. Science with them had 
allied, and indeed identified, itself with that idea of natural law which, since they learnt it 
through China from Hindustan, had always underlain their various religions.[64] They had 
acquired, therefore, a mental outlook which was determinist without being fatalist, and which 
combined the most absolute submission to Nature with untiring energy in thought and action.
One would like to hope that in the West a similar fusion might take place between the 
emotional and philosophical traditions of religion, and the new conception of intellectual duty 
introduced by Science. The political effect of such a fusion would be enormous. But for the 
moment that hope is not easy. The inevitable conflict between old faith and new knowledge 
has produced, one fears, throughout Christendom, a division not only between the conclusions 
of religion and science, but also between the religious and the scientific habit of mind. The 
scientific men of to-day no longer dream of learning from an English Bishop, as their 
predecessors learnt from Bishop Butler, the doctrine of probability in conduct, the rule that 
while belief must never be fixed, must indeed always be kept open for the least indication of 
new evidence, action, where action is necessary, must be taken as resolutely on imperfect 
knowledge, if that is the best available, as on the most perfect demonstration. The policy of the 
last Vatican Encyclical will leave few Abbots who are likely to work out, as Abbot Mendel 
worked out in long years of patient observation, a new biological basis for organic evolution. 
Mental habits count for more in politics than do the acceptance or rejection of creeds or 
evidences. When an English clergyman sits at his breakfast-table reading his Times or Mail, 
his attitude towards the news of the day is conditioned not by his belief or doubt that he who 
uttered certain commandments about non-resistance and poverty was God Himself, but by the 
degree to which he has been trained to watch the causation of his opinions. As it is, Dr. 
Jameson's prepared manifesto on the Johannesburg Raid stirred most clergymen like a 
trumpet, and the suggestion that the latest socialist member of Parliament is not a gentleman, 
produces in them a feeling of genuine disgust and despair.
It may be therefore that the effective influence in politics of new ideals of intellectual conduct 
will have to wait for a still wider change of mental attitude, touching our life on many sides. 
Some day the conception of a harmony of thought and passion may take the place, in the 
deepest regions of our moral consciousness, of our present dreary confusion and barren 
conflicts. If that day comes much in politics which is now impossible will become possible. 
The politician will be able not only to control and direct in himself the impulses of whose 
nature he is more fully aware, but to assume in his hearers an understanding of his aim. 
Ministers and Members of Parliament may then find their most effective form of expression in 
that grave simplicity of speech which in the best Japanese State papers rings so strangely to 
our ears, and citizens may learn to look to their representatives, as the Japanese army looked to 
their generals, for that unbought effort of the mind by which alone man becomes at once the 
servant and the master of nature.
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CHAPTER II
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
But our growing knowledge of the causation of political impulse, and of the conditions of 
valid political reasoning, may be expected to change not only our ideals of political conduct 
but also the structure of our political institutions.
I have already pointed out that the democratic movement which produced the constitutions 
under which most civilised nations now live, was inspired by a purely intellectual conception 
of human nature which is becoming every year more unreal to us. If, it may then be asked, 
representative democracy was introduced under a mistaken view of the conditions of its 
working, will not its introduction prove to have been itself a mistake?
Any defender of representative democracy who rejects the traditional democratic philosophy 
can only answer this question by starting again from the beginning, and considering what are 
the ends representation is intended to secure, and how far those ends are necessary to good 
government.
The first end may be roughly indicated by the word consent. The essence< of a representative 
government is that it depends on the periodically renewed consent of a considerable proportion 
of the inhabitants; and the degree of consent required may shade from the mere acceptance of 
accomplished facts, to the announcement of positive decisions taken by a majority of the 
citizens, which the government must interpret and obey.
The question, therefore, whether our adoption of representative democracy was a mistake, 
raises the preliminary question whether the consent of the members of a community is a 
necessary condition of good government. To this question Plato, who among the political 
philosophers of the ancient world stood at a point of view nearest to that of a modern 
psychologist, unhesitatingly answered, No. To him it was incredible that any stable polity 
could be based upon the mere fleeting shadows of popular opinion. He proposed, therefore, in 
all seriousness, that the citizens of his Republic should live under the despotic government of 
those who by 'slaving for it'[65] had acquired a knowledge of the reality which lay behind 
appearance. Comte, writing when modern science was beginning to feel its strength, made, in 
effect, the same proposal. Mr. H.G. Wells, in one of his sincere and courageous speculations, 
follows Plato. He describes a Utopia which is the result of the forcible overthrow of 
representative government by a voluntary aristocracy of trained men of science. He appeals, in 
a phrase consciously influenced by Plato's metaphysics, to 'the idea of a comprehensive 
movement of disillusioned and illuminated men behind the shams and patriotisms, the spites 
and personalities of the ostensible world....'[66] There are some signs, in America as well as in 
England, that an increasing number of those thinkers who are both passionately in earnest in 
their desire for social change and disappointed in their experience of democracy, may, as an 
alternative to the cold-blooded manipulation of popular impulse and thought by professional 
politicians, turn 'back to Plato'; and when once this question is started, neither our existing 
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mental habits nor our loyalty to democratic tradition will prevent it from being fully discussed.
To such a discussion we English, as the rulers of India, can bring an experience of government 
without consent larger than any other that has ever been tried under the conditions of modern 
civilisation. The Covenanted Civil Service of British India consists of a body of about a 
thousand trained men. They are selected under a system which ensures that practically all of 
them will not only possess exceptional mental force, but will also belong to a race, which, in 
spite of certain intellectual limitations, is strong in the special faculty of government; and they 
are set to rule, under a system approaching despotism, a continent in which the most numerous 
races, in spite of their intellectual subtlety, have given little evidence of ability to govern.
Our Indian experiment shows, however, that all men, however carefully selected and trained, 
must still inhabit 'the ostensible world.' The Anglo-Indian civilian during some of his working 
hours—when he is toiling at a scheme of irrigation, or forestry, or famine-prevention—may 
live in an atmosphere of impersonal science which is far removed from the jealousies and 
superstitions of the villagers in his district. But an absolute ruler is judged not merely by his 
efficiency in choosing political means, but also by that outlook on life which decides his 
choice of ends; and the Anglo-Indian outlook on life is conditioned, not by the problem of 
British India as history will see it a thousand years hence, but by the facts of daily existence in 
the little government stations, with their trying climates, their narrow society, and the 
continual presence of an alien and possibly hostile race. We have not, it is true, yet followed 
the full rigour of Plato's system, and chosen the wives of Anglo-Indian officials by the same 
process as that through which their husbands pass. But it may be feared that even if we did so, 
the lady would still remain typical who said to Mr. Nevinson, 'To us in India a pro-native is 
simply a rank outsider.'[67]
What is even more important is the fact that, because those whom the Anglo-Indian civilian 
governs are also living in the ostensible world, his choice of means on all questions involving 
popular opinion depends even more completely than if he were a party politician at home, not 
on things as they are, but on things as they can be made to seem. The avowed tactics of our 
empire in the East have therefore always been based by many of our high officials upon 
psychological and not upon logical considerations. We hold Durbars, and issue Proclamations, 
we blow men from guns, and insist stiffly on our own interpretation of our rights in dealing 
with neighbouring Powers, all with reference to 'the moral effect upon the native mind.' And, 
if half what is hinted at by some ultra-imperialist writers and talkers is true, racial and 
religious antipathy between Hindus and Mohammedans is sometimes welcomed, if not 
encouraged, by those who feel themselves bound at all costs to maintain our dominant position.
The problem of the relation between reason and opinion is therefore one that would exist at 
least equally in Plato's corporate despotism as in the most complete democracy. Hume, in a 
penetrating passage in his essay on The First Principles of Government, says: 'It is ... on 
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and 
most military governments as well as to the most free and the most popular.'[68] It is when a 
Czar or a bureaucracy find themselves forced to govern in opposition to a vague national 
feeling, which may at any moment create an overwhelming national purpose, that the facts of 
man's sublogical nature are most ruthlessly exploited. The autocrat then becomes the most 
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unscrupulous of demagogues, and stirs up racial, or religious, or social hatred, or the lust for 
foreign war, with less scruple than does the proprietor of the worst newspaper in a democratic 
State.
Plato, with his usual boldness, faced this difficulty, and proposed that the loyalty of the subject-
classes in his Republic should be secured once for all by religious faith. His rulers were to 
establish and teach a religion in which they need not believe. They were to tell their people 
'one magnificent lie';[69] a remedy which in its ultimate effect on the character of their rule 
might have been worse than the disease which it was intended to cure.
But even if it is admitted that government without consent is a complicated and ugly process, 
it does not follow either that government by consent is always possible, or that the machinery 
of parliamentary representation is the only possible, or always the best possible, method of 
securing consent.
Government by a chief who is obeyed from custom, and who is himself restrained by custom 
from mere tyranny, may at certain stages of culture be better than anything else which can be 
substituted for it. And representation, even when it is possible, is not an unchanging entity, but 
an expedient capable of an infinite number of variations. In England at this moment we give 
the vote for a sovereign parliament to persons of the male sex above twenty-one years of age, 
who have occupied the same place of residence for a year; and enrol them for voting purposes 
in constituencies based upon locality. But in all these respects, age, sex, qualification, and 
constituency, as well as in the political power given to the representative, variation is possible.
If, indeed, there should appear a modern Bentham, trained not by Fénelon and Helvétius, but 
by the study of racial psychology, he could not use his genius and patience better than in the 
invention of constitutional expedients which should provide for a real degree of government 
by consent in those parts of the British Empire where men are capable of thinking for 
themselves on political questions, but where the machinery of British parliamentary 
government would not work. In Egypt, for instance, one is told that at elections held in 
ordinary local constituencies only two per cent, of those entitled to vote go to the poll.[70] As 
long as that is the case representative government is impossible. A slow process of education 
might increase the proportion of voters, but meanwhile it would surely be possible for men, 
who understand the way in which Egyptians or Arabs think and feel, to discover other methods 
by which the vague desires of the native population can be ascertained, and the policy of the 
government made in some measure to depend on them.
The need for invention is even more urgent in India, and that fact is apparently being realised 
by the Indian Government itself. The inventive range of Lord Morley and his advisers does 
not, however, for the moment appear to extend much beyond the adaptation of the model of 
the English House of Lords to Indian conditions, and the organisation of an 'advisory Council 
of Notables';[71] with the possible result that we may be advised by the hereditary rent-
collectors of Bengal in our dealings with the tillers of the soil, and by the factory owners of 
Bombay in our regulation of factory labour.
In England itself, though great political inventions are always a glorious possibility, the 
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changes in our political structure which will result from our new knowledge are likely, in our 
own time, to proceed along lines laid down by slowly acting, and already recognisable 
tendencies.
A series of laws have, for instance, been passed in the United Kingdom during the last thirty or 
forty years, each of which had little conscious connection with the rest, but which, when seen 
as a whole, show that government now tends to regulate, not only the process of ascertaining 
the decision of the electors, but also the more complex process by which that decision is 
formed; and that this is done not in the interest of any particular body of opinion, but from a 
belief in the general utility of right methods of thought, and the possibility of securing them by 
regulation.
The nature of this change may perhaps be best understood by comparing it with the similar but 
earlier and far more complete change that has taken place in the conditions under which that 
decision is formed which is expressed in the verdict of a jury. Trial by jury was, in its origin, 
simply a method of ascertaining, from ordinary men whose veracity was secured by religious 
sanctions, their real opinions on each case.[72] The various ways in which those opinions might 
have been formed were matters beyond the cognisance of the royal official who called the jury 
together, swore them, and registered their verdict. Trial by jury in England might therefore 
have developed on the same lines as it did in Athens, and have perished from the same causes. 
The number of the jury might have been increased, and the parties in the case might have hired 
advocates to write or deliver for them addresses containing distortions of fact and appeals to 
prejudice as audacious as those in the Private Orations of Demosthenes. It might have become 
more important that the witnesses should burst into passionate weeping than that they should 
tell what they knew, and the final verdict might have been taken by a show of hands, in a 
crowd that was rapidly degenerating into a mob. If such an institution had lasted up to our 
time, the newspapers would have taken sides in every important case. Each would have had its 
own version of the facts, the most telling points of which would have been reserved for the 
final edition on the eve of the verdict, and the fate of the prisoner or defendant would often 
have depended upon a strictly party vote.
But in the English jury trial it has come to be assumed, after a long series of imperceptible and 
forgotten changes, that the opinion of the jurors, instead of being formed before the trial 
begins, should be formed in court. The process, therefore, by which that opinion is produced 
has been more and more completely controlled and developed, until it, and not the mere 
registration of the verdict, has become the essential feature of the trial.
The jury are now separated from their fellow-men during the whole case. They are introduced 
into a world of new emotional values. The ritual of the court, the voices and dress of judge and 
counsel, all suggest an environment in which the petty interests and impulses of ordinary life 
are unimportant when compared with the supreme worth of truth and justice. They are warned 
to empty their minds of all preconceived inferences and affections. The examination and cross-
examination of the witnesses are carried on under rules of evidence which are the result of 
centuries of experience, and which give many a man as he sits on a jury his first lesson in the 
fallibility of the unobserved and uncontrolled inferences of the human brain. The 'said I's,' and 
'thought I's,' and 'said he's,' which are the material of his ordinary reasoning, are here banished 
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on the ground that they are 'not evidence,' and witnesses are compelled to give a simple 
account of their remembered sensations of sight and hearing.
The witnesses for the prosecution and the defence, if they are well-intentioned men, often find 
themselves giving, to their own surprise, perfectly consistent accounts of the events at issue. 
The barristers' tricks of advocacy are to some extent restrained by professional custom and by 
the authority of the judge, and they are careful to point out to the jury each other's fallacies. 
Newspapers do not reach the jury box, and in any case are prevented by the law as to contempt 
of court from commenting on a case which is under trial. The judge sums up, carefully 
describing the conditions of valid inference on questions of disputed fact, and warning the jury 
against those forms of irrational and unconscious inference to which experience has shown 
them to be most liable. They then retire, all carrying in their minds the same body of 
simplified and dissected evidence, and all having been urged with every circumstance of 
solemnity to form their conclusions by the same mental process. It constantly happens 
therefore that twelve men, selected by lot, will come to a unanimous verdict as to a question 
on which in the outside world they would have been hopelessly divided, and that that verdict, 
which may depend upon questions of fact so difficult as to leave the practised intellect of the 
judge undecided, will very generally be right. An English law court is indeed during a well-
governed jury trial a laboratory in which psychological rules of valid reasoning are illustrated 
by experiment; and when, as threatens to occur in some American States and cities, it becomes 
impossible to enforce those rules, the jury system itself breaks down.[73]
At the same time, trial by jury is now used with a certain degree of economy, both because it is 
slow and expensive, and because men do not make good jurors if they are called upon too 
often. In order that popular consent may support criminal justice, and that the law may not be 
unfairly used to protect the interests or policy of a governing class or person, no man, in most 
civilised countries, may be sentenced to death or to a long period of imprisonment, except 
after the verdict of a jury. But the overwhelming majority of other judicial decisions are now 
taken by men selected not by lot, but, in theory at least, by special fitness for their task.
In the light of this development of the jury trial we may now examine the tentative changes 
which, since the Reform Act of 1867, have been introduced into the law of elections in the 
United Kingdom. Long before that date, it had been admitted that the State ought not to stretch 
the principle of individual liberty so far as to remain wholly indifferent as to the kind of 
motives which candidates might bring to bear upon electors. It was obvious that if candidates 
were allowed to practise open bribery the whole system of representation would break down at 
once. Laws, therefore, against bribery had been for several generations on the statute books, 
and all that was required in that respect was the serious attempt, made after the scandals at the 
general election of 1880, to render them effective. But without entering into definite bargains 
with individual voters, a rich candidate can by lavish expenditure on his electoral campaign, 
both make himself personally popular, and create an impression that his connection with the 
constituency is good for trade. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 therefore fixed a maximum 
of expenditure for each candidate at a parliamentary election. By the same Act of 1883, and by 
earlier and later Acts, applying both to parliamentary and municipal elections, intimidation of 
all kinds, including the threatening of penalties after death, is forbidden. No badges or flags or 
bands of music may be paid for by, or on behalf of, a candidate. In order that political opinion 
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may not be influenced by thoughts of the simpler bodily pleasures, no election meeting may be 
held in a building where any form of food or drink is habitually sold, although that building 
may be only a Co-operative Hall with facilities for making tea in an ante-room.
The existing laws against Corrupt Practices represent, it is true, rather the growing purpose of 
the State to control the conditions under which electoral opinion is formed, than any large 
measure of success in carrying out that purpose. A rapidly increasing proportion of the 
expenditure at any English election is now incurred by bodies enrolled outside the 
constituency, and nominally engaged, not in winning the election for a particular candidate, 
but in propagating their own principles. Sometimes the candidate whom they support, and 
whom they try to commit as deeply as possible, would be greatly relieved if they withdrew. 
Generally their agents are an integral part of his fighting organisation, and often the whole of 
their expenditure at an election is covered by a special subscription made by him to the central 
fund. Every one sees that this system drives a coach and horse through those clauses in the 
Corrupt Practices Act which restrict election expenses and forbid the employment of paid 
canvassers, though no one as yet has put forward any plan for preventing it. But it is 
acknowledged that unless the whole principle is to be abandoned, new legislation must take 
place; and Lord Robert Cecil talks of the probable necessity for a 'stringent and far-reaching 
Corrupt Practices Act.'[74] If, however, an act is carried stringent enough to deal effectually 
with the existing development of electoral tactics, it will have to be drafted on lines involving 
new and hitherto unthought-of forms of interference with the liberty of political appeal.
A hundred years ago a contested election might last in any constituency for three or four 
weeks of excitement and horseplay, during which the voters were every day further removed 
from the state of mind in which serious thought on the probable results of their votes was 
possible. Now no election may last more than one day, and we may soon enact that all the 
polling for a general election shall take place on the same day. The sporting fever of the weeks 
during which a general election even now lasts, with the ladder-climbing figures outside the 
newspaper offices, the flash-lights at night, and the cheering or groaning crowds in the party 
clubs, are not only waste of energy but an actual hindrance to effective political reasoning.
A more difficult psychological problem arose in the discussion of the Ballot. Would a voter be 
more likely to form a thoughtful and public-spirited decision if, after it was formed, he voted 
publicly or secretly? Most of the followers of Bentham advocated secrecy. Since men acted in 
accordance with their ideas of pleasure and pain, and since landlords and employers were able, 
in spite of any laws against intimidation, to bring 'sinister' motives to bear upon voters whose 
votes were known, the advisability of secret voting seemed to follow as a corollary from 
utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill, however, whose whole philosophical life consisted of a slowly 
developing revolt of feeling against the utilitarian philosophy to which he gave nominal 
allegiance till the end, opposed the Ballot on grounds which really involved the abandonment 
of the whole utilitarian position. If ideas of pleasure and pain be taken as equivalent to those 
economic motives which can be summed up as the making or losing money, it is not true, said 
Mill, that even under a system of open voting such ideas are the main cause which induce the 
ordinary citizen to vote. 'Once in a thousand times, as in the case of peace or war, or of taking 
off taxes, the thought may cross him that he shall save a few pounds or shillings in his year's 
expenditure if the side he votes for wins.' He votes as a matter of fact in accordance with ideas 
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of right or wrong. 'His motive, when it is an honourable one, is the desire to do right. We will 
not term it patriotism or moral principle, in order not to ascribe to the voter's frame of mind a 
solemnity that does not belong to it.' But ideas of right and wrong are strengthened and not 
weakened by the knowledge that we act under the eyes of our neighbours. 'Since then the real 
motive which induces a man to vote honestly is for the most part not an interested motive in 
any form, but a social one, the point to be decided is whether the social feelings connected 
with an act and the sense of social duty in performing it, can be expected to be as powerful 
when the act is done in secret, and he can neither be admired for disinterested, nor blamed for 
mean and selfish conduct. But this question is answered as soon as stated. When in every other 
act of a man's life which concerns his duty to others, publicity and criticism ordinarily improve 
his conduct, it cannot be that voting for a member of parliament is the single case in which he 
will act better for being sheltered against all comment.'[75]
Almost the whole civilised world has now adopted the secret Ballot; so that it would seem that 
Mill was wrong, and that he was wrong in spite of the fact that, as against the consistent 
utilitarians, his description of average human motive was right. But Mill, though he soon 
ceased to be in the original sense of the word a utilitarian, always remained an intellectualist, 
and he made in the case of the Ballot the old mistake of giving too intellectual and logical an 
account of political impulses. It is true that men do not act politically upon a mere stock-
exchange calculation of material advantages and disadvantages. They generally form vague 
ideas of right and wrong in accordance with vague trains of inference as to the good or evil 
results of political action. If an election were like a jury trial, such inferences might be formed 
by a process which would leave a sense of fundamental conviction in the mind of the thinker, 
and might be expressed under conditions of religious and civic solemnity to which publicity 
would lend an added weight, as it does in those 'acts of a man's life which concern his duty to 
others,' to which Mill refers—the paying of a debt of honour, for instance, or the equitable 
treatment of one's relatives. But under existing electoral conditions, trains of thought, formed 
as they often are by the half-conscious suggestion of newspapers or leaflets, are weak as 
compared with the things of sense. Apart from direct intimidation the voice of the canvasser, 
the excitement of one's friends, the look of triumph on the face of one's opponents, or the 
vague indications of disapproval by the rulers of one's village, are all apt to be stronger than 
the shadowy and uncertain conclusions of one's thinking brain. To make the ultimate vote 
secret, gives therefore thought its best chance, and at least requires the canvasser to produce in 
the voter a belief which, however shadowy, shall be genuine, rather than to secure by the mere 
manipulation of momentary impulse a promise which is shamefacedly carried out in public 
because it is a promise.
Lord Courtney is the last survivor in public life of the personal disciples of Mill, and at present 
he is devoting himself to a campaign in favour of 'proportional representation,' in which, as it 
seems to me, the old intellectualist misconceptions reappear in another form. He proposes to 
deal with two difficulties, first, that under the existing system of the 'single ballot' a minority 
in any single-member constituency may, if there are more candidates than two, return its 
representative, and secondly, that certain citizens who think for themselves instead of allowing 
party leaders to think for them—the Free-Trade Unionists, for instance, or the High-Church 
Liberals—have, as a rule, no candidate representing their own opinions for whom they can 
vote. He proposes, therefore, that each voter shall mark in order of preference a ballot paper 
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containing lists of candidates for large constituencies, each of which returns six or seven 
members, Manchester with its eight seats being given as an example.
This system, according to Lord Courtney, 'will lead to the dropping of the fetters which now 
interfere with free thought, and will set men and women on their feet, erect, intelligent, 
independent.'[76] But the arguments used in urging it all seem to me to suffer from the fatal 
defect of dwelling solely on the process by which opinion is ascertained, and ignoring the 
process by which opinion is created. If at the assizes all the jurors summoned were collected 
into one large jury, and if they all voted Guilty or Not Guilty on all the cases, after a trial in 
which all the counsel were heard and all the witnesses were examined simultaneously, verdicts 
would indeed no longer depend on the accidental composition of the separate juries; but the 
process of forming verdicts would be made, to a serious degree, less effective.
The English experiment on which the Proportional Representation Society mainly relies is an 
imaginary election, held in November 1906 by means of ballot papers distributed through 
members and friends of the society and through eight newspapers. 'The constituency,' we are 
told, 'was supposed to return five members; the candidates, twelve in number, were politicians 
whose names might be expected to be known to the ordinary newspaper reader, and who might 
be considered as representative of some of the main divisions of public opinion.'[77] The 
names were, in fact, Sir A. Acland Hood, Sir H. Campbell-Banner-man, Sir Thomas P. 
Whittaker, and Lord Hugh Cecil, with Messrs. Richard Bell, Austen Chamberlain, Winston 
Churchill, Haldane, Keir Hardie, Arthur Henderson, Bonar Law, and Philip Snowden. In all, 
12,418 votes were collected.
I was one of the 12,418, and in my case the ballot papers were distributed at the end of a 
dinner party. No discussion of the various candidates took place with the single exception that, 
finding my memory of Mr. Arthur Henderson rather vague, I whispered a question about him 
to my next neighbour. We were all politicians, and nearly all the names were those of persons 
belonging to that small group of forty or fifty whose faces the caricaturists of the Christmas 
numbers expect their readers to recognise.
At our dinner party not much unreality was introduced by the intellectualist assumption that 
the list of names were, as a Greek might have said, the same, 'to us,' as they were 'in 
themselves.' But an ordinary list of candidates' names presented to an ordinary voter is 'to him' 
simply a piece of paper with black marks on it, with which he will either do nothing or do as 
he is told.
The Proportional Representation Society seem to assume that a sufficient preliminary 
discussion will be carried on in the newspapers, and that not only the names and party 
programmes but the reasons for the selection of a particular person as candidate and for all the 
items in his programme will be known to 'the ordinary newspaper reader,' who is assumed to 
be identical with the ordinary citizen. But even if one neglects the political danger arising from 
the modern concentration of newspaper property in the hands of financiers who may use their 
control for frankly financial purposes, it is not true that each man now reads or is likely to read 
a newspaper devoted to a single candidature or to the propaganda of a small political group. 
Men read newspapers for news, and, since the collection of news is enormously costly, nine-
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tenths of the electorate read between them a small number of established papers advocating 
broad party principles. These newspapers, at any rate during a general election, only refer to 
those particular contests in which the party leaders are not concerned as matters of casual 
information, until, on the day of the poll, they issue general directions 'How to vote.' The 
choice of candidates is left by the newspapers to the local party organisations, and if any real 
knowledge of the personality of a candidate or of the details of his programme is to be made 
part of the consciousness of the ordinary voter, this must still be done by local electioneering 
in each constituency, i.e. by meetings and canvassing and the distribution of 'election 
literature.' Lord Courtney's proposal, even if it only multiplied the size of the ordinary 
constituency by six, would multiply by at least six the difficulty of effective electioneering, 
and even if each candidate were prepared to spend six times as much money at every contest, 
he could not multiply by six the range of his voice or the number of meetings which he could 
address in a day.
These considerations were brought home to me by my experience of the nearest approximation 
to Proportional Representation which has ever been actually adopted in England. In 1870 Lord 
Frederick Cavendish induced the House of Commons to adopt 'plural voting' for School Board 
elections. I fought in three London School Board elections as a candidate and in two others as 
a political worker. In London the legal arrangement was that each voter in eleven large 
districts should be given about five or six votes, and that the same number of seats should be 
assigned to the district. In the provinces a town or parish was given a number of seats from 
five to fifteen. The voter might 'plump' all his votes on one candidate or might distribute them 
as he liked among any of them.
This left the local organisers both in London and the country with two alternatives. They might 
form the list of party candidates in each district into a recognisable entity like the American 
'ticket' and urge all voters to vote, on party lines, for the Liberal or Conservative 'eight' or 'five' 
or 'three.' If they did this they were saved the trouble involved in any serious attempt to 
instruct voters as to the individual personalities of the members of the list. Or they might 
practically repeal the plural voting law, split up the constituency by a voluntary arrangement 
into single member sections, and spend the weeks of the election in making one candidate for 
each party known in each section. The first method was generally adopted in the provinces, 
and had all the good and bad effects from a party point of view of the French scrutin de liste. 
The second method was adopted in London, and perhaps tended to make the London elections 
turn more than they otherwise would have done upon the qualities of individual candidates. 
Whichever system was adopted by the party leaders was acted upon by practically all the 
voters, with the exception of the well-organised Roman Catholics, who voted for a Church and 
not a person, and of those who plumped for representatives of the special interests of the 
teachers or school-keepers.
If Lord Courtney's proposal is adopted for parliamentary elections, it is the 'ticket' system 
which, owing to the intensity of party feeling, will be generally used. Each voter will bring 
into the polling booth a printed copy of the ballot paper marked with the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., 
according to the decision of his party association, and will copy the numbers onto the 
unmarked official paper. The essential fact, that is to say, on which party tactics would depend 
under Lord Courtney's scheme is not that the votes would finally be added up in this way or in 
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that, but that the voter would be required to arrange in order more names than there is time 
during the election to turn for him into real persons.
Lord Courtney, in speaking on the second reading of his Municipal Representation Bill in the 
House of Lords,[78] contrasted his proposed system with that used in the London Borough 
Council elections, according to which a number of seats are assigned to each ward and the 
voter may give one vote each, without indication of preference, to that number of candidates. 
It is true that the electoral machinery for the London Boroughs is the worst to be found 
anywhere in the world outside of America. I have before me my party ballot-card instructing 
me how to vote at the last Council election in my present borough. There were six seats to be 
filled in my ward and fifteen candidates. I voted as I was told by my party organisation giving 
one vote each to six names, not one of which I remembered to have seen before. If there had 
been one seat to be filled, and, say, three candidates, I should have found out enough about 
one candidate at least to give a more or less independent vote; and the local party committees 
would have known that I and others would do so. Bach party would then have circulated a 
portrait and a printed account of their candidate and of his principles, and would have had a 
strong motive for choosing a thoroughly reputable person. But I could not give the time 
necessary for forming a real opinion on fifteen candidates, who volunteered no information 
about themselves. I therefore, and probably twenty-nine out of every thirty of those who voted 
in the borough, voted a 'straight ticket.' If for any reason the party committee put, to use an 
Americanism, a 'yellow dog' among the list of names, I voted for the yellow dog.
Under Lord Courtney's system I should have had to vote on the same ticket, with the same 
amount of knowledge, but should have copied down different marks from my party card. On 
the assumption, that is to say, that every name on a long ballot paper represents an individual 
known to every voter there would be an enormous difference between Lord Courtney's 
proposed system and the existing system in the London Boroughs. But if the fact is that the 
names in each case are mere names, there is little effective difference between the working of 
the two systems until the votes are counted.
If the sole object of an election were to discover and record the exact proportion of the 
electorate who are prepared to vote for candidates nominated by the several party 
organisations Lord Courtney's scheme might be adopted as a whole. But English experience, 
and a longer experience in America, has shown that the personality of the candidate nominated 
is at least as important as his party allegiance, and that a parliament of well-selected members 
who represent somewhat roughly the opinion of the nation is better than a parliament of ill-
selected members who, as far as their party labels are concerned, are, to quote Lord Courtney, 
'a distillation, a quintessence, a microcosm, a reflection of the community.'[79]
To Lord Courtney the multi-member constituency, which permits of a wide choice, and the 
preferential vote, which permits of full use of that choice, are equally essential parts of his 
plan; and that plan will soon be seriously discussed, because parliament, owing to the rise of 
the Labour Party and the late prevalence of 'three-cornered' contests, will soon have to deal 
with the question. It will then be interesting to see whether the growing substitution of the new 
quantitative and psychological for the old absolute and logical way of thinking about elections 
will have advanced sufficiently far to enable the House of Commons to distinguish between 
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the two points. If so, they will adopt the transferable vote, and so get over the difficulty of 
three-cornered elections, while retaining single-member constituencies, and therewith the 
possibility of making the personality of a candidate known to the whole of his constituents.
A further effect of the way in which we are beginning to think of the electoral process is that, 
since 1888, parliament, in reconstructing the system of English local government, has steadily 
diminished the number of elections, with the avowed purpose of increasing their efficiency. 
The Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894 swept away thousands of elections for 
Improvement Boards, Burial Boards, Vestries, etc. In 1902 the separately elected School 
Boards were abolished, and it is certain that the Guardians of the Poor will soon follow them. 
The Rural Parish Councils, which were created in 1894, and which represented a reversion by 
the Liberal Party to the older type of democratic thought, have been a failure, and will either 
be abolished or will remain ineffective, because no real administrative powers will be given to 
them. But if we omit the rural districts, the inhabitant of a 'county borough' will soon vote only 
for parliament and his borough council, while the inhabitant of London or of an urban district 
or non-county borough will only vote for parliament, his county, and his district or borough 
council. On the average, neither will be asked to vote more than once a year.
In America one notices a similar tendency towards electoral concentration as a means of 
increasing electoral responsibility. In Philadelphia I found that this concentration had taken a 
form which seemed to me to be due to a rather elementary quantitative mistake in psychology. 
Owing to the fact that the reformers had thought only of economising political force, and had 
ignored the limitations of political knowledge, so many elections were combined on one day 
that the Philadelphia 'blanket-ballot' which I was shown, with its parallel columns of party 
'tickets,' contained some four hundred names. The resulting effects on the personnel of 
Philadelphian politics were as obvious as they were lamentable. In other American cities, 
however, concentration often takes the form of the abolition of many of the elected boards and 
officials, and the substitution for them of a single elected Mayor, who administers the city by 
nominated commissions, and whose personality it is hoped can be made known during an 
election to all the voters, and therefore must he seriously considered by his nominators. One 
noticed again the growing tendency to substitute a quantitative and psychological for an 
absolute and logical view of the electoral process in the House of Commons debate on the 
claim set up by the House of Lords in 1907 to the right of forcing a general election (or a 
referendum) at any moment which they thought advantageous to themselves. Mr. Herbert 
Samuel, for instance, argued that this claim, if allowed, would give a still further advantage in 
politics to the electoral forces of wealth acting, at dates carefully chosen by the House of 
Lords, both directly and through the control of the Press. Lord Robert Cecil alone, whose mind 
is historical in the worst sense of that term, objected 'What a commentary was that on the "will 
of the people,"'[80] and thought it somehow illegitimate that Mr. Samuel should not defend 
democracy according to the philosophy of Thomas Paine, so that he could answer in the style 
of Canning. The present quarrel between the two Houses may indeed result in a further step in 
the public control of the methods of producing political opinion by the substitution of General 
Elections occurring at regular intervals for our present system of sudden party dissolutions at 
moments of national excitement.
But in the electoral process, as in so many other cases, one dares not hope that these slow and 
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half-conscious changes in the general intellectual attitude will be sufficient to suggest and 
carry through all the improvements of machinery necessary to meet our growing difficulties, 
unless they are quickened by a conscious purpose. At my last contest for the London County 
Council I had to spend the half hour before the close of the vote in one of the polling stations 
of a very poor district. I was watching the proceedings, which in the crush at the end are apt to 
be rather irregular, and at the same time was thinking of this book. The voters who came in 
were the results of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the room in 
rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward by a hurried and inefficient 
machine. About half of them were women, with broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy 
hair. All were dazed and bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from 
the making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the public house, or, 
since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them seemed to be trying, in the unfamiliar 
surroundings, to be sure of the name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they 
were to vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of my own, 
clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely tremendous fact which just eluded 
his power of speech. I was very anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my 
chief feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as even a decently 
satisfactory method of creating a government for a city of five million inhabitants, and that 
nothing short of a conscious and resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of 
political opinion would enable us to improve it.
Something might be done, and perhaps will be done in the near future, to abolish the more 
sordid details of English electioneering. Public houses could be closed on the election day, 
both to prevent drunkenness and casual treating, and to create an atmosphere of comparative 
seriousness. It is a pity that we cannot have the elections on a Sunday as they have in France. 
The voters would then come to the poll after twenty or twenty-four hours' rest, and their own 
thoughts would have some power of asserting themselves even in the presence of the 
canvasser, whose hustling energy now inevitably dominates the tired nerves of men who have 
just finished their day's work. The feeling of moral responsibility half consciously associated 
with the religious use of Sunday would also be so valuable an aid to reflection that the most 
determined anti-clerical might be willing to risk the chance that it would add to the political 
power of the churches. It may cease to be true that in England the Christian day of rest, in spite 
of the recorded protest of the founder of Christianity, is still too much hedged about by the 
traditions of prehistoric taboo to be available for the most solemn act of citizenship. It might 
again be possible to lend to the polling-place some of the dignity of a law court, and if no 
better buildings were available, at least to clean and decorate the dingy schoolrooms now used. 
But such improvements in the external environment of election-day, however desirable they 
may be in themselves, can only be of small effect.
Some writers argue or imply that all difficulties in the working of the electoral process will 
disappear of themselves as men approach to social equality. Those who are now rich will, they 
believe, have neither motive for corrupt electoral expenditure, nor superfluity of money to 
spend on it; while the women and the working men who are now unenfranchised or politically 
inactive, will bring into politics a fresh stream of unspoilt impulse.
If our civilisation is to survive, greater social equality must indeed come. Men will not 
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continue to live peacefully together in huge cities under conditions that are intolerable to any 
sensitive mind, both among those who profit, and those who suffer by them. But no one who is 
near to political facts can believe that the immediate effect either of greater equality or of the 
extension of the suffrage will be to clear away all moral and intellectual difficulties in political 
organisation.
A mere numerical increase in the number of persons in England who are interested in politics 
would indeed itself introduce a new and difficult political factor. The active politicians in 
England, those who take any part in politics beyond voting, are at present a tiny minority. I 
was to speak not long ago at an election meeting, and having been misdirected as to the place 
where the meeting was to be held, found myself in an unknown part of North London, 
compelled to inquire of the inhabitants until I should find the address either of the meeting-hall 
or of the party committee-room. For a long time I drew blank, but at last a cabman on his way 
home to tea told me that there was a milkman in his street who was 'a politician and would 
know.' There are in London seven hundred thousand parliamentary voters, and I am informed 
by the man who is in the best position to know that it would be safe to say that less than ten 
thousand persons actually attend the annual ward meetings of the various parties, and that not 
more than thirty thousand are members of the party associations. That division of labour which 
assigns politics to a special class of enthusiasts, looked on by many of their neighbours as well-
meaning busybodies, is not carried so far in most other parts of England as in London. But in 
no county in England, as far as I am aware, does the number of persons really active in politics 
amount to ten per cent. of the electorate.
There are, I think, signs that this may soon cease to be true. The English Elementary Education 
Act was passed in 1870, and the elementary schools may be said to have become fairly 
efficient by 1880. Those who entered them, being six years old, at that date are now aged 
thirty-four. The statistics as to the production and sale of newspapers and cheap books and the 
use of free libraries, show that the younger working men and women in England read many 
times as much as their parents did. This, and the general increase of intellectual activity in our 
cities of which it is only a part, may very probably lead, as the social question in politics grows 
more serious, to a large extension of electoral interest. If so, the little groups of men and 
women who now manage the three English parties in the local constituencies will find 
themselves swamped by thousands of adherents who will insist on taking some part in the 
choice of candidates and the formation of programmes. That will lead to a great increase in the 
complexity of the process by which the Council, the Executive, and the officers of each local 
party association are appointed. Parliament indeed may find itself compelled, as many of the 
American States have been compelled, to pass a series of Acts for the prevention of fraud in 
the interior government of parties. The ordinary citizen would find then, much more obviously 
than he does at present, that an effective use of his voting power involves not only the marking 
of a ballot paper on the day of the election, but an active share in that work of appointing and 
controlling party committees from which many men whose opinions are valuable to the State 
shrink with an instinctive dread.
But the most important difficulties raised by the extension of political interest from a very 
small to a large fraction of the population would be concerned with political motive rather than 
political machinery. It is astonishing that the early English democrats, who supposed that 
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individual advantage would be the sole driving force in politics, assumed, without realising the 
nature of their own assumption, that the representative, if he were elected for a short term, 
would inevitably feel his own advantage to be identical with that of the community.[81] At 
present there is a fairly sufficient supply of men whose imagination and sympathies are 
sufficiently quick and wide to make them ready to undertake the toil of unpaid electioneering 
and administration for the general good. But every organiser of elections knows that the 
supply is never more than sufficient, and payment of members, while it would permit men of 
good-will to come forward who are now shut out, would also make it possible for less worthy 
motives to become more effective. The concentration both of administrative and legislative 
work in the hands of the Cabinet, while it tends to economy of time and effort, is making the 
House of Commons yearly a less interesting place; and members have of late often expressed 
to me a real anxiety lest the personnel of the House should seriously deteriorate.
The chief immediate danger in the case of the two older parties is that, owing to the growing 
expense of electioneering and the growing effect of legislation on commerce and finance, an 
increasing proportion of the members and candidates may be drawn from the class of 'hustling' 
company-promoters and financiers. The Labour Party, on the other hand, can now draw upon 
an ample supply of genuine public spirit, and its difficulties in this respect will arise, not from 
calculated individual selfishness, but from the social and intellectual environment of working-
class life. During the last twenty years I have been associated, for some years continuously and 
afterwards at intervals, with English political working men. They had, it seemed to me, for the 
most part a great advantage in the fact that certain real things of life were real to them. It is, for 
instance, the 'class-conscious' working men who, in England as on the Continent, are the chief 
safeguard against the horrors of a general European war. But as their number and 
responsibility increase they will, I believe, have to learn some rather hard lessons as to the 
intellectual conditions of representative government upon a large scale. The town working 
man lives in a world in which it is very difficult for him to choose his associates. If he is of an 
expansive temperament, and it is such men who become politicians, he must take his mates in 
the shop and his neighbours in the tenement house as he finds them—and he sees them at very 
close range. The social virtue therefore which is almost a necessity of his existence is a good-
humoured tolerance of the defects of average human nature. He is keenly aware of the 
uncertainty of his own industrial position, accustomed to give and receive help, and very 
unwilling to 'do' any man 'out of his job.' His parents and grandparents read very little and he 
was brought up in a home with few books. If, as he grows up, he does not himself read, things 
beyond his direct observation are apt to be rather shadowy for him, and he is easily made 
suspicious of that which he does not understand. If, on the other hand, he takes to reading 
when he is already a grown man, words and ideas are apt to have for him a kind of abstract and 
sharply outlined reality in a region far removed from his daily life.
Now the first virtue required in government is the habit of realising that things whose 
existence we infer from reading are as important as the things observed by our senses, of 
looking, for instance, through a list of candidates for an appointment and weighing the 
qualifications of the man whom one has never met by the same standard as those of the man 
whom one has met, and liked or pitied, the day before; or of deciding on an improvement with 
complete impartiality as between the district one knows of on the map and the district one sees 
every morning. If a representative elected to govern a large area allows personal acquaintance 
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and liking to influence his decisions, his acquaintance and liking will he schemed for and 
exploited by those who have their own ends to gain. The same difficulty arises in matters of 
discipline, where the interests of the unknown thousands who will suffer from the inefficiency 
of an official have to be balanced against those of the known official who will suffer by being 
punished or dismissed; as well as in those numerous cases in which a working man has to 
balance the dimly realised interests of the general consumer against his intimate sympathy 
with his fellow-craftsmen.
The political risk arising from these facts is not, at present, very great in the parliamentary 
Labour Party. The working men who have been sent to parliament have been hitherto, as a 
rule, men of picked intelligence and morale and of considerable political experience. But the 
success or failure of any scheme aiming at social equality will depend chiefly on its 
administration by local bodies, to which the working classes must necessarily send men of less 
exceptional ability and experience. I have never myself served on an elected local body the 
majority of whose members were weekly wage earners. But I have talked with men, both of 
working-class and middle-class origin, who have been in that position. What they say confirms 
that which I have inferred from my own observation, that on such a body one finds a high 
level of enthusiasm, of sympathy, and of readiness to work, combined with a difficulty in 
maintaining a sufficiently rigorous standard in dealing with sectional interests and official 
discipline.
One is told that on such a body many members feel it difficult to realise that the way in which 
a well-intentioned man may deal with his own personal expenditure, his continued patronage, 
for instance, of a rather inefficient tradesman because he has a large family, or his refusal to 
contest an account from a dislike of imputing bad motives, is fatal if applied in the expenditure 
of the large sums entrusted to a public body. Sometimes there are even, one learns, indications 
of that good-humoured and not ill-meant laxity in expending public money which has had such 
disastrous results in America, and which lends itself so easily to exploitation by those in whom 
the habit of giving and taking personal favours has hardened into systematic fraud. When one 
of the West Ham Guardians, two years ago, committed suicide on being charged with 
corruption, the Star sent down a representative who filled a column with the news. 'His death,' 
we were told, 'has robbed the district of an indefatigable public worker. County Council, 
Board of Guardians, and Liberal interests all occupied his leisure time.' 'One of his friends' is 
described as saying to the Star reporter, 'You do not need to go far to learn of his big-souled 
geniality. The poor folks of the workhouse will miss him badly.'[82] When one has waded 
through masses of evidence on American municipal corruption, that phrase about 'big-souled 
geniality' makes one shudder.
The early history of the co-operative and trade-union movements in England is full of pathetic 
instances of this kind of failure, and both movements show how a new and more stringent 
ideal may be slowly built up. But such an ideal will not come of itself without an effort, and 
must be part of the conscious organised thought of each generation if it is to be permanently 
effective.
Those difficulties have in the past been mainly pointed out by the opponents of democracy. 
But if democracy is to succeed they must be frankly considered by the democrats themselves; 
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just as it is the engineer who is trying to build the bridge, and not the ferry-owner, who is 
against any bridge at all, whose duty it is to calculate the strain which the materials will stand. 
The engineer, when he wishes to increase the margin of safety in his plans, treats as factors in 
the same quantitative problem both the chemical expedients by which he can strengthen his 
materials and the structural changes by which the strain on those materials can be diminished. 
So those who would increase the margin of safety in our democracy must estimate, with no 
desire except to arrive at truth, both the degree to which the political strength of the individual 
citizen can, in any given time, be actually increased by moral and educational changes, and the 
possibility of preserving or extending or inventing such elements in the structure of democracy 
as may prevent the demand upon him being too great for his strength.
CHAPTER III
OFFICIAL THOUGHT
It is obvious, however, that the persons elected under any conceivable system of representation 
cannot do the whole work of government themselves.
If all elections are held in single member constituencies of a size sufficient to secure a good 
supply of candidates; if the number of elections is such as to allow the political workers a 
proper interval for rest and reflection between the campaigns; if each elected body has an area 
large enough for effective administration, a number of members sufficient for committee work 
and not too large for debate, and duties sufficiently important to justify the effort and expense 
of a contest; then one may take about twenty-three thousand as the best number of men and 
women to be elected by the existing population of the United Kingdom—or rather less than 
one to every two thousand of the population.[83]
This proportion depends mainly on facts in the psychology of the electors, which will change 
very slowly if they change at all. At present the amount of work to be done in the way of 
government is rapidly increasing, and seems likely to continue to increase. If so, the number of 
elected persons available for each unit of work must tend to decrease. The number of persons 
now elected in the United Kingdom (including, for instance, the Parish Councillors of rural 
parishes, and the Common Council of the City of London) is, of course, larger than my 
estimate, though it has been greatly diminished by the Acts of 1888, 1894 and 1902. Owing, 
however, to the fact that areas and powers are still somewhat uneconomically distributed it 
represents a smaller actual working power than would be given by the plan which I suggest.
On the other hand, the number of persons (excluding the Army and Navy) given in the Census 
Returns of 1901 as professionally employed in the central and local government of the United 
Kingdom was 161,000. This number has certainly grown since 1901 at an increasing rate, and 
consists of persons who give on an average at least four times as many hours a week to their 
work as can be expected from the average elected member.
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What ought to be the relation between these two bodies, of twenty-three thousand elected, and, 
say, two hundred thousand non-elected persons? To begin with, ought the elected members be 
free to appoint the non-elected officials as they like? Most American politicians of Andrew 
Jackson's time, and a large number of American politicians to-day, would hold, for instance, as 
a direct corollary from democratic principles, that the elected congressman or senator for a 
district or State has a right to nominate the local federal officials. There may, he would admit, 
be some risk in that method, but the risk, he would argue, is one involved in the whole scheme 
of democracy, and the advantages of democracy as a whole are greater than its disadvantages.
Our political logic in England has never been so elementary as that of the Americans, nor has 
our faith in it been so unflinching. Most Englishmen, therefore, have no feeling of disloyalty to 
the democratic idea in admitting that it is not safe to allow the efficiency of officials to depend 
upon the personal character of individual representatives. At the General Election of 1906 
there were at least two English constituencies (one Liberal and the other Conservative) which 
returned candidates whose personal unfitness had been to most men's minds proved by 
evidence given in the law courts. Neither constituency was markedly unlike the average in any 
respect. The facts were well known, and in each case an attempt was made by a few public-
spirited voters to split the party vote, but both candidates were successful by large majorities. 
The Borough of Croydon stands, socially and intellectually, well above the average, but Mr. 
Jabez Balfour represented Croydon for many years, until he was sentenced to penal servitude 
for fraud. No one in any of these three cases would have desired that the sitting member 
should appoint, say, the postmasters, or collectors of Inland Revenue for his constituency.
But though the case against the appointment of officials by individual representatives is clear, 
the question of the part which should be taken by any elected body as a whole in appointing 
the officials who serve under it is much more difficult, and cannot be discussed without 
considering what are to be the relative functions of the officials and the representatives after 
the appointment has taken place. Do we aim at making election in fact as well as in 
constitutional theory the sole base of political authority, or do we desire that the non-elected 
officials shall exert some amount of independent influence?
The fact that most Englishmen, in spite of their traditional fear of bureaucracy, would now 
accept the second of these alternatives, is one of the most striking results of our experience in 
the working of democracy. We see that the evidence on which the verdict at an election must 
be given is becoming every year more difficult to collect and present, and further removed 
from the direct observation of the voters. We are afraid of being entirely dependent on partisan 
newspapers or election leaflets for our knowledge, and we have therefore come to value, even 
if for that reason only, the existence of a responsible and more or less independent Civil 
Service. It is difficult to realise how short a time it is since questions for which we now rely 
entirely on official statistics were discussed by the ordinary political methods of agitation and 
advocacy. In the earlier years of George the Third's reign, at a time when population in 
England was, as we now know, rising with unprecedented rapidity, the question of fact 
whether it was rising or falling led to embittered political controversy.[84] In the spring of 1830 
the House of Commons gave three nights to a confused party debate on the state of the 
country. The Whigs argued that distress was general, and the Tories (who were, as it 
happened, right) that it was local[85]. In 1798 or 1830 the 'public' who could take part in such 
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discussions numbered perhaps fifty thousand at the most. At least ten million people must, 
since 1903, have taken part in the present Tariff Reform controversy; and that controversy 
would have degenerated into mere Bedlam if it had not been for the existence of the Board of 
Trade Returns, with whose figures both sides had at least to appear to square their arguments.
If official figures did not exist in England, or if they did not possess or deserve authority, it is 
difficult to estimate the degree of political harm which could be done in a few years by an 
interested and deliberately dishonest agitation on some question too technical for the personal 
judgment of the ordinary voter. Suppose, for instance, that our Civil Service were either 
notoriously inefficient or believed to be dominated by party influence, and that an organised 
and fraudulent 'currency agitation' should suddenly spring up. A powerful press syndicate 
brings out a series of well-advertised articles declaring that the privileges of the Bank of 
England and the law as to the gold reserve are 'strangling British Industry.' The contents bills 
of two hundred newspapers denounce every day the 'monopolists' and the 'gold-bugs,' the 'lies 
and shams' of the Bank Returns, and the 'paid perjurers of Somerset House.' The group of 
financiers who control the syndicate stand to win enormous sums by the creation of a more 
'elastic' currency, and subscribe largely to a Free Money League, which includes a few sincere 
paper-money theorists who have been soured by the contempt of the professional economists. 
A vigorous and well-known member of parliament—a not very reputable aristocrat perhaps, or 
some one loosely connected with the Labour movement—whom everybody has hitherto feared 
and no one quite trusted, sees his opportunity. He puts himself at the head of the movement, 
denounces the 'fossils' and 'superior persons' who at present lead Conservative and Liberal and 
Labour parties alike, and, with the help of the press syndicate and the subscription fund of the 
'Free Money League,' begins to capture the local associations, and through them the central 
office of the party which is for the moment in opposition, Can any one be sure that such a 
campaign, if it were opposed only by counter-electioneering, might not succeed, even although 
its proposals were wholly fraudulent and its leaders so ignorant or so criminal that they could 
only come into power by discrediting two-thirds of the honest politicians in the country and by 
replacing them with 'hustlers' and 'boodlers' and 'grafters,' and the other species for whom 
American political science has provided names? How is the ordinary voter—a market-
gardener, or a gas-stoker, or a water-colour painter—to distinguish by the help of his own 
knowledge and reasoning power between the various appeals made to him by the 'Reformers' 
and the 'Safe Money Men' as to the right proportion of the gold reserve to the note issue—the 
'ten per cent.' on the blue posters and the 'cent. per cent.' on the yellow? Nor will his 
conscience be a safer guide than his judgment. A 'Christian Service Wing' of the Free Money 
League may be formed, and his conscience may be roused by a white-cravatted orator, 
intoxicated by his own eloquence into something like sincerity, who borrows that phrase about 
'Humanity crucified on a cross of gold' which Mr. W.J. Bryan borrowed a dozen years ago 
from some one else. In an optimistic mood one might rely on the subtle network of confidence 
by which each man trusts, on subjects outside his own knowledge, some honest and better-
informed neighbour, who again trusts at several removes the trained thinker. But does such a 
personal network exist in our vast delocalised urban populations?
It is the vague apprehension of such dangers, quite as much as the merely selfish fears of the 
privileged classes, which preserves in Europe the relics of past systems of non-elective 
government, the House of Lords, for instance, in England, and the Monarchy in Italy or 
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Norway. Men feel that a second base in politics is required, consisting of persons independent 
of the tactics by which electoral opinion is formed and legally entitled to make themselves 
heard. But political authority founded on heredity or wealth is not in fact protected from the 
interested manipulation of opinion and feeling. The American Senate, which has come to be 
representative of wealth, is already absorbed by that financial power which depends for its 
existence on manufactured opinion; and our House of Lords is rapidly tending in the same 
direction. From the beginning of history it has been found easier for any skilled politician who 
set his mind to it, to control the opinions of a hereditary monarch than those of a crowd.
The real 'Second Chamber,' the real 'constitutional check' in England, is provided, not by the 
House of Lords or the Monarchy, but by the existence of a permanent Civil Service, appointed 
on a system independent of the opinion or desires of any politician, and holding office during 
good behaviour. If such a service were, as it is in Russia and to a large extent in India, a 
sovereign power, it would itself, as I argued in the last chapter, have to cultivate the art of 
manipulating opinion. But the English Civil servants in their present position have the right 
and duty of making their voice heard, without the necessity of making their will, by fair means 
or foul, prevail.
The creation of this Service was the one great political invention in nineteenth-century 
England, and like other inventions it was worked out under the pressure of an urgent practical 
problem. The method of appointing the officials of the East India Company had been a critical 
question in English politics since 1783. By that time it had already become clear that we could 
not permanently allow the appointment of the rulers of a great empire kept in existence by the 
English fleet and army to depend upon the irresponsible favour of the Company's directors. 
Charles James Fox in 1783, with his usual heedlessness, proposed to cut the knot, by making 
Indian appointments, in effect, part of the ordinary system of parliamentary patronage; and he 
and Lord North were beaten over their India Bill, not only because George the Third was 
obstinate and unscrupulous, but because men felt the enormous political dangers involved in 
their proposal. The question, in fact, could only be solved by a new invention. The expedient 
of administering an oath to the Directors that they would make their appointments honestly, 
proved to be useless, and the requirements that the nominees of the Directors should submit to 
a special training at Hayleybury, though more effective, left the main evil of patronage 
untouched.
As early, therefore, as 1833, the Government Bill introduced by Macaulay for the renewal and 
revision of the Company's charter contained a clause providing that East India cadetships 
should be thrown open to competition.[86] For the time the influence of the Directors was 
sufficient to prevent so great a change from being effected, but in 1853, on a further renewal of 
the Charter, the system of competition was definitely adopted, and the first open examination 
for cadetships took place in 1855.
In the meantime Sir Charles Trevelyan, a distinguished Indian Civilian who had married 
Macaulay's sister, had been asked to inquire, with the help of Sir Stafford Northcote, into the 
method of appointment in the Home Civil Service. His report appeared in the spring of 1854,
[87] and is one of the ablest of those State Papers which have done so much to mould the 
English constitution during the last two generations. It showed the intolerable effects on the 
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personnel of the existing Service of the system by which the Patronage Secretary of the 
Treasury distributed appointments in the national Civil Service among those members of 
parliament whose votes were to be influenced or rewarded, and it proposed that all posts 
requiring intellectual qualifications should be thrown open to those young men of good 
character who succeeded at a competitive examination in the subjects which then constituted 
the education of a gentleman.
But to propose that members of parliament should give up their own patronage was a very 
different thing from asking them to take away the patronage of the East India Company. Sir 
Charles Trevelyan, therefore, before publishing his proposal, sent it round to a number of 
distinguished persons both inside and outside the Government service, and printed their very 
frank replies in an appendix.
Most of his correspondents thought that the idea was hopelessly impracticable. It seemed like 
the intrusion into the world of politics of a scheme of cause and effect derived from another 
universe—as if one should propose to the Stock Exchange that the day's prices should be fixed 
by prayer and the casting of lots. Lingen, for instance, the permanent head of the Education 
Office, wrote considering that, as matter of fact, patronage is one element of power, and not by 
any means an unreal one; considering the long and inestimably valuable habituation of the 
people of this country to political contests in which the share of office ... reckons among the 
legitimate prizes of war; considering that socially and in the business of life, as well as in 
Downing Street, rank and wealth (as a fact, and whether we like it or not) hold the keys of 
many things, and that our modes of thinking and acting proceed, in a thousand ways, upon this 
supposition, considering all these things, I should hesitate long before I advised such a 
revolution of the Civil Service as that proposed by yourself and Sir Stafford Northcote.'[88] Sir 
James Stephen of the Colonial Office put it more bluntly, 'The world we live in is not, I think, 
half moralised enough for the acceptance of such a scheme of stern morality as this.'[89] When, 
a few years later, competition for commissions in the Indian army was discussed, Queen 
Victoria (or Prince Albert through her) objected that it reduced the sovereign to a mere signing 
machine.'[90]
In 1870, however, sixteen years after Trevelyan's Report, Gladstone established open 
competition throughout the English Civil Service, by an Order in Council which was 
practically uncriticised and unopposed; and the parliamentary government of England in one 
of its most important functions did in fact reduce itself 'to a mere signing machine.'
The causes of the change in the political atmosphere which made this possible constitute one 
of the most interesting problems in English history. One cause is obvious. In 1867 Lord 
Derby's Reform Act had suddenly transferred the ultimate control of the House of Commons 
from the 'ten pound householders' in the boroughs to the working men. The old 'governing 
classes' may well have felt that the patronage which they could not much longer retain would 
be safer in the hands of an independent Civil Service Commission, interpreting, like a blinded 
figure of Justice, the verdict of Nature, than in those of the dreaded 'caucuses,' which Mr. 
Schnadhorst was already organising.
But one seems to detect a deeper cause of change than the mere transference of voting power. 
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The fifteen years from the Crimean War to 1870 were in England a period of wide mental 
activity, during which the conclusions of a few penetrating thinkers like Darwin or Newman 
were discussed and popularised by a crowd of magazine writers and preachers and poets. The 
conception was gaining ground that it was upon serious and continued thought and not upon 
opinion that the power to carry out our purposes, whether in politics or elsewhere, must 
ultimately depend.
Carlyle in 1850 had asked whether 'democracy once modelled into suffrages, furnished with 
ballot-boxes and such-like, will itself accomplish the salutary universal change from Delusive 
to Real,' and had answered, 'Your ship cannot double Cape Horn by its excellent plans of 
voting. The ship may vote this and that, above decks and below, in the most harmonious 
exquisitely constitutional manner: the ship, to get round Cape Horn, will find a set of 
conditions already voted for, and fixed with adamantine rigour by the ancient Elemental 
Powers, who are entirely careless how you vote. If you can, by voting or without voting, 
ascertain those conditions, and valiantly conform to them, you will get round the Cape: if you 
cannot—the ruffian Winds will blow you ever back again.'[91]
By 1870 Carlyle's lesson was already well started on its course from paradox to platitude. The 
most important single influence in that course had been the growth of Natural Science. It was, 
for instance, in 1870 that Huxley's Lay Sermons were collected and published. People who 
could not in 1850 understand Carlyle's distinction between the Delusive and the Eeal, could 
not help understanding Huxley's comparison of life and death to a game of chess with an 
unseen opponent who never makes a mistake.[92] And Huxley's impersonal Science seemed a 
more present aid in the voyage round Cape Horn than Carlyle's personal and impossible Hero.
But the invention of a competitive Civil Service, when it had once been made and adopted, 
dropped from the region of severe and difficult thought in which it originated, and took its 
place in our habitual political psychology. We now half-consciously conceive of the Civil 
Service as an unchanging fact whose good and bad points are to be taken or left as a whole. 
Open competition has by the same process become a principle, conceived of as applying to 
those cases to which it has been in fact applied, and to no others. What is therefore for the 
moment most needed, if we are to think fruitfully on the subject, is that we should in our own 
minds break up this fact, and return to the world of infinite possible variations. We must think 
of the expedient of competition itself as varying in a thousand different directions, and shading 
by imperceptible gradations into other methods of appointment; and of the posts offered for 
competition as differing each from all the rest, as overlapping those posts for which 
competition in some form is suitable though it has not yet been tried, and as touching, at the 
marginal point on their curve, those posts for which competition is unsuitable.
Directly we begin this process one fact becomes obvious. There is no reason why the same 
system should not be applied to the appointment of the officials of the local as to those of the 
central government. It is an amazing instance of the intellectual inertia of the English people 
that we have never seriously considered this point. In America the term Civil Service is 
applied equally to both groups of offices, and 'Civil Service principles' are understood to cover 
State and Municipal as well as Federal appointments. The separation of the two systems in our 
minds may, indeed, be largely due to the mere accident that from historical reasons we call 
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them by different names. As it is, the local authorities are (with the exception that certain 
qualifications are required for teachers and medical officers) left free to do as they will in 
making appointments. Perhaps half a dozen Metropolitan and provincial local bodies have 
adopted timid and limited schemes of open competition. But in all other cases the local civil 
servants, who are already probably as numerous as those of the central government,[93] are 
appointed under conditions which, if the Government chose to create a Commission of 
Inquiry, would probably be found to have reproduced many of the evils that existed in the 
patronage of the central government before 1855.
It would not, of course, be possible to appoint a separate body of Civil Service Commissioners 
to hold a separate examination for each locality, and difficulties would arise from the selection 
of officials by a body responsible only to the central government, and out of touch with the 
local body which controls, pays, and promotes them when appointed. But similar difficulties 
have been obviated by American Civil Service Reformers, and a few days' hard thinking 
would suffice to adapt the system to English local conditions.
One object aimed at by the creation of a competitive Civil Service for the central government 
in England was the prevention of corruption. It was made more difficult for representatives 
and officials to conspire together in order to defraud the public, when the official ceased to 
owe his appointment to the representative. If an English member of parliament desired now to 
make money out of his position, he would have to corrupt a whole series of officials in no way 
dependent on his favour, who perhaps intensely dislike the human type to which he belongs, 
and who would be condemned to disgrace or imprisonment years after he had lost his seat if 
some record of their joint misdoing were unearthed.
This precaution against corruption is needed even more clearly under the conditions of local 
government. The expenditure of local bodies in the United Kingdom is already much larger 
than that of the central State, and is increasing at an enormously greater rate, while the fact that 
most of the money is spent locally, and in comparatively small sums, makes fraud easier. 
English municipal life is, I believe, on the whole pure, but fraud does occur, and it is 
encouraged by the close connection that may exist between the officials and the 
representatives. A needy or thick-skinned urban councillor or guardian may at any moment 
tempt, or be tempted, by a poor relation who helped him at his election, and for whom 
(perhaps as the result of a tacit understanding that similar favours should be allowed to his 
colleagues), he obtained a municipal post.
The railway companies, again, in England are coming every year more and more under State 
control, but no statesman has ever attempted to secure in their case, as was done in the case of 
the East India Company a century ago, some reasonable standard of purity and impartiality in 
appointments and promotion. Some few railways have systems of competition for boy clerks, 
even more inadequate than those carried on by municipalities; but one is told that under most 
of the companies both appointment and promotion may be influenced by the favour of 
directors or large shareholders. We regulate the minutiae of coupling and signalling on the 
railways, but do not realise that the safety of the public depends even more directly upon their 
systems of patronage.
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How far this principle should be extended, and how far, for instance, it would be possible to 
prevent the head of a great private firm from ruining half a country side by leaving the 
management of his business to a hopelessly incompetent relation, is a question which depends, 
among other things, upon the powers of political invention which may be developed by 
collectivist thinkers in the next fifty years.
We must meanwhile cease to treat the existing system of competition by the hasty writing of 
answers to unexpected examination questions as an unchangeable entity. That system has 
certain very real advantages. It is felt by the candidates and their relations to be 'fair.' It reveals 
facts about the relative powers of the candidates in some important intellectual qualities which 
no testimonials would indicate, and which are often unknown, till tested, to the candidates 
themselves. But if the sphere of independent selection is to be widely extended, greater variety 
must be introduced into its methods. In this respect invention has stood still in England since 
the publication of Sir Charles Trevelyan's Report in 1855. Some slight modifications have 
taken place in the subjects chosen for examination, but the enormous changes in English 
educational conditions during the last half century have been for the most part ignored. It is 
still assumed that young Englishmen consist of a small minority who have received the nearly 
uniform 'education of a gentleman,' and a large majority who have received no intellectual 
training at all. The spread of varied types of secondary schools, the increasing specialisation of 
higher education, and the experience which all the universities of the world have accumulated 
as to the possibility of testing the genuineness and intellectual quality of 'post graduate' theses 
have had little or no effect.
The Playfair Commission of 1875 found that a few women were employed for strictly 
subordinate work in the Post Office. Since then female typewriters and a few better-paid 
women have been introduced into other offices in accordance with the casual impulses of this 
or that parliamentary or permanent chief; but no systematic attempt has been made to enrich 
the thinking power of the State by using the trained and patient intellects of the women who 
graduate each year in the newer, and 'qualify by examination to graduate,' in the older 
Universities.
To the general public indeed, the adoption of open competition in 1870 seemed to obviate any 
necessity for further consideration not only of the method by which officials were appointed 
but also of the system under which they did their work. The race of Tite Barnacles, they learnt, 
was now to become extinct. Appointment was to be by 'merit,' and the announcement of the 
examination results, like the wedding in a middle-Victorian novel, was to be the end of the 
story. But in a Government office, as certainly as in a law-court or a laboratory, effective 
thinking will not be done unless adequate opportunities and motives are secured by 
organisation during the whole working life of the appointed officials. Since 1870, however, the 
organisation of the Government Departments has either been left to the casual development of 
office tradition in each Department or has been changed (as in the case of the War Office) by 
an agitation directed against one Department only. The official relations, for instance, between 
the First Division minority and the Second Division majority of the clerks in each office vary, 
not on any considered principle, but according to the opinions and prejudices of some once-
dominant but now forgotten chief. The same is true of the relation between the heads of each 
section and the officials immediately below them. In at least one office important papers are 
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brought first to the chief. His decision is at once given and is sent down the hierarchy for 
elaboration. In other offices the younger men are given invaluable experience, and the elder 
men are prevented from getting into an official rut by a system which requires that all papers 
should be sent first to a junior, who sends them up to his senior accompanied not only by the 
necessary papers but also by a minute of his own suggesting official action. One of these two 
types of organisation must in fact be better than the other, but no one has systematically 
compared them.
In the Colonial Office, again, it is the duty of the Librarian to see that the published books as 
well as the office records on any question are available for every official who has to report on 
it. In the Board of Trade, which deals with subjects on which the importance of published as 
compared with official information is even greater, room has only just been found for a 
technical library which was collected many years ago.[94] The Foreign Office and the India 
Office have libraries, the Treasury and the Local Government Board have none.
In the Exchequer and Audit Department a deliberate policy has been adopted of training junior 
officials by transferring them at regular intervals to different branches of the work. The results 
are said to be excellent, but nothing of the kind is systematically done or has even been 
seriously discussed in any other Department which I know.
Nearly all departmental officials are concerned with the organisation of non-departmental 
work more directly executive than their own, and part of a wise system of official training 
would consist in 'seconding' young officials for experience in the kind of work which they are 
to organise. The clerks of the Board of Agriculture should be sent at least once in their career 
to help in superintending the killing of infected swine and interviewing actual farmers, while 
an official in the Railway section of the Board of Trade should acquire some personal 
knowledge of the inside of a railway office. This principle of 'seconding' might well be 
extended so as to cover (as is already done in the army) definite periods of study during which 
an official, on leave of absence with full pay, should acquire knowledge useful to his 
department; after which he should show the result of his work, not by the answering of 
examination questions, but by the presentation of a book or report of permanent value.
The grim necessity of providing, after the events of the Boer War, for effective thought in the 
government of the British army produced the War Office Council. The Secretary of State, 
instead of knowing only of those suggestions that reach him through the 'bottle-neck' of his 
senior official's mind, now sits once a week at a table with half a dozen heads of sub-
departments. He hears real discussion; he learns to pick men for higher work; and saves many 
hours of circumlocutory writing. At the same time, owing to a well-known fact in the 
physiology of the human brain, the men who are tired of thinking on paper find a new stimulus 
in the spoken word and the presence of their fellow human beings, just as politicians who are 
tired with talking, find, if their minds are still uninjured, a new stimulus in the silent use of a 
pen.
If this periodical alternation of written and oral discussion is useful in the War Office, it would 
probably be useful in other offices; but no one with sufficient authority to require an answer 
has ever asked if it is so.
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One of the most important functions of a modern Government is the effective publication of 
information, but we have no Department of Publicity, though we have a Stationery Office; and 
it is, for instance, apparently a matter of accident whether any particular Department has or has 
not a Gazette and how and when that Gazette is published. Nor is it any one's business to 
discover and criticise and if necessary co-ordinate the statistical methods of the various official 
publications.
On all these points and many others a small Departmental Committee (somewhat on the lines 
of that Esher Committee which reorganised the War Office in 1904), consisting perhaps of an 
able manager of an Insurance Company, with an open-minded Civil Servant, and a business 
man with experience of commercial and departmental organisation abroad, might suggest such 
improvements as would without increase of expense double the existing intellectual output of 
our Government offices.
But such a Committee will not be appointed unless the ordinary members of parliament, and 
especially the members who advocate a wide extension of collective action, consider much 
more seriously than they do at present the organisation of collective thought. How, for 
instance, are we to prevent or minimise the danger that a body of officials will develop 
'official' habits of thought, and a sense of a corporate interest opposed to that of the majority of 
the people? If a sufficient proportion of the ablest and best equipped young men of each 
generation are to be induced to come into the Government service they must be offered 
salaries which place them at once among the well-to-do classes. How are we to prevent them 
siding consciously or unconsciously on all questions of administration with their economic 
equals? If they do, the danger is not only that social reform will be delayed, but also that 
working men in England may acquire that hatred and distrust of highly educated permanent 
officials which one notices in any gathering of working men in America.
We are sometimes told, now that good education is open to every one, that men of every kind 
of social origin and class sympathy will enter to an increasing extent the higher Civil Service. 
If that takes place it will be an excellent thing, but meanwhile any one who follows the 
development of the existing examination system knows that care is required to guard against 
the danger that preference in marking may, if only from official tradition, be given to subjects 
like Greek and Latin composition, whose educational value is not higher than others, but 
excellence in which is hardly ever acquired except by members of one social class.
It would, of course, be ruinous to sacrifice intellectual efficiency to the dogma of promotion 
from the ranks, and the statesmen of 1870 were perhaps right in thinking that promotion from 
the second to the first division of the service would be in their time so rare as to be negligible. 
But things have changed since then. The competition for the second division has become 
incomparably more severe, and there is no reasonable test under which some of those second 
class officials who have continued their education by means of reading and University 
teaching in the evening would not show, at thirty years of age, a greater fitness for the highest 
work than would be shown by many of those who had entered by the more advanced 
examination.
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But however able our officials are, and however varied their origin, the danger of the 
narrowness and rigidity which has hitherto so generally resulted from official life would still 
remain, and must be guarded against by every kind of encouragement to free intellectual 
development. The German Emperor did good service the other day when he claimed (in a semi-
official communication on the Tweedmouth letter) that the persons who are Kings and 
Ministers in their official capacity have as Fachmänner (experts) other and wider rights in the 
republic of thought. One only wishes that he would allow his own officials after their day's 
work to regroup themselves, in the healthy London fashion, with labour leaders, and colonels, 
and schoolmasters, and court ladies, and members of parliament, as individualists or socialists, 
or protectors of African aborigines, or theosophists, or advocates of a free stage or a free ritual.
The intellectual life of the government official is indeed becoming part of a problem which 
every year touches us all more closely. In literature and science as well as in commerce and 
industry the independent producer is dying out and the official is taking his place. We are 
nearly all of us officials now, bound during our working days, whether we write on a 
newspaper, or teach in a university, or keep accounts in a bank, by restrictions on our personal 
freedom in the interest of a larger organisation. We are little influenced by that direct and 
obvious economic motive which drives a small shopkeeper or farmer or country solicitor to a 
desperate intensity of scheming how to outstrip his rivals or make more profit out of his 
employees. If we merely desire to do as little work and enjoy as much leisure as possible in 
our lives, we all find that it pays us to adopt that steady unanxious 'stroke' which neither 
advances nor retards promotion.
The indirect stimulus, therefore, of interest and variety, of public spirit and the craftsman's 
delight in his skill, is becoming more important to us as a motive for the higher forms of 
mental effort, and threats and promises of decrease or increase of salary less important. And 
because those higher efforts are needed not only for the advantage of the community but for 
the good of our own souls we are all of us concerned in teaching those distant impersonal 
masters of ours who are ourselves how to prevent the opportunity of effective thought from 
being confined to a tiny rich minority, living, like the Cyclops, in irresponsible freedom. If we 
consciously accept the fact that organised work will in future be the rule and unorganised work 
the exception, and if we deliberately adjust our methods of working as well as our personal 
ideals to that condition, we need no longer feel that the direction of public business must be 




I have discussed, in the three preceding chapters, the probable effect of certain existing 
intellectual tendencies on our ideals of political conduct, our systems of representation, and the 
methods which we adopt for securing intellectual initiative and efficiency among our 
professional officials—that is to say, on the internal organisation of the State.
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In this chapter I propose to discuss the effect of the same tendencies on international and inter-
racial relations. But, as soon as one leaves the single State and deals with the interrelation of 
several States, one meets with the preliminary question, What is a State? Is the British Empire, 
or the Concert of Europe, one State or many? Every community in either area now exerts 
political influence on every other, and the telegraph and the steamship have abolished most of 
the older limitations on the further development and extension of that influence. Will the 
process of coalescence go on either in feeling or in constitutional form, or are there any 
permanent causes tending to limit the geographical or racial sphere of effective political 
solidarity, and therefore the size and composition of States?
Aristotle, writing under the conditions of the ancient world, laid it down that a community 
whose population extended to a hundred thousand would no more be a State than would one 
whose population was confined to ten.[95] He based his argument on measurable facts as to the 
human senses and the human memory. The territory of a State must be 'visible as a whole' by 
one eye, and the assembly attended by all the full citizens must be able to hear one voice—
which must be that of an actual man and not of the legendary Stentor. The governing officials 
must be able to remember the faces and characters of all their fellow citizens.[96] He did not 
ignore the fact that nearly all the world's surface as he knew it was occupied by States 
enormously larger than his rule allowed. But he denied that the great barbarian monarchies 
were in the truest sense 'States' at all.
We ourselves are apt to forget that the facts on which Aristotle relied were both real and 
important. The history of the Greek and mediaeval City-States shows how effective a stimulus 
may be given to some of the highest activities and emotions of mankind when the whole 
environment of each citizen comes within the first-hand range of his senses and memory. It is 
now only here and there, in villages outside the main stream of civilisation, that men know the 
faces of their neighbours and see daily as part of one whole the fields and cottages in which 
they work and rest. Yet, even now, when a village is absorbed by a sprawling suburb or 
overwhelmed by the influx of a new industrial population, some of the older inhabitants feel 
that they are losing touch with the deeper realities of life.
A year ago I stood with a hard-walking and hard-thinking old Yorkshire schoolmaster on the 
high moorland edge of Airedale. Opposite to us was the country-house where Charlotte Brontë 
was governess, and below us ran the railway, linking a string of manufacturing villages which 
already were beginning to stretch out towards each other, and threatened soon to extend 
through the valley an unbroken succession of tall chimneys and slate roofs. He told me how, 
within his memory, the old affection for place and home had disappeared from the district. I 
asked whether he thought that a new affection was possible, whether, now that men lived in 
the larger world of knowledge and inference, rather than in the narrower world of sight and 
hearing, a patriotism of books and maps might not appear which should be a better guide to 
life than the patriotism of the village street.
This he strongly denied; as the older feeling went, nothing, he said, had taken its place, or 
would take its place, but a naked and restless individualism, always seeking for personal 
satisfaction, and always missing it. And then, almost in the words of Morris and Ruskin, he 
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began to urge that we should pay a cheap price if we could regain the true riches of life by 
forgetting steam and electricity, and returning to the agriculture of the mediaeval village and 
the handicrafts of the mediaeval town.
He knew and I knew that his plea was hopeless. Even under the old conditions the Greek and 
Italian and Flemish City-States perished, because they were too small to protect themselves 
against larger though less closely organised communities; and industrial progress is an invader 
even more irresistible than the armies of Macedon or Spain. For a constantly increasing 
proportion of the inhabitants of modern England there is now no place where in the old sense 
they 'live.' Nearly the whole of the class engaged in the direction of English industry, and a 
rapidly increasing proportion of the manual workers, pass daily in tram or train between 
sleeping-place and working-place a hundred times more sights than their eyes can take in or 
their memory retain. They are, to use Mr. Wells's phrase, 'delocalised.'[97]
But now that we can no longer use the range of our senses as a basis for calculating the 
possible area of the civilised State, there might seem to be no facts at all which can be used for 
such a calculation. How can we fix the limits of effective intercommunication by steam or 
electricity, or the area which can be covered by such political expedients as representation and 
federalism? When Aristotle wished to illustrate the relation of the size of the State to the 
powers of its citizens he compared it to a ship, which, he said, must not be too large to be 
handled by the muscles of actual men. 'A ship of two furlongs length would not be a ship at 
all.'[98] But the Lusitania is already not very far from a furlong and a half in length, and no one 
can even guess what is the upward limit of size which the ship-builders of a generation hence 
will have reached. If once we assume that a State may be larger than the field of vision of a 
single man, then the merely mechanical difficulty of bringing the whole earth under a 
government as effective as that of the United States or the British Empire has already been 
overcome. If such a government is impossible, its impossibility must be due to the limits not of 
our senses and muscles but of our powers of imagination and sympathy.
I have already pointed out[99] that the modern State must exist for the thoughts and feelings of 
its citizens, not as a fact of direct observation but as an entity of the mind, a symbol, a 
personification, or an abstraction. The possible area of the State will depend, therefore, mainly 
on the facts which limit our creation and use of such entities. Fifty years ago the statesmen 
who were reconstructing Europe on the basis of nationality thought that they had found the 
relevant facts in the causes which limit the physical and mental homogeneity of nations. A 
State, they thought, if it is to be effectively governed, must be a homogeneous 'nation,' because 
no citizen can imagine his State or make it the object of his political affection unless he 
believes in the existence of a national type to which the individual inhabitants of the State are 
assimilated; and he cannot continue to believe in the existence of such a type unless in fact his 
fellow-citizens are like each other and like himself in certain important respects. Bismarck 
deliberately limited the area of his intended German Empire by a quantitative calculation as to 
the possibility of assimilating other Germans to the Prussian type. He always opposed the 
inclusion of Austria, and for a long time the inclusion of Bavaria, on the ground that while the 
Prussian type was strong enough to assimilate the Saxons and Hanoverians to itself, it would 
fail to assimilate Austrians and Bavarians. He said, for instance, in 1866: 'We cannot use these 
Ultramontanes, and we must not swallow more than we can digest.'[100]
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Mazzini believed, with Bismarck, that no State could be well governed unless it consisted of a 
homogeneous nation. But Bismarck's policy of the artificial assimilation of the weaker by the 
stronger type seemed to him the vilest form of tyranny; and he based his own plans for the 
reconstruction of Europe upon the purpose of God, as revealed by the existing correspondence 
of national uniformities with geographical facts. 'God,' he said, 'divided humanity into distinct 
groups or nuclei upon the face of the earth.... Evil governments have disfigured the Divine 
design. Nevertheless you may still trace it, distinctly marked out—at least as far as Europe is 
concerned—by the course of the great rivers, the direction of the higher mountains, and other 
geographical conditions.'[101]
Both Mazzini and Bismarck, therefore, opposed with all their strength the humanitarianism of 
the French Revolution, the philosophy which, as Canning said, 'reduced the nation into 
individuals in order afterwards to congregate them into mobs.'[102] Mazzini attacked the 
'cosmopolitans,' who preached that all men should love each other without distinction of 
nationality, on the ground that they were asking for a psychological impossibility. No man, he 
argued, can imagine, and therefore no one can love, mankind, if mankind means to him all the 
millions of individual human beings. Already in 1836 he denounced the original Carbonari for 
this reason: 'The cosmopolitan,' he then said, 'alone in the midst of the immense circle by 
which he is surrounded, whose boundaries extend beyond the limits of his vision; possessed of 
no other weapons than the consciousness of his rights (often misconceived) and his individual 
faculties—which, however powerful, are incapable of extending their activity over the whole 
sphere of application constituting the aim ... has but two paths before him. He is compelled to 
choose between despotism and inertia.'[103] He quotes the Breton fisherman who, as he puts 
out to sea, prays to God, 'Help me my God! My boat is so small and Thy ocean so wide.'[104]
For Mazzini the divinely indicated nation stood therefore between the individual man and the 
unimaginable multitude of the human race. A man could comprehend and love his nation 
because it consisted of beings like himself 'speaking the same language, gifted with the same 
tendencies and educated by the same historical tradition,'[105] and could be thought of as a 
single national entity. The nation was 'the intermediate term between humanity and the 
individual,'[106] and man could only attain to the conception of humanity by picturing it to 
himself as a mosaic of homogeneous nations. 'Nations are the citizens of humanity as 
individuals are the citizens of the nation,'[107] and again, 'The pact of humanity cannot be 
signed by individuals, but only by free and equal peoples, possessing a name, a banner, and the 
consciousness of a distinct existence.'[108]
Nationalism, as interpreted either by Bismarck or by Mazzini, played a great and invaluable 
part in the development of the political consciousness of Europe during the nineteenth century. 
But it is becoming less and less possible to accept it as a solution for the problems of the 
twentieth century. We cannot now assert with Mazzini, that the 'indisputable tendency of our 
epoch' is towards a reconstitution of Europe into a certain number of homogeneous national 
States 'as nearly as possible equal in population and extent'[109] Mazziui, indeed, 
unconsciously but enormously exaggerated the simplicity of the question even in his own time. 
National types throughout the greater part of south-eastern Europe were not even then divided 
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into homogeneous units by 'the course of the great rivers and the direction of the high 
mountains,' but were intermingled from village to village; and events have since forced us to 
admit that fact. We no longer, for instance, can believe, as Mr. Swinburne and the other 
English disciples of Mazzini and of Kossuth seem to have believed in the eighteen sixties, that 
Hungary is inhabited only by a homogeneous population of patriotic Magyars. We can see that 
Mazzini was already straining his principle to the breaking point when he said in 1852: 'It is in 
the power of Greece ... to become, by extending itself to Constantinople, a powerful barrier 
against the European encroachments of Russia.'[110] In Macedonia to-day bands of Bulgarian 
and Greek patriots, both educated in the pure tradition of Mazzinism, are attempting to 
exterminate the rival populations in order to establish their own claim to represent the 
purposes of God as indicated by the position of the Balkan mountains. Mazzini himself would, 
perhaps, were he living now, admit that, if the Bismarckian policy of artificial assimilation is 
to be rejected, there must continue to be some States in Europe which contain inhabitants 
belonging to widely different national types.
Bismarck's conception of an artificial uniformity created by 'blood and iron' corresponded 
more closely than did Mazzini's to the facts of the nineteenth century. But its practicability 
depended upon the assumption that the members of the dominant nationality would always 
vehemently desire to impose their own type on the rest. Now that the Social-Democrats, who 
are a not inconsiderable proportion of the Prussian population, apparently admire their Polish 
or Bavarian or Danish fellow-subjects all the more because they cling to their own national 
characteristics, Prince Bülow's Bismarckian dictum the other day, that the strength of Germany 
depends on the existence and dominance of an intensely national Prussia, seemed a mere 
political survival. The same change of feeling has also shown itself in the United Kingdom, 
and both the English parties have now tacitly or explicitly abandoned that Anglicisation of 
Ireland and Wales, which all parties once accepted as a necessary part of English policy.
A still more important difficulty in applying the principle that the area of the State should be 
based on homogeneity of national type, whether natural or artificial, has been created by the 
rapid extension during the last twenty-five years of all the larger European states into non-
European territory. Neither Mazzini, till his death in 1872, nor Bismarck, till the colonial 
adventure of 1884, was compelled to take into his calculations the inclusion of territories and 
peoples outside Europe. Neither of them, therefore, made any effective intellectual preparation 
for those problems which have been raised in our time by 'the scramble for the world.' Mazzini 
seems, indeed, to have vaguely expected that nationality would spread from Europe into Asia 
and Africa, and that the 'pact of humanity' would ultimately be 'signed' by homogeneous and 
independent 'nations,' who would cover the whole land surface of the globe. But he never 
indicated the political forces by which that result was to be brought about. The Italian invasion 
of Abyssinia in 1896 might have been represented either as a necessary stage in the Mazzinian 
policy of spreading the idea of nationality to Africa, or as a direct contradiction of that idea 
itself.
Bismarck, with his narrower and more practical intellect, never looked forward, as Mazzini 
did, to a 'pact of humanity,' which should include even the nations of Europe, and, indeed, 
always protested against the attempt to conceive of any relation whatsoever, moral or political, 
as existing between any State and the States or populations outside its boundaries. 'The only 
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sound principle of action,' he said, 'for a great State is political egoism.'[111] When, therefore, 
after Bismarck's death German sailors and soldiers found themselves in contact with the 
defenceless inhabitants of China or East Africa, they were, as the Social-Democrats quickly 
pointed out, provided with no conception of the situation more highly developed than that 
which was acted upon in the fifth century A.D., by Attila and his Huns.
The modern English imperialists tried for some time to apply the idea of national homogeneity 
to the facts of the British Empire. From the publication of Seeley's Expansion of England in 
1883 till the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902 they strove to believe in the existence of a 'Blood,' 
an 'Island Race,' consisting of homogeneous English-speaking individuals, among whom were 
to be reckoned not only the whole population of the United Kingdom, but all the reasonably 
white inhabitants of our colonies and dependencies; while they thought of the other inhabitants 
of the Empire as 'the white man's burden'—the necessary material for the exercise of the white 
man's virtues. The idealists among them, when they were forced to realise that such a 
homogeneity of the whites did not yet exist, persuaded themselves that it would come 
peacefully and inevitably as a result of the reading of imperial poems and the summoning of 
an imperial council. The Bismarckian realists among them believed that it would be brought 
about, in South Africa and elsewhere, by 'blood and iron.' Lord Milner, who is perhaps the 
most loyal adherent of the Bismarckian tradition to be found out of Germany, contended even 
at Vereeniging against peace with the Boers on any terms except such an unconditional 
surrender as would involve the ultimate Anglicisation of the South African colonies. He still 
dreams of a British Empire whose egoism shall be as complete as that of Bismarck's Prussia, 
and warns us in 1907, in the style of 1887, against those 'ideas of our youth' which were 'at 
once too insular and too cosmopolitan.'[112]
But in the minds of most of our present imperialists, imperial egoism is now deprived of its 
only possible psychological basis. It is to be based not upon national homogeneity but upon 
the consciousness of national variation. The French in Canada are to remain intensely French, 
and the Dutch in South Africa intensely Dutch; though both are to be divided from the world 
outside the British Empire by an unbridgeable moral chasm. To imperialism so conceived facts 
lend no support. The loyal acceptance of British Imperial citizenship by Sir Wilfred Laurier or 
General Botha constitutes something more subtle, something, to adapt Lord Milner's phrase, 
less insular but more cosmopolitan than imperial egoism. It does not, for instance, involve an 
absolute indifference to the question whether France or Holland shall be swallowed up by the 
sea.
At the same time the non-white races within the Empire show no signs of enthusiastic 
contentment at the prospect of existing, like the English 'poor' during the eighteenth century, 
as the mere material of other men's virtues. They too have their own vague ideas of 
nationality; and if those ideas do not ultimately break up our Empire, it will be because they 
are enlarged and held in check, not by the sentiment of imperial egoism, but by those wider 
religious and ethical conceptions which pay little heed to imperial or national frontiers. It may, 
however, be objected by our imperial 'Real-politiker' that cosmopolitan feeling is at this 
moment both visionary and dangerous, not because, as Mazzini thought, it is psychologically 
impossible, but because of the plain facts of our military position. Our Empire, they say, will 
have to fight for its existence against a German or a Russian Empire or both together during 
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the next generation, and our only chance of success is to create that kind of imperial sentiment 
which has fighting value. If the white inhabitants of the Empire are encouraged to think of 
themselves as a 'dominant race,' that is to say as both a homogeneous nation and a natural 
aristocracy, they will soon be hammered by actual fighting into a Bismarckian temper of 
imperial 'egoism.' Among the non-white inhabitants of the Empire (since either side in the next 
inter-imperial war will, after its first serious defeat, abandon the convention of only employing 
European troops against Europeans) we must discover and drill those races who like the 
Gurkhas and the Soudanese, may be expected to fight for us and to hate our enemies without 
asking for political rights. In any case we, like Bismarck, must extirpate, as the most fatal 
solvent of empire, that humanitarianism which concerns itself with the interests of our future 
opponents as well as those of our fellow-subjects.
This sort of argument might of course be met by a reductio ad absurdum. If the policy of 
imperial egoism is a successful one it will be adopted by all empires alike, and whether we 
desire it or not, the victor in each inter-imperial war will take over the territory of the loser. 
After centuries of warfare and the steady retrogression, in the waste of blood and treasure and 
loyalty, of modern civilisation, two empires, England and Germany, or America and China, 
may remain. Both will possess an armament which represents the whole 'surplus value,' 
beyond mere subsistence, created by its inhabitants. Both will contain white and yellow and 
brown and black men hating each other across a wavering line on the map of the world. But 
the struggle will go on, and, as the result of a naval Armageddon in the Pacific, only one 
Empire will exist. 'Imperial egoism,' having worked itself out to its logical conclusion, will 
have no further meaning, and the inhabitants of the globe, diminished to half their number, 
will be compelled to consider the problems of race and of the organised exploitation of the 
globe from the point of view of mere humanitarianism.
Is the suggestion completely wanting in practicability that we might begin that consideration 
before the struggle goes any further? Fifteen hundred years ago, in south-eastern Europe, men 
who held the Homoousian opinion of the Trinity were gathered in arms against the 
Homoiousians. The generals and other 'Real-politiker' on both sides may have feared, like 
Lord Milner, lest their followers should become 'too cosmopolitan,' too ready to extend their 
sympathies across the frontiers of theology. 'This' a Homoousian may have said 'is a practical 
matter. Unless our side learn by training themselves in theological egoism to hate the other 
side, we shall be beaten in the next battle.' And yet we can now see that the practical interests 
of Europe were very little concerned with the question whether 'we' or 'they' won, but very 
seriously concerned with the question whether the division itself into 'we' or 'they' could not be 
obliterated by the discovery either of a less clumsy metaphysic or of a way of thinking about 
humanity which made the continued existence of those who disagreed with one in theology no 
longer intolerable. May the Germans and ourselves be now marching towards the horrors of a 
world-war merely because 'nation' and 'empire' like 'Homoousia' and 'Homoiousia' are the best 
that we can do in making entities of the mind to stand between us and an unintelligible 
universe, and because having made such entities our sympathies are shut up within them?
I have already urged, when considering the conditions of political reasoning, that many of the 
logical difficulties arising from our tendency to divide the infinite stream of our thoughts and 
sensations into homogeneous classes and species are now unnecessary and have been avoided 
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in our time by the students of the natural sciences. Just as the modern artist substitutes without 
mental confusion his ever-varying curves and surfaces for the straight and simple lines of the 
savage, so the scientific imagination has learnt to deal with the varying facts of nature without 
thinking of them as separate groups, each composed of identical individuals and represented to 
us by a single type.
Can we learn so to think of the varying individuals of the whole human race? Can we do, that 
is to say, what Mazzini declared to be impossible? And if we can, shall we be able to love the 
fifteen hundred million different human beings of whom we are thus enabled to think?
To the first question the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 offered an answer. Since 
then we have in fact been able to represent the human race to our imagination, neither as a 
chaos of arbitrarily varying individuals, nor as a mosaic of homogeneous nations, but as a 
biological group, every individual in which differs from every other not arbitrarily but 
according to an intelligible process of organic evolution.[113] And, since that which exists for 
the imagination can exist also for the emotions, it might have been hoped that the second 
question would also have been answered by evolution, and that the warring egoisms of nations 
and empires might henceforth have been dissolved by love for that infinitely varying multitude 
whom we can watch as they work their way through so much pain and confusion towards a 
more harmonious relation to the universe.
But it was the intellectual tragedy of the nineteenth century that the discovery of organic 
evolution, instead of stimulating such a general love of humanity, seemed at first to show that 
it was for ever impossible. Progress, it appeared, had been always due to a ruthless struggle for 
life, which must still continue unless progress was to cease. Pity and love would turn the edge 
of the struggle, and therefore would lead inevitably to the degeneration of the species.
This grim conception of an internecine conflict, inevitable and unending, in which all races 
must play their part, hung for a generation after 1859 over the study of world-politics as the 
fear of a cooling sun hung over physics, and the fear of a population to be checked only by 
famine and war hung over the first century of political economy. Before Darwin wrote, it had 
been possible for philanthropists to think of the non-white races as 'men and brothers' who, 
after a short process of education, would become in all respects except colour identical with 
themselves. Darwin made it clear that the difficulty could not be so glossed over. Racial 
variations were shown to be unaffected by education, to have existed for millions of years, and 
to be tending perhaps towards divergence rather than assimilation.
The practical problem also of race relationship has by a coincidence presented itself since 
Darwin wrote in a sterner form. During the first half of the nineteenth century the European 
colonists who were in daily contact with non-European races, although their impulses and their 
knowledge alike revolted from the optimistic ethnology of Exeter Hall, yet could escape all 
thought about their own position by assuming that the problem would settle itself. To the 
natives of Australia or Canada or the Hottentots of South Africa trade automatically brought 
disease, and disease cleared the land for a stronger population. But the weakest races and 
individuals have now died out, the surviving population are showing unexpected powers of 
resisting the white man's epidemics, and we are adding every year to our knowledge of, and 
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therefore our responsibility for, the causation of infection. We are nearing the time when the 
extermination of races, if it is done at all, must be done deliberately.
But if the extermination is to be both inevitable and deliberate how can there exist a 
community either of affection or purpose between the killers and the killed? No one at this 
moment professes, as far as I know, to have an easy and perfect answer to this question. The 
point of ethics lies within the region claimed by religion. But Christianity, which at present is 
the religion chiefly concerned, has conspicuously failed even to produce a tolerable working 
compromise. The official Christian theory is, apparently, that all human souls are of equal 
value, and that it ought to be a matter of indifference to us whether a given territory is 
inhabited a thousand years hence by a million converted Central African pigmies or a million 
equally converted Europeans or Hindus. On the practical point, however, whether the stronger 
race should base its plans of extension on the extermination of the weaker race, or on an 
attempt, within the limits of racial possibility, to improve it, Christians have, during the 
nineteenth century, been infinitely more ruthless than Mohammedans, though their 
ruthlessness has often been disguised by more or less conscious hypocrisy.
But the most immediately dangerous result of political 'Darwinism' was not its effect in 
justifying the extermination of African aborigines by European colonists, but the fact that the 
conception of the 'struggle for life' could be used as a proof that that conflict among the 
European nations for the control of the trade-routes of the world which has been threatening 
for the last quarter of a century is for each of the nations concerned both a scientific necessity 
and a moral duty. Lord Ampthill, for instance, the athletic ex-governor of Madras, said the 
other day: 'From an individual struggle, a struggle of families, of communities, and nations, 
the struggle for existence has now advanced to a struggle of empires.'[114]
The exhilaration with which Lord Ampthill proclaims that one-half of the species must needs 
slaughter the other half in the cause of human progress is particularly terrifying when one 
reflects that he may have to conduct negotiations as a member of the next Conservative 
Government with a German statesman like Prince Büllow, who seems to combine the teaching 
of Bismarck with what he understands to have been the teaching of Darwin when he defends 
the Polish policy of his master by a declaration that the rules of private morality do not apply 
to national conduct.
Any such identification of the biological advantage arising from the 'struggle for life' among 
individuals with that which is to be expected from a 'struggle of empires' is, of course, 
thoroughly unscientific. The 'struggle of empires' must either be fought out between European 
troops alone, or between Europeans in combination with their non-European allies and 
subjects. If it takes the first form, and if we assume, as Lord Ampthill probably does, that the 
North European racial type is 'higher' than any other, then the slaughter of half a million 
selected Englishmen and half a million selected Germans will clearly be an act of biological 
retrogression. Even if the non-European races are brought in and a corresponding number of 
selected Turks and Arabs and Tartars, or of Gurkhas and Pathans and Soudanese are 
slaughtered, the biological loss to the world, as measured by the percentage of surviving 
'higher' or 'lower' individuals will only be slightly diminished.
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Nor is that form of the argument much better founded which contends that the evolutionary 
advantage to be expected from the 'struggle of empires' is the 'survival' not of races but of 
political and cultural types. Our victory over the German Empire, for instance, would mean, it 
is said, a victory for the idea of political liberty. This argument, which, when urged by the 
rulers of India, sounds somewhat temerarious, requires the assumption that types of culture are 
in the modern world most successfully spread by military occupation. But in the ancient world 
Greek culture spread most rapidly after the fall of the Greek Empire; Japan in our own time 
adopted Western culture more readily as an independent nation than she would have done as a 
dependency of Russia or France; and India is perhaps more likely to-day to learn from Japan 
than from England.
Lord Ampthill's phrase, however, represents not so much an argument, as a habit of feeling 
shared by many who have forgotten or never known the biological doctrine which it echoes. 
The first followers of Darwin believed that the human species had been raised above its 
prehuman ancestors because, and in so far as, it had surrendered itself to a blind instinct of 
conflict. It seemed, therefore, as if the old moral precept that men should control their more 
violent impulses by reflection had been founded upon a mistake. Unreflecting instinct was, 
after all, the best guide, and nations who acted instinctively towards their neighbours might 
justify themselves like the Parisian ruffians of ten years ago, by claiming to be 'strugforlifeurs.'
If this habit of mind is to be destroyed it must be opposed not merely by a new argument but 
by a conception of man's relation to the universe which creates emotional force as well as 
intellectual conviction.
And the change that has already shown itself in our conception of the struggle for life among 
individuals indicates that, by some divine chance, a corresponding change may come in our 
conception of the struggle between peoples. The evolutionists of our own time tell us that the 
improvement of the biological inheritance of any community is to be hoped for, not from the 
encouragement of individual conflict, but from the stimulation of the higher social impulses 
under the guidance of the science of eugenics; and the emotional effect of this new conception 
is already seen in the almost complete disappearance from industrial politics of that 
unwillingly brutal 'individualism' which afflicted kindly Englishmen in the eighteen sixties.
An international science of eugenics might in the same way indicate that the various races 
should aim, not at exterminating each other, but at encouraging the improvement by each of its 
own racial type. Such an idea would not appeal to those for whom the whole species arranges 
itself in definite and obvious grades of 'higher' and 'lower,' from the northern Europeans 
downwards, and who are as certain of the ultimate necessity of a 'white world' as the Sydney 
politicians are of the necessity of a 'white Australia.' But in this respect during the last few 
years the inhabitants of Europe have shown signs of a new humility, due partly to widespread 
intellectual causes and partly to the hard facts of the Russo-Japanese war and the arming of 
China. The 'spheres of influence' into which we divided the Far East eight years ago, seem to 
us now a rather stupid joke, and those who read history are already bitterly ashamed that we 
destroyed by the sack of the Summer Palace in 1859, the products of a thousand years of such 
art as we can never hope to emulate. We are coming honestly to believe that the world is richer 
for the existence both of other civilisations and of other racial types than our own. We have 
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been compelled by the study of the Christian documents to think of our religion as one only 
among the religions of the world, and to acknowledge that it has owed much and may owe 
much again to the longer philosophic tradition and the subtler and more patient brains of 
Hindustan and Persia. Even if we look at the future of the species as a matter of pure biology, 
we are warned by men of science that it is not safe to depend only on one family or one variety 
for the whole breeding-stock of the world. For the moment we shrink from the interbreeding of 
races, but we do so in spite of some conspicuous examples of successful interbreeding in the 
past, and largely because of our complete ignorance of the conditions on which success 
depends.
Already, therefore, it is possible without intellectual dishonesty to look forward to a future for 
the race which need not be reached through a welter of blood and hatred. We can imagine the 
nations settling the racial allocation of the temperate or tropical breeding-grounds, or even 
deliberately placing the males and females of the few hopelessly backward tribes on different 
islands, without the necessity that the most violent passions of mankind should be stimulated 
in preparation for a general war. No one now expects an immediate, or prophesies with 
certainty an ultimate, Federation of the Globe; but the consciousness of a common purpose in 
mankind, or even the acknowledgment that such a common purpose is possible, would alter 
the face of world-politics at once. The discussion at the Hague of a halt in the race of 
armaments would no longer seem Utopian, and the strenuous profession by the colonising 
powers that they have no selfish ends in view might be transformed from a sordid and useless 
hypocrisy into a fact to which each nation might adjust its policy. The irrational race-hatred 
which breaks out from time to time on the fringes of empire, would have little effect in world 
politics when opposed by a consistent conception of the future of human progress.
Meanwhile, it is true, the military preparations for a death-struggle of empires still go on, and 
the problem even of peaceful immigration becomes yearly more threatening, now that 
shipping companies can land tens of thousands of Chinese or Indian labourers for a pound or 
two a head at any port in the world. But when we think of such things we need no longer feel 
ourselves in the grip of a Fate that laughs at human purpose and human kindliness. An idea of 
the whole existence of our species is at last a possible background to our individual 
experience. Its emotional effect may prove to be not less than that of the visible temples and 
walls of the Greek cities, although it is formed not from the testimony of our eyesight, but 
from the knowledge which we acquire in our childhood and confirm by the half-conscious 
corroboration of our daily life.
We all of us, plain folk and learned alike, now make a picture for ourselves of the globe with 
its hemispheres of light and shadow, from every point of which the telegraph brings us hourly 
news, and which may already be more real to us than the fields and houses past which we 
hurry in the train. We can all see it, hanging and turning in the monstrous emptiness of the 
skies, and obedient to forces whose action we can watch hundreds of light-years away and feel 
in the beating of our hearts. The sharp new evidence of the camera brings every year nearer to 
us its surface of ice and rock and plain, and the wondering eyes of alien peoples.
It may be that we shall long continue to differ as to the full significance of this vision. But now 
that we can look at it without helpless pain it may stir the deepest impulses of our being. To 
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some of us it may bring confidence in that Love that Dante saw, 'which moves the Sun and the 
other Stars.' To each of us it may suggest a kinder pity for all the bewildered beings who hand 
on from generation to generation the torch of conscious life.
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